|
|
|
Immoral Science and my Nuclear Odyssey: The World Behind the Security Fence
An Appeal to all
Scientists Worldwide
by Andreas Toupadakis
On January 31 of this year, I
resigned from a permanent, highly paid, classified position in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) in California. I went to LLNL believing that I would be
useful in helping to dismantle nuclear weapons and in disposing of their
deadly byproducts. That was my desire. Instead, very soon, I found myself
expected to work on the maintenance of nuclear weapons. When I realized
that within the Lab, environmental or nonproliferation work was but an
illusion, I decided to resign. My conscience simply does not allow me to
work for the development or maintenance of nuclear weapons. I believe that
if a foundation or institution is corrupt you must wash your hands and
withdraw from it. Today I would like to tell you my story.
I was born and raised in
Rethymno, a city of Crete, one of the many beautiful islands of Greece. My
ancestors were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. I learned from them my
first lessons, that "Science without virtue is immoral" (in fact it is a
fountain of evil!) and that I should know myself. I received my Ph.D. in
Chemistry from the University of Michigan in 1990. Since then I have spent
my career as a chemist in two national labs, in industry, and in academia.
After receiving my Ph.D., I
began my search for a job. I was invited for an interview by Amoco in
Naperville, Illinois and was impressed that they had a limousine to bring
me to my hotel. That is called corporate luring. There were other
interviews by Dow Chemical and by Dow Corning in Midland, Michigan, and by
some other smaller companies around Ann Arbor. A trip to the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LLNL) to interview for a post-doctoral position was
fascinating. First of all, the landscape was extraordinary. I had never
seen the sky so big and blue, and the unique green color of the little
green that there is there. During this trip, I also met Dr. Gregory Kubas,
whose work in sulfur dioxide and hydrogen had fascinated me when I had
read his papers before meeting him. His unique combination of child-like
character and great intelligence made me think for the first time in my
life that it is possible for an educated man, especially in the sciences,
to still maintain a child-like heart even at the age of 50. I felt that I
could work with him forever.
Next there was a fellowship
announcement from the Michelson Laboratory in China Lake, California for
which I applied by writing a proposal on organometallic cadmium and
mercury species, although I knew nothing about their use for night-time
war plane sensors. At that time, we had taken out a lot of loans because I
was a graduate student and my wife was only working part-time in order to
take care of our two small children. I thought industry could provide the
best solution to our financial problems. Also, getting into academia was
not easy at the time even though I had excellent letters of
recommendation. I received two offers from my applications and to my
amazement both were post-doctoral government jobs. From Michelson
laboratory I received pamphlets with warplanes on the covers and I lost
any desire to do basic research for them, so I did not accept their offer.
I finally had no choice but to accept the LANL offer with Dr. Gregory
Kubas. I was glad because I liked Greg very much as a person and as a
scientist. The work was purely basic research with no connection to
weapons programs, but I had no idea what the future would hold for me
eight years later because of my association with Los Alamos National
Laboratory. Looking back I know now that these purely academic projects
are sustained in order to lure young scientists into the national labs. I
heard this in plain language one Thanksgiving afternoon, sitting around
the table with senior weapons scientists: "We need new blood to carry on
our weapons research; we need new post-docs in purely basic research". It
was not a surprise that at that time a post-doc in academia was making
around $18,000/year, but at Los Alamos National Lab I started with
$35,000, certainly good bait to attract new scientists.
We arrived in Los Alamos in
the summer of 1990. The family settled and I started working. My working
experience with Dr. Gregory Kubas was the best I have ever had. But the
system was not working. Despite his continual efforts to obtain a hood for
me, I never got one during my entire stay in Los Alamos as a Post-Doc. I
did all my work on the bench with a vacuum line and I breathed a lot of
organic solvents and sulfur dioxide, an extremely noxious gas. I had to
use glassware that other researchers were using for radioactive chemistry,
even though I myself was not working on radioactive chemistry. One day I
left the door of my lab open in order to be able to breathe when a staff
member passing by said: "Close your doors, don't you see the sign?" I did
not argue because I already knew that she did not have much sympathy for
those below her, especially for foreigners. I had talked about this with a
lab-mate from another country and he had felt the same way.
Someone suggested that I work
in a nearby hood, but I did not take their advice because radioactive
waste was stored there. A few months later, I noticed a spill on the floor
next to that hood and I talked to my roommate. He brought a device and
found that it was radioactive. He called the decontamination service and
they came and put yellow ribbons around the area until they cleaned it up.
Technical area 21 (TA21) in Los Alamos was as old as the first atomic
bomb. One day the room where basic research was done on radioactive
elements was flooded because of some failure overnight. Our desks were in
rooms next to rusty drums holding radioactive waste. No one would speak
because everyone was hoping for a staff position. The work environment was
totally unacceptable even though there was much talk about safety. In
addition to all the other problems, almost every time I wanted to run a
reaction, the cooling water system was down. I could not do much work.
Eventually I left, with only one publication.
During that period the Iraq
war was going on, and seeing the insanity of the action, I wept at my
desk, hiding my eyes from my roommates because I was embarrassed. At that
time, I could not connect the mission of the national labs with the
brutality of the war. I accepted an offer from Dow Corning in the spring
of 1991 and left LANL. During my two years with Dow Corning I lived in the
place of proprietary information and secrecy for profit. The breast
implant issue was on the news almost daily and the word about bankruptcy
and likely layoffs was going around, and in fact they did file for
bankruptcy later after I left. I realized that everything there was done
for profit and not for the wellbeing of humans. The vision of the company
was to put a deodorant in the hand of every African and Asian citizen. I
was shocked to recognize their plans while at the same time they talked
about integrity. By then, I was really disappointed about being a chemist.
I was providing my skills to immoral science, helping the company make
profits at the expense of the uneducated public.
At that point, we decided to
go back to my native country to be closer to family and to give my
daughters the opportunity to become more familiar with their roots, their
second language, and their grandparents and relatives. My wife and I
taught at the University of Crete for two years, which we enjoyed greatly,
even though the salary was quite low according to American standards.
Eventually, after 2 1/2 years, we decided to come back to the USA,
however, because we missed living in a multicultural society where
open-mindedness and original thought were more common. After having lived
in the U.S. for fifteen years at that point, I had grown used to that
aspect of life here.
I used my previous connection
with Dr. Kubas and I obtained a six-month contract as a visiting scientist
at LANL. I did basic research on hydrogen chemistry, and published a
paper. The working conditions at this time were many times worse, even
though I now had a hood. After another radioactive flooding incident, they
began demolishing radioactive rooms in the building we were still working
in. After the six-month contract period, I would again be without a job.
At that time, I had an interview with the Nuclear Materials Technology
Division and I was offered a contract job to evaluate data on the
chemistry and properties of plutonium-containing residues produced at
Department of Energy nuclear weapons production facilities during the
cold-war era. This was the so-called "94-1" project. My official work
assignment was: "Work on defining storage criteria for actinide materials
and residues. This work will include, but will not be limited to,
adsorption/desorption phenomena, kinetics of gas solid reactions in
actinide materials and possibly include theoretical modeling of the
above." Formally I belonged to the Pit Disassembly Team in the Weapons
Component Technology Group, NMT-5, but my work was strictly on
environmental issues. I was given a security clearance because it was more
convenient to be inside the plutonium facility than outside.
When I was hired for the 94-1
contractor job, two technical people, Dr. Dove and Mr. Hawk interviewed
me. Mr. Hawk told me that Dr. Dove was a very good actinide chemist and
that he would be my mentor. From Dr. Dove I was able to learn very quickly
the special chemistry of the project. Dr. Dove was extremely knowledgeable
about actinide chemistry and a very meticulous scientist with integrity. I
had fun working with him. With Mr. Hawk, I hardly had any technical
discussion because he was more interested in running the program than
dealing with its technical aspects. After several months, I was shocked
when Mr. Hawk told me not to talk to Dr. Dove anymore and that he did not
want Dr. Dove's name in the reports anymore. I had the sense that if I did
not obey his command, I could lose my job overnight. It made me think
about many things. I continued writing my reports. One day Mr. Hawk came
into my office and when he saw me working on a graph he commented, "So you
are doing some science!" From a few conversations that I had with him, I
could see that he was not aware of the basics on the project as Dr. Dove
was; in fact he seemed to care only about seeing the project go his way,
no matter what the facts were. We frequently had meetings at Sandia Labs
in Albuquerque with DOE representatives, and in these meetings I was asked
to give presentations. Several times, I was asked by Mr. Hawk to present
falsified results. In order to avoid telling lies, I delayed my arrival at
the meetings. When I talked to a man from a different DOE site about my
problem, I could see that he understood but he could not do anything about
it. I could see that the whole project was led by a small number of people
driven by personal ego and politics. The DOE people from headquarters
seemed knowledgeable and wise, but the DOE people from Albuquerque
appeared to be driven only by ego. Several times in these meetings the
exchange of words between these groups became explosive and preposterous.
I was working in a windowless
basement room with two other people. Dr. Victim was a post-doc working in
the plutonium facility and was doing work in the steel boxes. One day it
happened. He forgot about a tiny opening for a few seconds and that was
it. He inhaled a small dose of radioactive material and was brought to the
hospital by the group leader for treatment that night. It was on the local
news. Dr. Victim was fired within one month and was gone: contaminated and
without a job. I never heard of him again. The contaminated room had to be
cleaned up quickly, before it spread to other rooms of the building. Teams
of people from our group were formed to go in and clean it up. They took
turns because it was dangerous to stay for too long. I kept getting e-mail
messages urging me to participate but I had made up my mind not to because
I was not trained and I had never gone into these rooms before. They told
me that they would train me within hours but I kept silent. The next day I
heard that someone had fallen from a ladder and had been contaminated.
That made me more determined not to participate in the cleanup effort.
Because of the contamination, all the computers and some very expensive
instrumentation had to be disposed of. The culture was such that it made
you think that if you were not a hero in the cleanup effort, you would not
have a chance to get a staff position. One night at about the same time in
a different building, there was a large explosion followed by fire. It was
said that if people had been around they would have been killed.
Apparently because of the extreme secrecy of the project involved, samples
had been mislabeled and put in the wrong ovens.
The rumors at this point were
that money for environmental work was not coming in and that I could be
without work overnight. We had just bought a house and my wife had only a
part time job. I was advised that my chances for work would be much better
if I would be trained as a radioactive materials handler and start working
in the plutonium facility. I could see where I was going but felt that I
had no other choice. Once again, it was like being in hell. I took all the
training in order to be able to work in the boxes. After many hours of
training, I was astonished at the deception. The reading materials that
every worker had to read and be examined on stated that radiation is just
like the sunlight; in fact airline stewardesses could get higher doses
than plutonium workers could. But if this was true, why had there been
such a commotion after the little accident with Dr. Victim?
I started working in the
plutonium facility. I could not believe how I had found myself in that
position, having to handle radioactive waste in a place worse than hell
because of the hundreds of regulations about safety and security concerns.
I was in a state of despair. I started believing that I was getting
physically sick and I had panic attacks that I would die. I could not talk
to anyone, not even to my wife, because I did not want to make her worry.
This went on for months, until my many efforts to secure a staff position
had failed. In one way I was relieved; on the other hand, I was again in a
state of nowhere to go. I had applied to every college and high school in
Los Alamos, Santa Fe and even in Albuquerque. I could not get hired in
public school because I did not have teaching certification. I had only
one offer from a community college in Albuquerque with a very small
salary. We decided we could not afford to make ends meet with that salary
and we would have to move to a place we really did not like. My team
leader came to my rescue when she told me that someone in Livermore was
looking for a chemist and that I should write to him. I did. I was given
an interview and I was offered the job after a few weeks. I would have a
starting salary of $7200 per month, a one-time hiring bonus in the amount
of $10,000 payable within 30 days of my start date, and the best benefits
you could get. I was never told what I would be working on and I assumed
that it would be similar to what I had been doing in Los Alamos, working
in the environmental area. When I was writing my cover letter I wanted to
state the code number for the job and I called the Lab. I got the code #
and I went on the web to read the job description. I saw that it was not
really environmental and it was not a good match with my background, so I
called again and expressed my concern. I was told that it did not really
matter because the Lab was planning to change the description anyway, so I
assumed that all this was just a formality and that I did not have to pay
much attention. But when I arrived, I soon realized that I was working in
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, maintaining the nuclear arsenal. What
exactly is the DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program? Here are two quotes that
show very clearly the aggressiveness of the program and its
incompatibility with the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaties signed
by the USA government:
1) The Department of Energy
will ensure the safety, security and reliability of the enduring
stockpile, without nuclear tests... through the vigorous implementation of
the integrated Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a scientific
and technical challenge perhaps as formidable as the Manhattan Project.
-- Testimony of Dr. Victor Reis, (former) DOE Assistant Secretary of
Defense Programs to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1997.
2) Our tools under stockpile
stewardship are working so well today that we are not only able to certify
safety and reliability... but we are also able to meet new military
requirements. -- Interview with Undersecretary of Energy Ernest Moniz in
Air Force Magazine, February 2000.
The Stockpile Stewardship
Program has many facets, one of which is to analyze the aging processes of
the materials used in nuclear weapons, such as high explosives, uranium,
plutonium, organic materials, and polymers. I belonged to the Chemistry
and Materials Science Directorate, to the Chemistry and Chemical
Engineering division and to the Weapon Materials Compatibility and Aging
Group (WMCA). I was trapped once again. During the first months I traveled
to several DOE production-sites, I met many people, and I did a lot of
reading; I found myself again in a state of despair. By the end of the
year, I was asked to write proposals for the Stockpile Stewardship program
and that was it. I knew I would never do that. I started looking for a
different job, perhaps in environmental or nonproliferation work. My
supervisor, a very good person, could see my struggle and I was told that
I was free to decide to either stay with him or look for a different job.
I remembered his words during my interview: "If it turns out you do not
like the job, there are many other opportunities here at the lab." It was
at about that time that he came in my office and told me that effective
immediately I would have a 4% salary raise. At that moment I felt that I
had to finish the "story." I started to feel pressure to begin writing the
proposal for the new fiscal year and I started talking with a colleague.
That colleague told me that he had gone through the same struggle but that
eventually he had convinced himself that working on weapons was for the
benefit of humanity. I told him that I could not do that. When my
supervisor came back I told him that I wanted to find a different job and
that I did not want to do nuclear weapons work. He said he had to talk to
his superiors because he had never experienced a case like this. He came
back, very strict this time, telling me that I was hired to do a
particular job and that if I refused, I would be on my own. I was told
that I would have a hard time finding a different job at LLNL. Now the
statement: " If it turns out you do not like the job there are many other
opportunities here at the lab" did not match with the way I was being
treated.
Several days later I was
approached again and I was asked if I had any family problems. I said I
had no family problems but I had to find a different job. Now my
supervisor sat down and told me step by step what would happen to me after
he initiated the process. He asked: "Do you know what you are doing? Do
you realize what you are doing? Do you really want to do this?" I
responded in a very calm way that I had made my decision. I left and went
home. I told my wife what I had done. She asked me: "But you said that you
would wait until you find a different job; now what will happen?" My
reasoning was that if I could not do the job I was expected to do, I would
not have the support from my supervisor to find a new job anyway, so why I
should wait? To ease her distress I went into the house and I called my
supervisor to ask if we could talk again the next day. He had left for a
trip and I could not reach him. This time was perhaps the most agonizing
time in my life to this day. The next day, 9/15/99, Dr. Leader, the
division leader came to my room first thing in the morning, closed the
door, and asked me the question: "Do you want to work on nuclear weapons?"
"No," I said. "I came to do environmental work." He left without a word.
On 9/20/99 my supervisor was
back from his trip. He explained to me that going to Employment Between
Assignments status (EBA) would not be good for me. A week later he came to
my office again and he said that for security reasons I had to move the
next week into a cubicle on the first floor, and in October I would be
supported by his program only 45%. After October, zero support. I asked
how I would be supported. He said: "It will not be my problem; management
will look into that." He also said that someone from AVLIS, (the recently
terminated Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation program) without a job
wanted to work on nuclear weapons and that he would take my place. In a
conversation I had with a colleague, I asked why such an over budget was
observed with the NIF project (National Ignition Facility). The answer was
so clear. He said: "To secure funding you ask for less than what the
project will cost; otherwise you will not be funded. After you start and a
lot of investment has been put in place, then you ask for more. Most
likely they will not refuse because they do not want to waste all the
money that has been spent."
Down in the cubicle I started
having interviews with people from different divisions, but I soon
realized that I was fooling myself. I realized that all work in LLNL is
directly or indirectly related to weapons. At the same time, I spoke out
at two public hearings, one about mandatory polygraphy tests planned for
lab employees, and one about the National Ignition Facility (NIF), where I
publicly resigned, calling LLNL a place of insanity. The next day it was
on the air through KPFA, a Bay Area radio station. The polygraphy tests
were planned for 13,000 workers across the DOE complex. After the outcry
of a few scientists, they finally decided that only 800 people had to take
the test. That reduction from 13,000 to 800 was additional proof to me
that something very wrong was going on at my work place, not to mention
that some months before we were brainwashed by many hours of lectures
given by FBI agents that Dr. Wen Ho Lee was a great spy. Immediately after
that, a culture of mistrust fear and terror was placed around everyone. We
had to turn our computers off for many weeks, both classified and
unclassified computers, and they were giving us lectures everyday about
security. Again, after my own investigation from outside sources, I
concluded that this man was most likely being used for some purpose I
could not understand at that time. But I did find a huge report, the Cox
report: "U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY/COMMERCIAL CONCERNS WITH THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA". I looked at it and I could not understand why
there were people spending their time writing all these volumes, http://www.house.gov/coxreport/pdf/gen.pdf.
It became obvious to me that the purpose of the report was nothing else
but to demonize China. Then I started wondering why a Chinese scientist
was accused as a spy even without any evidence of espionage. I could not
understand the logic of anything taking place around me. I realized I was
working in a mad place. Later on at my press conference in San Francisco,
the local Chinese TV channel 66 took me aside at the end of my speech in a
different room and asked me what I thought about Lee's case. I told them
that I didn't think this man should not be in prison. He must be released
immediately. The same night they broadcast our conversation.
I was also interviewed by
National Ignition Facility (NIF) managers and scientists during my search
for a different job. In a conversation with one of them, I asked him about
the rumors that there are serious technical problems with the NIF project.
He said, yes there are but we are working on them. Again I could not
understand why a multibillion project was given the OK while even its own
scientists were not sure that it would work. During my search for an
environmental position, I was trained for a day and was asked to work on a
project that had to do with the verification process for documents about
the storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. I experienced a very
hostile environment and I quit after a few days.
On January 13, I found a note
on my chair telling me to go and see the division leader. I will refer to
him as Dr. Leader here. That day, I was planning to submit my resignation
letter to the lab director's office. I took that letter, along with the
open letter I was planning to give out to the press, and I went to see Dr.
Leader. He was nervous and didn't seem to know what to say. I waited.
After some effort he hesitantly told me that they had seen me on the local
TV news a few days earlier and the way I talked they thought that perhaps
I had family or personal problems because I seemed excited while speaking.
Dr. Leader said that they had decided to ask me to see a counselor. In
fact he said that the lab has a policy that if one of its employees talks
about the end of the world then he should see a counselor. I asked him if
that was a suggestion or a mandatory request and he said it was a
suggestion. I told him that I rejected his suggestion and that I did not
have any personal or family problems. In fact, I told him that since I had
decided to resign, my family and I were happier than at any other time.
Dr. Leader could see what I was talking about, but he was a man of the
system. He had to follow orders. I forgot to tell him that many scientists
love to have Einstein's picture on the wall of their offices, but that
according to their policy, if Einstein was working today at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, they would suggest that he go and see a
counselor. Einstein did, in fact, talk about the end of the world many
times. Before I left, I did not forget to place in Dr. Leader's hand the
Russell-Einstein manifesto.
I also gave him the open
envelope with my letter of resignation for the director and I asked him to
read it because after that he would not have any more concerns about me.
He read it and said that it was clear. I asked him if he would like to
hear my open letter and he agreed. I read all 8 pages to him. At the end,
to my amazement he again asked me to see a counselor. And in a very subtle
way I was warned that it would not be a good idea if I would be speaking
out. This warning was not from him personally; it was rather a friendly
reminder that seemed to say, "What can we do? An invisible hand is on the
top of our head and we must not speak the truth otherwise the hand might
eliminate us." I was also told at that time that the peace movement would
take advantage of me and bring me troubles. Next I delivered my letter of
resignation to the Director's office.
The next day at about 4:00 PM
I again found a note on my chair, this time from Dr. Leader himself, not
his secretary, telling me to go and see him. He told me that I had to move
my things within an hour, and to give him my badge, and that he would walk
with me until the gate. We had a very nice conversation for about ten
minutes, and since I could see that he was nervous and afraid, I told him
that he did not have to be afraid of me. But I also told him that in the
future, most likely, they would call someone else crazy. That person,
without a job and perhaps without a family, might not be as kind as I was.
I explained to him that no matter how much security they had within the
lab, an angry man could find his adversaries anywhere if he really wanted
to. I concluded that in view of the current policies of the lab and in
general of the nation, the future would bring an increase of violence. I
told him that I had resigned for that very reason. If national labs build
more powerful weapons every day, then the only thing they bring to smaller
nations and to the world is fear. Fear brings violence and I do not want
to be a part of it. In a few minutes I was outside of the concentration
camp, the prison of scientists, where scientific principles are used to
build the grave of humanity.
I began working with my new
friends in the peace movement, and on February 16, we held a press
conference in San Francisco, where I released to the media my Open Letter
to the Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, explaining the
reasons for my resignation.
The letter is also an appeal
to every secretary, technician, custodian, scientist, engineer, and any
other person whose participation supports the world war machine to
withhold their skills from weapons work and from activities that support
or enable weapons work. I also made three specific recommendations:
(1) Establish informed consent
hiring practices at national weapons laboratories and all other
scientific/military establishments.
(2) Stop bringing high school
and college students into the weapons labs.
(3) Encourage and help
scientists to withhold their skills from weapons work.
Since my resignation I have
been poor but happy. We do not know how we will make ends meet, even
together with my wife, teaching in four different colleges. But I believe
that I have found my calling: to inform scientists and the public about
the deceptive ways new scientists are lured into weapons work; to remind
people that nuclear weapons are the perfect tool for humanity to commit
suicide; and to call on each person to do his or her best to prevent that
from happening.
At this time, I would like to
express my sincere thanks to Jackie Cabasso executive director of Western
States Legal Foundation and the rest of the staff for their caring and
professional support during my difficult times. They have been like
brothers and sisters.
I encourage the scientists of
every nation to join positions where their work uplifts humanity instead
of destroying humanity. After all, it would be to their advantage to stay
away from secrecy. Very interestingly in a commentary in the Wall Street
Journal of November 3, 2000 titled, "It's No Secret. This Is a Bad Bill,"
R. James Woolsey, director of the CIA from 1993-95 speaks in this way
regarding jobs behind the security fence: "If you were formerly in the
government, remain silent about such issues. If you are already in
government, consider a mid-career change to get away from classified
material before you expand your exposure any further. And if you are
trying to decide about beginning a career or accepting a stint in
government, think again."
Mr.
Andreas Toupadakis, Ph.D.
is a Former Research Scientist of Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001 Andreas Toupadakis
by the same author:
|
|
|
