The
post-September 11 events of cosmic proportions have resulted in world
focusing on Afghanistan. Renewed interest of many local, regional and
international players has resulted in surge of writings on Afghanistan.
Policy makers of different countries are looking at the past, present and
possible future of Afghanistan more closely. The task is difficult due to
the convergence of various complex factors including internal, regional
and international involving broad strategic, ethnic, economic and security
areas. A closer look at the last twenty five year traumatic history of the
region clearly illustrates the complexity of the problem due to clash of
divergent aims and objectives of several parties. Neat ideological or
rhetorical statements belie the underlying stresses of the society, which
is caught in the eye of the storm and trying to control the events, which
are beyond its grasp. This article will briefly deal with the interplay
of these factors in the last twenty-five years after the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
Afghans:
When the war is over, I want
to read Persian poetry and go somewhere where there are no damn mountains.
- Late Ahmad Shah Masud - Afghan Commander
Afghanistan over the
centuries had incoherent relationship with the external world. However, on
domestic front, it exhibited a degree of internal flexibility, which has
‘dampened more extreme turbulence within this multi-ethnic, linguistically
heterogeneous, historically composite, and never entirely logical
nation-state’.1 The external relationships of Afghanistan are still
incoherent but the events of last twenty-five years have shattered that
internal flexibility. The relationship between tribes and adjoining states
of Pakistan and Afghanistan is a complex one. ‘The relationship is not of
war or peace, black or white, but shades of grey; one that reflects the
continuing socio-political dynamics of a special, indeed unique, situation
that has prevailed in the region’. The 1978 Communist coup in Afghanistan
changed the country forever. The brutal repression by the government of
different segments of the society started a chain reaction of violence,
which was going to haunt the Afghans for years to come. Despite a popular
revolt and little control over the countryside, the Kabul regime was able
to maintain the semblance of a central state with working institutions.
In 1992 after the fall of Najibullah, Afghanistan gradually fragmented
into city-states resembling the medieval model and traditional link
between banditry and trade re-emerged. In this slip into
disintegration and disorganization, people tend to gravitate to
their more primordial beliefs and attachments of clan, tribe and ethnic
identity. The state disintegrated and the stage was set for the next
level of civil war, which will be more brutal and bloody. The scene is
well summarized by one astute observer of Afghan scene in these words,
“Billions of dollars worth modern weapons that had outlasted the strategic
interests of their providers circulated in a devastated country with
neither national institutions nor national identity”.
The core supporters
of many leaders were only their ethnic kins. Burhanuddin Rabbani’s close
associates and armed guards were from his native Badakhshan province,
Ahmad Shah Masud’s close confidants were Panjsheris while Abdul Rasheed
Dostum’s Jowzyani Militia was predominantly Uzbek. De-tribalized Pushtuns
were aligned with Gulbadin Hikmatyar while tribal Pushtuns rallied around
their traditional heads in the form of local militias. The rise of tribal
militias was a complex phenomenon. In early 80s, minorities, clans, which
were weaker or defeated by their rivals and lower strata of the tribal
society, joined the militias. The interior ministry ran the Sarandoy
militia. This phenomenon had a devastating effect on the internal
cohesion of Afghan society. The clan, tribal and ethnic bonds became
stronger at the expense of already weak Afghan nationalism. The alliances
were formed and broken at a dizzying speed due to local factors. In
Kunduz province in early eighties, fighters belonging to Jamiat-e-Islami
killed many civilians on the suspicion of collaboration with the
government. The result was that the whole population of the valley went
over to the government and became the strongest group of militiamen. In
Ghor province, a large number of fighters belonging to Harkat-e-Inqilab
joined government militias to fight more effectively against their local
rivals belonging to Hizb-e-Islami. In 1986, continuous fighting between
Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami in northern area alienated the local
population and 3,000 Uzbek families switched side to the government and
became militia members. The orgy of bloodshed which followed was
unprecedented in the history of Afghanistan. The fall of Khost in March
1991 was a classical example of the reincarnation of medieval thought
process of the resistance. Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) deferred to
the wishes of local commanders and modified their plans and reached an
agreement about the distribution of the booty prior to assault. After the
fall of Khost, everything went up in the air and resistance groups
pillaged the town rather than administering it.
After the fall of
Najibullah in 1992, the interim set up was predominantly non-Pushtun.
Pushtuns resented the coalition of Rabbani-Masud-Dostum which was
entrenched in Kabul. Shia Hizb-e-Wahdat was aligned with Rabbani.
Hikmatyar made the history by being the only Prime Minister in the world
history who rather than coming to capital to assume his post preferred to
encamp in the city suburb and periodically shell his capital with barrages
of rockets resulting in much death and devastation. The former communist
Pushtun defence minister, General Shahnawaz Tanai had earlier defected to
Hikmatyar. Later, Pushtun supporters of Najibullah switched their
allegiance to Hikmatyar. The ethnic and regional polarization was
finalized with the defection of Khalqi Sarandoy Militia to Hikmatyar
ranks. In 1994, Hikmatyar joined hands with Dostum to oust Masud from
Kabul. Hizb-e-Wahdat conveniently dumped Rabbani-Masud government and
jumped on the Dostum-Hikmatyar bandwagon. By that time, thoroughly
disgusted by the fratricidal war, Pakistan was wooing Taliban in the
south. Hikmatyar furious of being unceremoniously dumped by Pakistan did
a somersault, joined Rabbani and came to Kabul in June 1996 to assume his
post of prime minister. Later, when the Taliban came to the Kabul doors,
he left for Iran. Nangarhar Shura led by Haji Abdul Qadeer governed the
three eastern provinces. In an ambush, 70 of the key commanders of shura
were killed and few hours later Taliban stormed the Jalalabad.9 In the
north, in September 1997, a four way duel was going on between militias
belonging to Dostum, Abdul Malik, Masud and Hizb-e-Wahdat in Mazar Sharif.
The northern seesaw of battles ended when Taliban pacified the region with
only remnants of resistance in small pockets.
The rise of Taliban
was partly due to Pushtun frustrations. It was the historic phenomenon of
coming together of Pushtun tribesmen at the time of crisis. Pushtuns of
different inclinations either openly supported or approved of them. They
created an ‘artificial unity among Pushtuns’. They started in the
southern part of the country. After stabilizing their base in Kandahar,
they moved outwards, first taking eastern cities and later Kabul and north
of the country. The initial dramatic successes were partly due to the
frustrations of general populace regarding total anarchy and infighting.
Taliban rule brought the much-sought peace. The problem started when
Taliban became more closely aligned with radical foreigners mainly Arabs
and started to strictly enforce their version of religious law totally
ignoring Afghan traditions. In this, Taliban resembled more like their
communist predecessors. ‘Just as the isolation of Kabul based Marxist
leaders from the lives of the rural poor led them to formulate unrealistic
social programmes, so the cloistered society of the all-male madrasa has
led the Taliban to create an idealized vision of Afghan villages
unmoderated by the domestic influences of women, families, elders, and the
everyday realities of tilling fields, tending flocks, and raising
children’. After the September 11 attacks in United States, US came to
Afghanistan with a heavy might to wrap up Taliban and flush out Osama bin
Ladin and his network. The total rout of Taliban surprised everybody
except those who are well versed with Afghan history. As one
correspondent rightly pointed when he was watching US bombing from
Northern Alliance frontlines that, ‘the cost of one of these bombs
probably would have been enough to purchase the defection of every single
Taliban commander in the trenches opposite’. Many non-Afghans who were
fed on the stories of rhetoric and propaganda didn’t have the knowledge of
inner dynamics of Afghan society. While a small core of committed
individuals is still attached to Taliban leadership, the majority of
general cadres had simply switched the sides to Taliban when they were in
firm control. One Pakistani fighter who made it back to Pakistan after the
fall of Taliban expressed his frustrations but correct ground realities in
these words, “The only people who fought were the non-Afghans. Mullah
Omar and his regime would not have fallen if his lieutenants were men of
character. Afghans are venal”. It was ironic to see the pictures of
Taliban fighters with black turbans, carrying same AK-47 rifles and riding
in the same pick up trucks. The only difference was that instead of the
white flag of Taliban, the old Afghan flag was wavering on the pick up
truck and the fighters were smiling accompanied with US Special Forces
personnel who were sharing the pick up truck with them. In December 2001,
seeing the imminent demise of Taliban, several ministers and close
associates defected and showed up in Pakistan. They formed a new party, Khuddamul Furqan Jamiat (KFJ). They publicly supported the interim Karzai
government and stated that they will work with the Karzai government to
ensure national reconciliation inside the country.
The post-Taliban
Afghanistan is as complex and unpredictable as it was before. Various
groups, factions and clans with different visions are put under one roof.
In Kandahar, after initial tussle between Gul Agha and Maulvi Naqeebullah,
Gul Agha emerged as the governor. He tried to get support of American
troops to move against Ismael Khan in Herat but Karzai’s skills prevented
that. In Paktia, the showdown between Badshah Khan Zardan and Saifullah
Khan ended with Badshah Khan becoming governor of Paktia. His brother
Kamal Khan is trying to outsmart his rival Zakim Khan Zadran in Khost.
Interestingly, Kamal is from Paktia and Zakim is from Paktika thus
complicating the regional and clan relations. Haji Abdul Qadeer is again
the governor of Nangarhar province. In north, Dostum and Fahim are
strengthening their position. In the media, only the fighting is getting
the coverage. Behind the scene, many Afghans from all over the globe with
different skills are trying to start the healing process of their
devastated homeland. Many expatriates including teachers, doctors,
economic experts have come to Afghanistan to help to re-build their
country. The involvement of Afghans of different ethnic backgrounds and
with variety of skills has rekindled the hope of a better and peaceful
future for Afghanistan.
Regional Players:
The former Chief of
Staff (COS) of Zia, Lt. General (r) Syed Rafaqat pointed to the complex
and conflicting aims of various regional players, “... Some neighbouring
countries are supportive of various ethnic group’s claims and ambitions.
The external states are using the ethnic and geographic fault lines of
Afghanistan to mirror and advance their own geostrategic interests”.
Many regional countries, which saw an unstable Afghanistan as a threat to
their national interests tried to intervene for variety of reasons. This
exercise rather than stabilizing the region resulted in more widespread
involvement of external forces. The backing of different Afghan factions
further fractured the Afghan society as various players could not
accommodate the genuine desires of their competitors.
Pakistan:
‘Pakistan may have to
co-exist with a new government in Afghanistan that is not to its entire
liking’.
General Khalid M. Arif
After Soviet
invasion, Pakistan’s involvement with Afghanistan was limited to training,
equipping and planning of operations for the resistance fighters to tie
down Soviet Union in Afghanistan as no one expected that Soviets will
leave. Later, when it became clear that Soviets may leave, Pakistan
became more ambitious and worked to have a government in Afghanistan which
is friendly to Islamabad. In 1988, when the Soviet withdrawal was
imminent, ISI and CIA predicted that after Soviet withdrawal, the
Najibullah regime will crumble quickly. In May 1988, Zia promised
Congressman Charles Wilson that ‘I will give you Jalalabad as a Christmas
present, with Hikmatyar in charge’. In 1989, during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s first term in office, ISI embarked on the Jalalabad
offensive to take the city as a base for interim government. At that
time, both United States and Pakistan agreed on this plan but for
different reasons. It was the wish of some hawkish Americans to see the
outright bloody assault on major cities and seeing the humiliation of
Soviets clinging to their helicopters as this would be the befitting
revenge of Vietnam. On Pakistani side, some born again ‘holy warriors’ of
defence establishment were dreaming of heading the victory parade and
entering Kabul as modern day Saladin and to earn the lofty title of
‘Victors of Kabul’. ISI Chief, Lt. General Hamid Gul told the Afghan Cell
(the meetings were attended by Prime Minister Benazir, her National
Security Advisor, Iqbal Akhund, Chief of ISI and US ambassador) that the
city could be taken in a week ‘if the government was prepared to allow for
a certain degree of bloodshed’.18 Pakistanis were not too much concerned
with the nuisance of bloodshed as it was mainly Afghan. Some astute Afghan
commanders on the field were furious about ISIs decision of frontal attack
of the city. One commander considered it a ‘dumb’ idea as it was dumb to
lose ten thousand lives. In one commentator’s words, ‘a major Afghan war
decision was taken by the Pakistanis with no Afghans present, but with the
US ambassador looking on’. Many Afghans resented this blatant
interference and several commanders were alienated. In October 1990
meeting of national commanders shura in Kunar, Afghans blocked the
participation of ISI Chief Asad Durrani and opposed the ISI plan of direct
attack on Kabul. By 1994, Pakistan was disgusted by the civil war and
disappointed due to constant failures of their main ally, Hikmatyar and
started to look for new ‘potential Pushtun proxies in Afghanistan’.
Initially Benazir Bhutto’s Pushtun interior minister, Major General (r)
Naseerullah Khan Babar did the ground breaking work. Later, ISI took the
charge of providing logistic support and broker alliances of General
Dostum, General Shahnawaz Tanai and former commander Jalaluddin Haqqani
with Taliban. These alliances were vital and provided Taliban with
necessary material and technical edge to defeat their rivals. In
addition, the close alliance of Taliban with religious seminaries in
Pakistan provided them with enough foot soldiers to fight at different
fronts in Afghanistan. ISI instructed provincial governments of
Balochistan and North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) not to allow any
political activities of Afghans who were against Taliban. Many
anti-Taliban individuals were asked to leave Pakistan thus preventing any
organized opposition to the Taliban.
After the September
11 attacks, when United States decided to take care of Osama bin Ladin and
Taliban, Pakistan had to make a difficult decision. General Musharraf
decided to distance itself from the fire in Afghanistan and supported US
war efforts in the neighbouring Afghanistan. Pakistan after the
unsuccessful attempts to convince Taliban of the gravity of the situation,
worked with US in toppling them. In view of the dramatic shift in the
Afghan policy, Pakistan now allowed anti-Taliban elements to organize
their activities and open offices in Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence
helped bring together various groups in Peshawar and Quetta and several
members of Afghan diaspora in Europe and United States. This included pro-Zahir
Shah elements, former commanders Abdul Haq, Haji Zaman, Syed Ahmad Gilani,
General Rahim Wardak and Hamid Karzai. These efforts of Pakistani
intelligence in coordination with CIA and the generous amount of money
provided by US were crucial in neutralizing the southern and eastern
Pushtun areas.
The main aim of
Pakistan’s Afghan policy was to have a friendly government in Afghanistan
to secure the Western border. Unfortunately, the policies, which it
adopted, had exactly the opposite effects. None of the Afghan element was
willing to subordinate its actions to Pakistan’s wishes. In fact, many
Afghan groups developed contacts with various political groups and state
institutions of Pakistan giving them leverage. In addition, Pakistan’s
Afghan policy roused the suspicion of Pakistan’s traditional friends, i.e.
China and Iran due to instability of the region. Ironically, some in
Pakistan like Qazi Hussain Ahmad of Jamaat-e-Islami, who has worked
closely with Afghans and Pakistani defence establishment are blaming the
intelligence agencies with the benefit of hindsight. He stated, ‘Pakistan
did not want to see the Afghan people deciding their fate independently’
and ‘were skeptical that if all Afghan people united under one leadership
they would become master of their own fate, which in turn, could create
trouble for Pakistan’. The events had a sobering effect on Pakistani
establishment and have resulted in much pondering about the wisdom of
following a shortsighted policy.
Iran:
"The
enemy of my enemy is my friend."
An Arab proverb
In early eighties due
to its war with Iraq, Iran was not actively involved in Afghanistan.
Iranian activities in Afghanistan quickly increased after the ceasefire
with Iraq. The Shia groups who were bitter due to meagre financial and
military support from Pakistan became close to Iran. Later some moderate
Sunnis including Syed Ahmad Gilani, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Sibghatullah
Mujjaddadi also became close to Iran. The eight resistance groups formed
a ‘Coalition Council’ in Tehran. They told Cordovez in 1988 that they will
not recognize any interim government set up in Peshawar. After the
emergence of several Central Asian Republics (CARs) as independent
countries in 1991, Iran was worried about the increased US influence in
the area. This concern was legitimate as US has publicly announced
several times its policy of isolating Iran. It was in this context that
emergence of Taliban was seen with deep suspicion. Iran believed that
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and US were cooperating in consolidating Taliban,
which will be detrimental to Iranian interests in the area. This prompted
more active Iranian financial and military support of the groups opposing
Taliban. In 1998, the murder of Iranian diplomats when Taliban swept Mazar
Sharif brought two countries to the verge of armed conflict.
When United States
decided to attack Afghanistan, Iran knowing the proximity of a grave
danger to its interests gave verbal support to US efforts. When Gulbadin
Hikmatyar issued statements against the interim Afghan government, Iran
moved quickly to close his offices in Iran. Iranian interior minister said
that opponents of the government of Hamid Karzai ‘who take advantage of
the security they enjoy in Iran to say what they like, could create
tension between Iran and Afghanistan’. Hikmatyar was later asked to
leave Tehran. Iran gave active financial, economic and military support
to Ismael Khan who is well entrenched in Herat but stayed well away from
any measure which would bring US ire. Iran also helped to set up direct
contact of Ismael Khan with Pakistan government.
The main concern of
the three CARs (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) bordering
Afghanistan was the spill over of militants into their territories. They
joined hands with Russia and China to forestall the destabilization of the
whole region. Uzbekistan and Turkey had contacts with Dostum. Dostum took
refuge in Turkey when Taliban ran over his fiefdom. Recently, Turkish
government helped bridging the gap between Dostum and Pakistan.
International
Players:
Many countries
especially United States and Saudi Arabia had played a large role
especially in the last twenty years in the events in Afghanistan. Russia
though major player until 1991 had markedly reduced influence since its
disintegration into many independent states. It has given limited
military help to the Taliban opposition and deployed troops in Tajikistan
near the border of Afghanistan. It is suspicious of increasing US
influence in the area traditionally seen by them as their area of
influence but not in a position to challenge the US in any meaningful way.
In addition, it is also concerned with the increasing influence of
militant Islamists in Chechnya and Daghestan.
Saudi Arabia:
"We
expect men to be wrong about the most important changes through which they
live."
Harold Lasswel
In late seventies,
Saudis were facing severe criticism for their close alliance with US both
from Arab governments not in line with US policies and Iran. After the
1979 Iranian revolution, the Saudi-Iranian relations became hostile.
Saudis used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a springboard to portray
their commitment to Muslim causes and brush up their Islamic credentials.
In early eighties in close cooperation with America, Saudi Arabia provided
a large amount of financial aid for military and humanitarian purposes for
Afghanistan. Several humanitarian organizations of Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf sheikdoms opened offices and ran clinics and hospitals in Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia was able to develop direct relations with some resistance
groups especially Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Hikmatyar. During the Gulf war,
the support of Iraq by Hikmatyar and Sayyaf brought the ire of Saudis and
they worked on new proxies. In 1991, about 7,000 tons of captured Iraqi
military arms and ammunition including heavy equipment was delivered to
Mujahideen.27 Pakistan had close working relations with all Sunni groups,
most of them based in Peshawar. They never tried to bring Shia groups
into the coalition to avoid friction with Saudis. After the cut off of US
funds, Saudis became the largest provider of funds for Afghan adventure.
The direct role of Saudi Arabia also dramatically increased. Chief of
Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki developed close relationship with ISI and
some Afghan factions. He travelled frequently to Islamabad and
Afghanistan. In July 1996, he visited Kandahar and Islamabad and was
actively involved in the planning of fresh offensives of Taliban in close
consultations with Taliban and ISI. Later, the warm relations between
Taliban and Saudis hit the bottom when Taliban refused to cooperate on
Osama bin Ladin issue. Saudi Arabia also funded many charitable
institutions and religious seminaries in Pakistan. Saudis funded the most
conservative individuals and organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ironically, most of them turned against the Saudi royal family and had
openly criticized the royal family for its close relationship with US.
United States:
All wars end. I
think that’s a universal rule. So one of these days this war too will
end. Then I believe the pipeline will be secure.
John Maresca, Vice President of UNOCAL for International Relations
commenting on Afghan civil war in February 1998
President Carter had
signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of pro-Soviet
regime in Kabul in July 1979, about five months before the Soviet army
entered Afghanistan. His national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski
wrote to him the same day that this aid was going to induce a Soviet
military intervention. When Soviets finally came in December 1979,
Brzezinski wrote to Carter that ‘we now have the opportunity of giving to
the USSR its Vietnam war’.28 And the rest is history. Large-scale supply
of arms and ammunition to Afghan resistance during the eighties was
largely the CIA not so covert operation. After the Soviet withdrawal, CIA
let ISI deal with the ugly mess of Afghanistan.
After the emergence
of Central Asian Republics (CARs) as independent countries in 1991 and
the prospects of availability of huge oil and gas reserves in the area
brought that area to the attention of various energy corporations. In
1997, a multinational consortium, Central Asia Gas Pipeline Consortium (CentGas)
was evaluating the construction of a gas pipeline. The proposed 790-mile
pipeline will link Daulatabad gas field in Turkmenistan, pass through
southern Afghanistan to Multan in Pakistan. In the next stage, from
Multan the pipeline will reach Delhi for the growing energy market of
India. UNOCAL of California and Delta of Saudi Arabia was working on
another 1040 mile long oil pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to a
port to be constructed on the coast of Pakistan. Many members of
President Bush team and Afghans involved in current situation have links
with energy corporations. President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice has been former member of the board of Chevron, a large US
oil firm. Vice President Dick Cheney has headed Halliburton, a large oil
pipeline construction firm. Laila Helms, an Afghan-American and
niece-in-law of former CIA director Richard Helms was contact person
between Taliban and UNOCAL and arranged for the visit of Taliban
representatives to United States. The interim chief, Hamid Karzai has
been an advisor to UNOCAL. He has been involved in negotiations of UNOCAL
with Taliban. The former Reagan National Security Advisor, Robert
McFarlane runs a K-Street oil-consulting firm. He was working closely
with Abdul Haq in the region after September 11. In fact, when Haq was
trapped inside Afghanistan, McFarlane made frantic calls to CIA to rescue
him. Taliban promptly executed Haq to discourage other potential
troublemakers. This did not deterred Hamid Karzai who worked with various
groups inside Afghanistan. The gathering of Afghans from all over the
world in Bonn resulted in the temporary agreement on an interim government
which will pave the way for the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) to deliberate
on the future of Afghanistan. The dilemma of present interim government is
that it has to have a sufficient distance from its American supporters so
that Afghans do not perceive it as a puppet of US.
Conclusion
The major problem of
Afghanistan is the relatively low level of Afghan nationalism. The
internal conflict of last two decades with atrocities committed by all
sides on ethnic rivals and forced displacements will make the task of
rekindling the flame of nationalism more difficult. Only educated urban
Afghans have enough nationalistic fervour to overcome strong underlying
sub-national sentiments. This political instability is the major
hindering factor in the resolution of differences among different groups.
Political reconstruction is the essential pre-requisite for the economic
reconstruction of the country. Afghanistan is at a major crossroad of its
history today. The chain of events, which has led to the present
situation, was beyond the control of Afghans. But now, it is Afghans who
will have to do soul searching and make some difficult choices. It depends
a lot on what are long-term objectives of United States. If their aim is
short to medium range that after stabilization to a reasonable level, they
will pull their troops out and may leave it to an international force
dominated by Turkish troops, then Afghans may be more independent in their
decision making in near future. On the contrary, if US decide that
American troops are going to protect the potential oil and gas pipelines
passing through Afghanistan, then choices for Afghans will be limited.
This will ultimately bring the clash between US and some Afghan groups.
The second scenario is less likely as due to domestic concerns, US may not
be able to keep troops in Afghanistan for long even if it wished. Second,
economically, the oil and gas pipelines are mainly corporate concerns and
not US national concern, therefore the broad national support for
continued long term troop deployment will be limited. The potential
pipelines are mainly for emerging energy markets of Asia, not much for the
rest of the world. Recent decision of British to gradually hand over the
peacekeeping responsibility to Turkish troops is a sign that British and
US would limit their direct troop involvement. Afghans have to do the
mind-boggling calculations to decide which path to follow, which not only
restores the dignity and morale of Afghan nation but also allays the fears
of its immediate neighbours, Iran and Pakistan and satisfy the concerns of
United States. On the positive side, a balanced and low key Afghan
rejuvenation may bring a bright future for its new generation. Failure to
achieve a modest stabilization may herald the nightmare of anarchy and
bloodshed. Another round of orgy of blood may cause the division of
Afghanistan at the Hindu Kush. The northern Tajik, Uzbek and Turkeman
drifting toward their ethnic kins across the border while southern and
eastern Pushtuns gravitating to Pushtuns across Durand line.
"Consider not only
present but future discords...... If one waits until they are at hand,
the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable."
Machiavelli
Notes:
[1] The Friday Times, March 03, 2002
[2] Afridi, Fazal-ur-Rehman. The
Phenomenon of Afghan Warlords. The Frontier Post (Internet Edition),
February 11, 2002
[3] Rafaqat, Syed. Lt. General (r).
Afghanistan Imbroglio: Then and Now. Dawn (Internet Edition), October 31,
2001
[4] Arif, Khalid M. General (r).
Afghanistan’s Difficult Hour. Dawn (Internet Edition), November 28, 2001
[5] The News (Internet Edition), October
26, 2001
[6] Ahmad, Hussain Qazi. Compelling
Lessons From The Afghan Crisis.The News (Internet Edition), December 10,
2001
[7] Dawn (Internet Edition), February 11,
2002
[8] Testimony of vice president,
International Relations of UNOCAL John Maresca to House Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific and Committee on International Relations, February
12, 1998. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees. March 07, 2002
