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Sharon Victory - What Next?
by Adam Keller & Beate Zilversmidt
So, these most miserable elections ended as expected. What
would have seemed an implausible nightmare but a few months ago is now
sober reality:
Ariel Sharon has been elected Prime Minister of Israel.
Still, this result is not so much the victory of a notorious hard-liner as
it is the defeat of the failing incumbent. Barak, the man who spoke peace
but went to war, was not so much defeated by the opposition as by himself.
As no leader of the right could have possibly have done, it was Barak who
fatally broke up and demoralized the peace constituency, driving a large
part of his former voters into boycotting the elections or casting blank
ballots. The Arab citizens of Israel - a community which gave Barak 95% of
its vote in 1999, more than any other segment of Israeli society - already
hurt by Barak's patronizing attitude and his pointed refusal to include
them in his cabinet, were traumatized by his police shooting down 13
demonstrators in the Arab villages and towns of northern Israel. And also
among Jewish voters of the peace camp, the Blank Ballot option - hitherto
promoted only by marginal groups - became widely attractive. Barak's camp
was a depressed, a split camp - with the "in spite of
everything" voters and the ones who decided to boycott an election
where the choice was between bad and worse.
For Sharon to have such a smashing victory over Barak it
was enough to have his own constituency turn up. He could count on his own
party as well as on the ultra-right and the religious. Where most election
campaigns are directed towards the "middle of the road" Ariel
Sharon this time didn't have to make much of an effort to convince this
sector.
In the one and a half year of his term, Barak did raise
some positive ideas, some of them actually taboo-breaking - but until his
last day in office seriousness about actually carrying them out remained
uncertain. He failed to build trust with the Palestinians (or for that
matter, with many sections of the Israeli society), nor did he implement a
single one of the many far reaching concessions which he verbally
espoused. Meanwhile, he did continue with the policy of settlement
extension and confiscation of Palestinian lands, destruction of
Palestinian houses. And when after the September provocation, Palestinians
on Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif burst out in anger Barak reacted with what
the UN Security Council rightfully condemned as an excessive use of force,
though Barak himself termed it "a policy of restraint."
A restraint which led to seven deaths on the very first
day, reaching a total of nearly 400 in the following months, many of them
children - not to mention thousands of wounded, a large part of them
crippled for life; hundreds of destroyed houses; tens of thousands of
felled trees; closure, siege and curfew reducing millions to poverty and
hardship... Barak's conduct - making concessions, but just too little to
get an agreement, and then accusing his Arab interlocutors of
intransigence - has discredited peace among the Israeli population,
thereby paving the way for Sharon.
The peace movement was simply too divided.
Many of his most enthusiastic supporters in 1999 felt
unable to vote back into office a prime minister who launched the worst
wave of repression since Israel occupied these territories in 1967. And
the others weren't really enthusiastic, even if they did vote for
"the lesser evil." Indeed, Ariel Sharon's CV stretches from the
massacre of Palestinian civilians at Quibya in 1953 to the massacre of
Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila in 1982; and once the Kahan
Commission of Inquiry excluded him from involvement in military matters he
found other ways to deserve the nickname "the bulldozer."
It should have been easy enough to frighten the Israeli
electorate by no more than factually recounting Sharon's career. In fact,
the considerable efforts made in this direction by Barak's best
propagandists failed against one simple consideration: Sharon's war had
taken place nearly twenty years ago, and much of the electorate are too
young to remember or had lived in Russia at the time. The war with the
Palestinians, a war of Barak's own making, is taking place right here and
now.
The debate over these elections, which absorbed peace
activists in an often acrimonious debate, has this evening become moot.
After these results, the Israeli peace movement has immediately to rebuild
its inner coherence - to be able to confront the bleak new reality. In
fact, opposition to the new regime has started already a few days before
the elections, when the polls already left little doubt about the results.
Last Saturday thousands marched across Jerusalem, under driving rain, to
commemorate the 18th anniversary of the murder of Emil Grunszweig - the
peace activist killed by a Sharon follower during a 1983 demonstration
demanding Sharon's resignation from the Defence Ministry. A day later,
seventeen among hundreds of protesting activists were arrested when
blocking the road in front of the Defence Ministry to protest the cruel
siege of the Palestinian population. And the Yesh Gvul movement reports a
great increase in the number of soldiers refusing service in the occupied
territories ever since Sharon started to show a lead in the polls.
One more thing: also this new prime minister will soon
struggle with the impossibility in this polarized country to create a
stable government. There is an inevitable contradiction between the
interests of the ultra-orthodox and the Russian immigrants who are adamant
against religious coercion - and Sharon will need them both. More
important, Sharon will need to face the insurgent Palestinians and unveil
the practical solutions which he has to offer - as he carefully avoided
doing throughout the elections campaign.
Sharon's career over the past four decades leaves little
doubt about what his natural tendency would lead him to do: to increase
the brutal oppression of the Palestinians even beyond the levels to which
Barak already resorted. That is certainly what the settlers and other
Sharon allies on the extreme right expect of him - but that road could
lead to an all-out regional war, to Israel's international isolation and a
deep rift in Israeli society. Avigdor Liebermann of the quasi--Fascist
"National Unity Party", who may get a senior portfolio in the
Sharon cabinet, already set it out in vivid colours, in a newspaper
interview which was highly embarrassing to the Sharon campaign: reconquest
of the Palestinian enclaves, all-out regional war, Israeli planes bombing
from Cairo to Teheran... Alternately, Sharon may strive to create a
moderate image, and make some superficial conciliatory gestures at the
outset of his term; but there is no way he can reopen serious negotiations
with the Palestinians - even were he so inclined - without unraveling his
own constituency.
A Sharon cabinet would be weak and unsteady, torn by
internal contradictions and commanding only a slender parliamentary
majority, and with his rival, former PM Binyamin Netanyahu, constantly
breathing down Sharon's neck. Should the Labour Party resist the
temptation of joining Sharon in a "National Unity" cabinet, so
as to change it "from within" - an option which was almost
openly discussed even during the elections campaign itself - and should it
succeed in replacing Barak by a leader not tainted with colossal failure,
it stands a good chance of recovering from the fiasco and contesting a new
set of elections in the not-too- distant future. After all, the same
opinion polls which predicted today's results have also clearly indicated
that repudiation of Barak does not necessarily imply rejection of the
peace process.
On the contrary: even while Sharon was climbing higher and
higher in the polls, a steady 65% to 70% majority in the same polls
expressed themselves in favour of continuing the peace process. And Shimon
Peres, a Labourite with a much more dovish image than Barak, had done much
better than him in the polls and could have faced Sharon on much more
equal terms - though Barak obstinately rejected all pleas and entreaties
to let this possibility be put to the electoral test.
Today's results - while a grave set-back which could cost
the lives of many - did not alter the basic ingredients of the situation -
neither the Palestinians' determination to obtain sovereign statehood on
their own soil, nor the disinclination of most Israelis to sacrifice their
soldier sons in the cause of denying the Palestinians that statehood. And
that disinclination certainly includes also many of those who today voted
Sharon.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001
The Other Israel
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