by Edward Said
One of the most telling
moments during Bill Clinton's public inquisition over his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky came, as I recall, when he was
asked point blank whether he had had sex with his young assistant.
His answer was, "it depends what you mean by sex." The
man's bold evasiveness and his capacity to override reality with a
sudden new manoeuvre of his own (especially after what had already
been revealed to the whole world about his dalliance with Lewinsky)
were also typical of Clinton's approach to Middle East peace at Camp
David. By virtue of his position as American president he had an
opportunity to do what no one else could, that is, really bring both
Israelis and Palestinians (but especially Israelis) to a genuine
recognition of what the issues were and then perhaps face the
stronger and more culpable party with some real choices. Such a
procedure would of course have required that he make an effort to go
beyond the clichés and biases of his Middle East team, nearly every
one of them a known pro-Zionist and/or former Israeli lobby
employee, and get at the essence of the problem, which, simply put,
is that one people has dispossessed another. This is a dateable
historical fact (1948) and not, as the poorly informed Mrs Albright
put it, a "biblical" contest "going back thousands of
years."
After all, Clinton might
well have asked himself why it is that even so pliant a man as
Yasser Arafat has hesitated so long in agreeing to Israeli terms for
the final status. Could it be that there is a genuine people here
with a genuine grievance, one that can't go away simply by bringing
a couple of leaders to Camp David and making them sign an agreement
that effectively obliterates one people's rights so that the other
would basically get off with the whole pie and no responsibility for
anything that happened?
The shallowness of
Clinton's approach was further demonstrated by his acquiescence to
Ehud Barak's position that Israel might consider
"understanding" and "noting" the suffering of
the Palestinian people but would assume no part of the blame for
causing it. Did it ever occur to Clinton that there is no such thing
as suffering without cause or blame? And is it not a scandal that in
all the media and governmental posturing about the failure of the
talks, no one said a word about Clinton's moral villainy? Wasn't it
perfectly clear that the whole misguided attempt to get himself and
his lacklustre vice president (already in trouble with his flagging
presidential campaign) a cheap boost was an effort that was doomed
to fail, precisely because Clinton's evasion of the truth led him to
a "bold" theatrical coup that then blew up in his face?
How could he imagine that the entire Muslim and Arab world, to say
nothing of every single Palestinian, would accept Israeli
sovereignty over Jerusalem as well as over most of historical
Palestine in return only for Israeli and American approval for a
mere scrap of a sham state? Was it necessary to treat Arafat and the
people he claimed to represent not only as contemptible little
creatures but as morons as well? And in addition to stripping them
of their history as residents of Palestine, how did Clinton and
Barak expect Palestinians to give up their right of return after
having gone to war a year ago on behalf of the Kossovan Albanians'
right of return? Was there no limit to the flagrantly double
standard and the hypocrisy?
The fault is not
entirely Israel's or Clinton's. In the 22 July issue of The Guardian
a senior Palestinian official at Camp David was quoted as saying
that for "us the friendship with America is everything. Without
it, we are nothing." Never were more dishonourable and craven
words ever spoken, words that typify everything that is wrong with
the Palestinian position during the entire peace process. First of
all, they denigrate the Palestinian struggle to nothing, reducing
all the efforts and sacrifices made on behalf of Palestine by people
who genuinely and, one might even say fervently, believed in the
truth and justice of their cause. That is the opposite of nothing.
Secondly, it places Palestinians at a fantastic disadvantage by
consigning them essentially to the position of slaves begging for
mercy. How can one expect such merchants of power as Barak or
Clinton to respect people who do not respect themselves? Third, it
further demoralises Palestinians by revealing that their leaders
have a very low opinion of them. Lastly, it gives the US carte
blanche to say or do anything it may wish with the Palestinians. For
if a leadership sees itself only as a tool of the antagonist, the
struggle is over, and the winner can work his will without the
slightest concern for the loser. I might also add that so abject a
sentiment can also fill our adversaries (or "peace
partners" as the revolting euphemism has it) with a kind of
disgust at us.
Having said all that, it
remains the case, I believe, that Arafat did the right thing by not
signing. A revealing article by Belal Al-Hassan in the Al Hayat 28
July issue gives a very useful background of the Palestinian and
Arab context out of which Arafat was working, and this of course was
totally neglected by the media (as well as by Clinton of course) in
their ill-tempered attacks on the Palestinians for not being willing
to compromise, and the gushing praise for Barak because he was so
"courageous," a word in this context that has no possible
relevance. Having already annexed Jerusalem, expanded its
boundaries, stuffed the place with new Israeli settlements, Israel
doesn't require much courage to express a willingness to give back
Beit Hanina and Abu Dis to partial Palestinian sovereignty. As for
Israel's much vaunted magnanimity in being willing to challenge
longstanding "taboos" about Jerusalem by talking about
them, that too is the rankest nonsense. The facts are that Jerusalem
is still divided, and that 200,000 Palestinians live there, and
without Arab and Islamic backing, Arafat was simply in no position
to compromise on East Jerusalem as well as the settlements as well
as the right of return, all for nothing more than a pat on the back
and a phony state that couldn't fool even as ardent a claimant for
the illusion as Arafat. As I predicted in an article two weeks ago,
Barak really wanted Arafat to sign a termination of the Arab-Israeli
conflict (my view has been supported by most of the Israeli press
reports on the Camp David meetings, which the Israelis admit were
really designed to wring the ultimate concession out of the hapless
Arafat), and in effect to get away without making fundamental
changes in the Israeli situation. That is, Israel can continue to
possess 78 per cent of Mandatory Palestine as its own, plus
strategic parts of the 22 per cent that remain, maintain a rigid
separation between Jews and non-Jews, keep all of Jerusalem, go on
with the invidious Law of Return, continue to control water,
borders, security, and never have to deal with its historical
responsibilities as having forcibly displaced an entire people in
order to come into existence.
Well then, what now? I
worry that having returned home to a hero's welcome Arafat will then
turn around, assured of his domestic support, return to Camp David
and capitulate to Israel and Clinton. But he has one last chance to
redeem himself and the misguided path he adopted in secret at Oslo
seven years ago. And that is, finally, to tell the truth to his
people, openly and honestly, something he has never done. The
question of Palestine and, for that matter, the question of Israel
constitute together one of the most colossal, unimaginably complex
issues in all history: there are massive religious, political,
social, cultural and historical issues involved which no individual
leader (certainly none of the calibre of Barak, Clinton and the
others) can possibly comprehend; none of them has either the moral
conscience or the intellect or the soul to encompass what is at
stake. The only recourse for Arafat is to turn to his people, and
not just the group of sycophants and pygmies with whom he has
surrounded (and isolated) himself. What he must do for the first
time since 1982 is to mobilise his people, call on their talents and
endowments, summon their resources, mobilise them to commit
themselves to the task ahead, which is nothing less than remaining
firm to our collective vision as a dispossessed people requiring
serious redress for our grievances and claims. With his people, and
only with his people, can Arafat become not only the conscience but
also the vision of the peace process, both of which it now lacks.
By doing so he can offer
the Israelis a real peace with justice, and not a cold peace with
injustice rankling in every Palestinian breast. Israel and the US
are too strong for him to take on alone and, since he has discovered
that throwing himself on their mercy can only produce more demands
from them, he must rely on all the other, unused resources at his
command. There is no doubt that in the end Palestinians must
compromise and must be absolutely clear in saying that we fully
intend to recognise a secure Israeli-Jewish presence in our midst,
but only as a result of the basic issues having been resolved to our
minimum satisfaction. This is not a matter of whim: it is
consolidated in every known international and legal resolution. The
South African model is additionally useful here: as Mandela did, we
must be inclusive in our vision, and we must require that an end be
put to the invidious idea that one people has all the rights whereas
the other people must accept inferior status. In addition, something
like a Truth and Reconciliation Commission made up of Israelis and
Palestinians who have substantial moral status in their societies
would be a good idea too. Equality is the core principle, however,
and even though it cannot be mathematically precise it has to
address the fundamental discrepancy that now obtains between Jew and
Arab.
I have no illusion at
all that this will be easy, or that the absence of real democracy in
the Arab world is anything but a hindrance to the real contest in
Palestine. But I do not believe that there is any other way for
Arafat if he wishes to avoid the dismal logical end to the Oslo
peace process, which he barely escaped at Camp David. This is a
moment for vision, principle and courage. If he wants my support in
such a task, he will have it.
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