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The Right of Return, At Last
by Edward
Said
Now that all the cheery
atmospherics connected with Ehud Barak's tenure in office have more or
less dissipated, and he or his party faces prosecution for campaign
corruption at home, and an increasing demand for results abroad, the true
face of his regime is emerging with startling, not to say disquieting
clarity. One knows certain things about Zionism as an ideology, but it is
nevertheless shocking to encounter and re-encounter them repeatedly. One's
surprise and dismay at so raw and primitive a state of inhuman denial
should never be diminished, the better to be able to see it for what it
is, something I am deeply sorry to say no Arab regime has had the courage
to face up to. For me, one of the worst offenders in this moral blindness
remains the Palestinian leadership, which has actually eased the way
forward for Zionist arguments and plans, with scarce allowance for the
sufferings of the huge mass of Palestinians who languish in camps,
shantytowns, and makeshift houses in Palestine and in too many Arab
countries to be counted.
The by now notorious peace
process finally has come down to the one issue that has been at the core
of Palestinian depredations since 1948: the fate of the refugees who were
displaced in 1948, again in 1967, and again in 1982 by naked Israeli
ethnic cleansing. Any other description of those acts by the Israeli army
is a travesty of the truth, no matter how many protestations are heard
from the unyielding Zionist right-wing (assuming that the left is more
likely to accept the truth). That the Palestinians have endured decades of
dispossession and raw agonies rarely endured by other peoples --
particularly because these agonies have either been ignored or denied, and
even more poignantly, because the perpetrators of this tragedy are
celebrated for social and political achievements that make no mention at
all of where those achievements actually began -- is of course the locus
of "the Palestinian problem," but it has been pushed very far
down the agenda of negotiations until finally now, it has popped up to the
surface.
For the past several weeks,
two contradictory sets of happenings have occurred which, in their stark,
irreconcilable antithesis, tell almost the whole story of what is wrong
with an unevolved Zionism on the one hand, and what is just as seriously
wrong with the peace process on the other. Barak and several of his
faceless underlings have been on record tirelessly in Israel, in Europe
and elsewhere to affirm their increasingly strident disavowal of any
responsibility for Palestinian dispossession. Here and there, a more
humane Israeli official will, for example, temper these disavowals with an
acknowledgement that Israel bears some responsibility for the
"transfers" that took place in 1948 and 1967, but that "the
Arabs" -- who presumably are supposed to have evicted Palestinians
too: the notion is too preposterous to require rebuttal -- are also
responsible, thereby preparing the way for a magnanimous offer for Israel
to take back 100,000 of the nearly 4.5 million refugees who now exist in
the Arab world and beyond. But such individual declarations are remarkable
for their infrequency and the lack of response they have engendered from
Barak and his entourage, to say nothing of the Knesset majority, the
settlers, and a dispiritingly large number of ordinary Israelis who seem
to believe that, whatever happened in 1948, they will never have anything
to do with it. It's not their problem, and so why should they have
anything to say? That, of course, is precisely Barak's negotiating
strategy: to refuse any discussion at all of the refugee claim to return,
repatriation and/or compensation. Recent revelations by an Israeli
researcher that a bigger 15 May 1948 massacre than the notorious one at
Deir Yassin took place in Tantura, with over 200 Palestinian civilian
victims shot in cold blood by Zionist soldiers, has not shaken Barak's
stony rejectionism an iota.
The contradictory part of the
issue is the snowballing effect of what is now a universal Palestinian
demand heard literally all over the globe for the right of return.
Petitions have been signed by the dozens, thousands of names in the Arab
world, Europe, Africa and the Americas have been added to these lists on a
daily basis, and for the first time ever, the right of return has been put
squarely on the political agenda. Asaad Abdel-Rahman, the PLO's minister
in charge of the refugee question for the peace process, has recently made
some excellent strong statements about the absolute right of return for
Palestinians evicted by Israel: these statements express the right kind of
resolve and the right kind of moral indignation. After all, Abdel-Rahman
says, a UN resolution (number 194) has been affirmed annually since 1948;
it allows Palestinians the right of return and/or compensation. Why should
there be a compromise by Palestinians given the world community's
unanimity? Even the US has supported the resolution, with Israel the lone
dissenter. The troubling thing, however, is that Abdel-Rahman hints that
the PLO leadership may do a deal with Israel on the refugees behind his
back which, in view of the long history of shabby Arafatian compromises
whose net effect have been to sell out his people, is an allowable, not to
say perfectly well-founded worry.
The one certain thing is that
it is going to take a great deal of ingenuity, public relations
spin-doctoring, and specious logic to convince any Palestinian that the
deal to be made (as it will be) by the PLO is not in effect an abrogation
of the right of return. Consider the logic of what has happened since
1991. On every major issue separating Palestinians from Israelis, it is
the Palestinians who have given way. Yes, they have achieved small gains
here and there, but all one needs to do is to look at the map of Gaza and
the West Bank, then visit those places, then read the agreements, then
listen to the Israelis and Americans, and one will have a pretty good idea
of what has happened by way of compromise, flawed arrangements, and a
general abrogation of full Palestinian self-determination. All this has
been achieved because the Palestinian leadership has selfishly put its own
self-interest, over-inflated squadrons of security guards, commercial
monopolies, unseemly persistence in power, lawless despotism,
anti-democratic greed and cruelty, before the collective Palestinian good.
Until now, it has connived with Israel to let the refugee issue slither
down the pole; but now that the final status era is upon us all, there's
no more room down there. And so, as I said above, we're back to the basic,
the irreconcilable, the irremediably interlocked contradiction between
Palestinian and Israeli nationalism. Unfortunately, I have no faith
whatever that our leadership will in fact maintain its façade of
resistance and continue to let Abdel-Rahman and others like him carry the
message forward. There is always another Abu Mazen-Yossi Beilin
arrangement to be made, and if the Israelis can "persuade"
Arafat's men that Abu Dis is in fact Jerusalem, why can't they also
persuade them that the refugees will just have to remain refugees for a
bit longer? Of course they can, and will.
So that leaves the unanswered
question before us all: is the Palestinian people as a whole -- you and I
-- going to accept this final card being played against us, or not?
Unfortunately, the short-run prognosis is not good: witness the wasted
opportunity to impeach the Authority last November after the petition of
20 was signed, several of its signatories unlawfully imprisoned, the rest
threatened. Very little happened by way of repercussion, and the Authority
got away with its brazen strong-arm tactics. Arafat survives inside the
Palestinian territories today for two main reasons: one, he is needed by
the international supporters of the peace process, Israel, the US and the
EU chief among them. He is needed to sign, and that, after all, is what he
is good for. Nothing else: everyone knows this. He can deliver his people.
The second reason is that because he is a master at corrupting even the
best of his people, he has bought off or threatened all organised
opposition (there are always individuals who cannot be coopted) and
therefore removed them as a threat. The rest of the population is too
uncertain and discouraged to do much. The Authority employs about 140,000
people; multiply that by five or six (the number of dependents of each
employee) and you get close to a million people whose livelihood hangs by
the string offered by Yasser Arafat. Much as he is disliked, disrespected
and feared, he will remain so long as he has this leverage over an
enormous number of people, who will not jeopardise their future just
because they are ruled by a corrupt, inefficient and stupid dictatorship
which cannot even deliver the essential services for daily civil life like
water, health, electricity, food, etc.
That leaves the Palestinian
diaspora, which produced Arafat in the first place: it was from Kuwait and
Cairo that he emerged to challenge Shukairy and Hajj Amin. A new
leadership will almost certainly appear from the Palestinians who live
elsewhere: they are a majority, none of them feels that Arafat represents
them, all of them regard the Authority as without real legitimacy, and
they are the ones with the most to gain from the right of return, which
Arafat and his men are going to be forced to back down on. We must
encourage ourselves to do the work of inventorying the desires and the
number of refugees, cataloguing the property losses, compiling the list of
destroyed villages, carrying forward the claims such as the petition now
being circulated by BADIL. The extraordinary engineer and scholar Salman
Abu Sitta has already done a lot of the work about property and
demographics; others are following his lead, or supporting him. He works
entirely on his own, or with the support of friends. To expect Yasser
Arafat to take advantage of all this loyal expertise and authentic
commitment is of course a pipe dream. What he has done is to contract out
the final status negotiations to a right-wing London think tank, the Adam
Smith Institute, which is paid for its services by the British Foreign
Office, and has retained an American consulting firm, Arthur Andersen, to
advertise its investment attractions. No other liberation group in history
has sold itself to its enemies like this. We all have a stake in making
sure that these shabby diversions will fail, and that the small handful of
expert Palestinians who are now complicit in these arrangements will come
to their senses and leave the Authority to sink terminally into the mud
all around it. And then we will press the claims for return and
compensation in earnest with new leaders.
Source:
by the same author:
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