by Gamal Nkrumah
Poor Pakistan. While a confident India sets
the pace in South Asia, its economy growing by a galloping six per
cent a year, its old rival Pakistan is saddled with a crippling $51
billion debt and a leader who has broken promises to inaugurate
democracy and last week proclaimed himself president. Pakistani
opposition figure Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, chief of the multi-party
Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, called Musharraf's move
"a national tragedy." Under these unfortunate circumstances,
President General Parvez Musharraf is to visit India for talks.
The omens for Pakistan are bad. First, the
finances. This week, the extent of Pakistan's financial woes became
plain. Pakistani Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz pledged to freeze
defence spending in 2002. The move aims to mollify international
lenders and persuade them to reschedule future interest payments.
This is a perilous step in a country which is a nuclear power, has a
budding defence industry and whose president's position depends on
the favour of the army.
Next, the general. Every now and then, a
Pakistani general usurps power by force only to declare himself
president some time later. The pattern is predictable. With each new
dictator comes a new bunch of cronies, helping themselves to plum
jobs in return for facilitating the leader's iron rule. Meanwhile
public enterprises go bankrupt. Pakistan's most shameful tradition
was started by General Ayyub Khan in 1960. General Yahya Khan in
1969 and General Zia Ul-Haq in 1978 continued the trend. Last week,
Parvez Musharraf solemnly took the oath of office under the national
provisional constitutional order: an order he devised himself and
introduced after he illegally toppled the democratically-elected
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. A new
despot's justification for such a coup can sometimes be original, at
least. This one wasn't. Musharraf claims to have strangled democracy
so he can "handle the delicate upcoming negotiations with India." As
he does so, Pakistan's chances of escaping the cycle of coup,
counter-coup and corruption grow slimmer.
Still, India -- the world's largest democracy
-- has not balked at Musharraf's illegal move. In mid-July, when the
Pakistani potentate visits India, his hosts will roll out the red
carpet and give him the 21 gun salute reserved for visiting heads of
state. Indeed, India was the first country to officially recognise
Musharraf as president of Pakistan, and the Indian ambassador in
Islamabad attended Musharraf's oath-taking ceremony.
On the face of it, India appears to be bending
over backwards to accommodate Musharraf. Why? There are precedents:
India traditionally prefers to negotiate with a strong ruler who has
a tight grip on the armed forces, than with a weakling presiding
over a precarious civil government who cannot take tough and binding
decisions.
There is more. India hopes that, in spite of
his past, Musharraf will deliver; that he is less in thrall to
Pakistan's various interest groups than an elected leader would be
and may be able to move boldly. For India, there is an urgent need
for a new policy framework for bilateral relations. India cannot
stomach a long-term freeze in the current status quo in Kashmir. It
is keen for regional stability to allow its economic development to
flourish. The combustibility of Kashmir is too much of a variable.
But it will find solving the Kashmir problem
difficult. The Indian government declared a unilateral cease-fire in
Kashmir six months ago. The main Pakistan-backed separatist umbrella
group in the Indian-run part of Kashmir, the All Party Hurriyat
Conference (APHC), rejected the cease-fire after the militant
factions over-ruled the more moderate tendencies. Over 250 have died
from violence since Delhi abandoned the cease-fire in May.
For India, bilateral talks are especially
urgent. New Delhi, which in the past has refused to internationalise
the Kashmir question, wants to keep third party mediators such as
the United States out. As the stronger party vis-à-vis Pakistan, it
wants to exploit its negotiating advantage before powers like the
US, with its eye on stemming nuclear proliferation, interfere to
level the playing field.
In general, India hopes Musharraf is strong
enough to rein in the militants, while Pakistan stays weak enough to
pressure. So New Delhi regards Musharraf as a good potential
partner. This is quite a volte-face. After Musharraf's military coup
in 1999, India and Pakistan appeared to be on an unstoppable
collision course. Musharraf was behind the 1999 Kargil campaign
which saw heavily armed infiltrators slip through the border that
separates Indian- administered Kashmir from Azad Kashmir controlled
by Pakistan. But in politics a few years is a long time.
But forces may arise that stop Musharraf being
as accommodating as India hopes. He is obliged to retain vociferous
anti-India stalwarts like General Javed Nasir, a former Pakistani
Intelligence (ISI) chief, as aides. And the Kashmir problem has
defeated many a general before Musharraf. This time it may be no
different.
But despite these problems; despite
Musharraf's assumption of autocratic power; despite a pitted road on
the way to accord, India will welcome the new dictator with all the
fanfare reserved for a head of state next month. The talks are
crucial for regional stability containing the potentially deadly
Kashmir problem. "Keep the conversation going, one word leading to
another," sang the celebrated Urdu poet Sardar Jafri. India and
Pakistan are about to take the bard's counsel to heart. Let's hope
their talks have a touch of metre and rhyme to them, and don't
degenerate into discordant doggerel.