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Bombing for...What?
by Alan Bock
Was I the only one who sensed
a sort of plaintive-ness in the president’s assertion? "The no-fly
zones are enforced on a daily basis," said George W. as he touched
lightly on the decision of British and American warplanes to dump bombs on
targets outside the no-fly zone. "It’s part of a strategy."
You could almost hear him
saying to himself something like "At least I hope it is. I hope my
advisers and the Brits aren’t completely out to lunch on this one. If
we’ve been doing it for 10 years there must be some sensible reason for
it. Right?"
If President Bush had some
private doubts as to whether there really is a strategy or whether
stepping up the bombing of the evil Saddam (or those already victimized by
his regime) he would have been correct. The question Americans should be
asking – they aren’t getting much help from most elements of the
establishment media or their anointed talking heads – is fairly simple
but not easy to answer. Just what core American interest is involved in
maintaining no-fly zones over Iraqi territory 10 years after Bush I
decided to end the Gulf War when he did – after the Iraqis were driven
out of Kuwait but before anything resembling an offensive further into
Iraq could be implemented?
Protecting The Interests of
Others?
There has been speculation
about which interests really might be benefited by expanding the bombing
of Iraq – and at least according to Tuesday’s news possibly expanding
it more in the near future.
Some say it helps oil
interests, and one of the immediate consequences of the bombing was an up-tick
in world oil prices due to speculation that Iraq would take what it has on
offer off the world market. This was followed by speculation that the OPEC
oil cartel of governments is almost ready to order production cutbacks,
which would drive world oil prices up even more. So at least in the short
run the bombing seems to have worked to increase the future incomes of oil
producers.
Some say the real concern here
is the security of Israel. Upon Ariel Sharon’s election as prime
minister in Israel Saddam Hussein announced that he would be accepting
volunteers for a huge volunteer army to conduct a mighty jihad that would
finally drive the nasty Jews out of Jerusalem. Most observers believe he
was bluffing, but, some would-be analysts speculate, a few bombs near
Baghdad might send the message that he better not. The irony is that the
most immediate aftermath has been the issuance of gas masks in Israel in
anticipation of the possibility that Saddam’s threatened retaliation for
the U.S.-British bombing raids might involve some sort of violent
incursion against Israel.
Some say that the bombing was
really pushed by the British, that Royal Air Force pilots had noticed more
potshots and closer misses at British planes in the last month or so and
had demanded stern action by their government. So the anglophilic
internationalists in charge of foreign policy at the erstwhile breakaway
colony responded when the Motherland called. The Brits seem to be pleased
with developments and ready to ask the U.S. to bomb some more. So maybe it
serves British interests.
Given the opposition to and
criticism of the expanded bombing from European countries like France and
Russia and what seems to be renewed support for Saddam Hussein (who had
been something of a forgotten factor in the Middle East equation) among
ordinary Arabs throughout the Middle East, you might argue that the
bombing benefited Saddam. Whether the demonstrations reflected genuine and
widespread pro-Saddam sentiment in the West Bank, Jordan and elsewhere
(it’s likely most Middle Eastern Arabs know he’s no prize, even as
most Democrats in this country always knew Clinton was a scoundrel)
demonstrations did take place and did bolster Saddam’s prestige. The
coalition Bush I cobbled together to support the Gulf War in 1990 has
disintegrated, with many key members actively criticizing Britain and the
United States.
Where is US National Interest?
So a number of entities might
stand to benefit from the expanded bombs over Baghdad. But what benefit
does the United States get? What core national interest of the United
States is so clearly at stake that the only choice is to drop bombs? What
interest of US citizens and consumers will be advanced by this action?
As nearly as I can tell, the
only US interest in keeping up the pressure on Saddam is so vague as to be
almost impossible to express in a concrete fashion. It shows we mean
business and won’t be pushed around by a tinpot tyrant? It shows that
the new president is a willing to drop bombs as the last president? It
enhances our prestige as a firm opponent of the evil Saddam? It reinforces
our sense of the leadership that befits a superpower?
One could assert any of the
above and expect nothing but softballs from most of the media. But one
would be hard-pressed to make anything resembling an intellectually
respectable case that any of the above are core interests of the United
States (whatever those are) or that dropping bombs outside the no-fly zone
was the only or even the best way to advance those interests, vague as
they are.
Thinking Trans-nationally
One of the reasons US leaders
so seldom spend time or energy trying to determine or defend the US
national interest is that they have fallen into the trap of our times when
it comes to international relations. Having been educated in state schools
or private schools that endorse a statist agenda, they have come to
believe as an article of faith – the kind of thing that is considered so
self-evident that serious argument isn’t required – that nationalism
is passé at best and a cover for isolationism or the lust to indulge in
something like ethnic cleansing at least.
There are two way one could
view international relations. (Well, actually there are dozens of ways and
numerous qualifications one might put on the bifurcation I’m
propounding, but I’m trying to simplify to get to something like
principles here.)
The first uses a metaphor some
have proposed for a free society. Some people say a genuinely free and
civil society is one in which I control 100 percent of my own actions and
resources and 0 percent of the actions and resources of others – which
obliges me to work with others on the basis of mutual agreement rather
than through plunder or putting a gun to their heads. Nobody who uses this
metaphor believes that such a balance has been achieved anywhere in the
world’s history, and some doubt that it will ever be achieved. But it
offers an ideal toward which those who want to see freedom practiced as
well as celebrated can aspire.
Translating the metaphor to
the international sphere one would suggest that a proper international
order is one in which each national entity is viewed as being 100 percent
sovereign within its own borders and exercises 0 percent sovereignty over
other countries. There are still college international relations courses
in which this ideal is taught as the basis of international relations and
international law properly understood – and in a few cases as a
description of the world as it is. But while nobody believes the 100-zero
balance is likely to be achieved – some countries will always be more
influential than others even if they don’t employ coercion to impose
their will – this is one possible way to envision a properly run world.
The other possible way to view
the international order is to think trans-nationally – to view
nationalism and the nation-state as a relic, or as a stepping-stone on the
path to the kind of institutions that are really needed to ensure peace in
the world – a powerful world government, or at least powerful
institutions like the U.N. that can enforce universal standards on
recalcitrant nation-states that just haven’t been enlightened yet.
Buying The New World Order
I would contend that most
policymakers and scholars in international relations, at least in the
United States, buy into the second view of the world to one degree or
another. And not only do they see their mission of enlightenment to
embrace building powerful international institutions with the will and the
resources to slap the recalcitrant into line, they see this vision –
ever more powerful international or transnational institutions – as the
only alternative to a cramped, cribbed, bigoted, inward-looking, backward
and unenlightened isolationism.
So when they look at the world
out there, most US policymakers of both major parties seldom even think
about anything so "narrow" as the US national interest. It’s
far more enlightened and forward-looking to have a global vision, one that
places the interests of transnational institutions, or the needs of a
famine-stricken population (although not the ones caused by US or UN
sanctions), or the vision of peace enforced by a proper centralized
peacemaking world body ahead of mere US interests. And they do this so
automatically that they hardly know they are doing it.
As suggested, this is not the
only possible paradigm for international relations. Indeed, a strong case
could be made that peace and progress are more likely in a world in which
the first paradigm – treat all countries as sovereign within their
borders, maintain trade and tourism policies that are as open and
unrestricted as possible and keep political and military entanglements to
a minimum – governed the actions of most statesmen.
Unfortunately, most American
elites have fallen into the habit of equating internationalism with trans-nationalism.
So they do all manner of things that have no relationship to US interests
but instead serve some vague and vaporous transnational agenda.
Alan Bock is Senior
Essayist at the Orange County Register, a
weekly columnist for WorldNetDaily
and a regular contributor to Antiwar.com.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001 Alan
Bock & Antiwar.com
by the same author:
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