Introduction
Politics and profession of soldiering
has nothing in common. They are totally different but essential elements
of any society. Politicians and soldiers have an interesting relationship
in all societies. In societies where civilians are in control, military
officers act in accepted boundaries though ready to defend their turf
against civilian encroachment. In societies where political institutions
are weak and there is lack of consensus on legitimate course of
succession, soldiers gradually expand their area of influence. They
gradually restrict the role of civilians in various areas and sometimes
directly take over the state replacing the civilians. This generally
accepted model does not mean that military as an institution has no
relevance to the important policy decisions. Even in countries where the
tradition of civilian supremacy is well established, military has a
political role relating to national security, albeit a different one. One
commentator has correctly pointed that “the military’s political role is a
question not of whether but of how much and what kind”.
This article will evaluate soldier’s
attitude towards political activity and how it develops. This will be
followed by the details of Pakistani experience of politicization of
officer’s corps and how repeated and prolonged military rules have
militarized the politics. In the end, the complex relationship between
soldiers and politicians will be summarized.
Soldiers & Politics
Soldier’s disdain for politics and
politicians is universal. Soldiers by nature of their training and job
requirement place high value on discipline, recognized chain of command
and espirit de corps. These values are essential for any professional
army. Soldiers generalize these values and attitudes to the whole society
without appreciating the difficulties and various conflicting demands by
interest groups in a modern nation state. In under-developed countries,
the problems are compounded by host of other negative social and economic
factors. Discussion, debate and arguments about different points of view
are essential ingredients of politics in every society. The nature of
political activity is more chaotic on surface. Soldier’s concept of
political order is based on the model of discipline, which he has learned
in his barracks and daily life. “Institutions that permit disorder are
condemned. The men who purposefully encourage disorder, as well as those
whose inactions inadvertently allow for disorder, are dangerous”. This is how soldier sees the political activity of his
society. Political activity is seen as undermining of the discipline of
society and politicians as opportunists and self-seeking demagogues. This
thought process is at the root of how a military first withdraws respect
and later support of any civilian government which is followed by kicking
the quarrelling politicians out of the corridors of power. The chaos and
instability caused by the weak civilian institutions is blamed for paving
the way for military to take over the state. This is the universal
justification used by all military rulers. Once the politicians are
condemned as useless bunch, the question arises then who is competent to
run the state? Now the self-righteous attitude of officer corps comes into
play. In under-developed countries, military sees itself as the most
modern institution of the society. In addition, being a member of a well
organized and disciplined force and overdose of patriotic and
nationalistic symbols reinforces the notion that soldiers are more
competent than civilians. In countries where military is the dominant
institution, the military leadership considers itself as ‘final arbiters
of political process, final judges as to whether a particular turn of
events is acceptable from their standpoint as the guardians of national
integrity’.
Modern military is essentially a large
bureaucratic organization. The negative attitude of soldiers towards
politics is partly related to this fact, which is shared by the civilian
bureaucrats. Soldiers look at the policy decisions and difficult conflicts
of the society in administrative and technical terms. In case of Pakistan,
this thought process is deeply rooted in the colonial past of the country.
British colonial policy makers in twentieth century thought that natives
were not educated enough or mature enough to run their own affairs. What
they needed was a good administration. Make sure that law and order is
maintained and there is peaceful environment for economic activity.
Natives were allowed to run the municipalities and serve at Viceroy’s
Council as advisors but had no role in vital decision-making process. This
colonial model of running the state was based on the notion of
‘administration’ rather than ‘governance’. The ‘sword arm’ and ‘steel
frame’ of the Raj was the real government. Politicians were men who were
allowed to run only ‘certain’ affairs and could be send home anytime when
it was determined by British that they were not doing their job. The armed
and unarmed bureaucrats of Pakistan who took control in the first ten
years after independence were the product of this system. From soldier’s
point of view, military’s direct control of the state was aimed at
‘lifting government above politics’. The general negative attitude of Pakistani officer corps
towards political activity is not different from any other military.
The soldier has replaced the civilian.
What to do next? Due to the nature of their ethos and training, military
leaders run a tightly controlled and highly authoritarian model of
government. The decision making process is not seen a ‘political
enterprise’ but ‘an apolitical, problem-solving exercise’. Military leaders disdain political activity and mass
participation as it causes disorder. In the early part of the military
rule, this can be achieved easily without excessive use of force. The
circumstances under which Ayub Khan in 1958 and General Musharraf in 1999
took over gave some transient room for personal charisma of the coup
leader. Unstable political activity from 1954 to 1958 (the main cause of
which was the authoritative intervention and intrigues of Governor
General) and charisma of Ayub resulted in initial welcome of coup by
general public. Similarly, complex problems of a soft state like Pakistan
in 1999 had caused sufficient apathy of general public and personal
charisma of Musharraf worked in favour of military. Both cases proved once
again that ‘legitimation through charisma alone tends to be unstable and
transitory’. The military men should know better. Even genuinely populist
civilian leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could not last more than four years as
he was unable to address the fundamental issues facing the society. Once
the military rule is prolonged some kind of participation becomes
essential. This means that the reluctant military leader has to embark on
a course, which he hates. He has to indulge in ‘the demeaning and
distasteful business of compromise and bargaining’.
This confusion in soldier’s mind, believing that the
particular course is harmful but then he has no choice results in a very
confusing and complicated situation. Ayub Khan had extensively spoken and
written against politics and politicians. Once his rule was extended, he
had to shed his uniform (a fatal mistake which his successor would not
repeat), patronize a political party named Conventional Muslim League and
had to work with political entities. He ruled long enough to see the
futility of his exercise when he has to sit with quarrelling politicians
of Pakistan in a round table conference and to his utter dismay had to
accept their demands. General Zia-ul-Haq experimented with a non-party
election in 1985 but it proved to be a non-starter. In less than three
years, he had wound up the whole facade of democracy without politics.
General Musharraf confident of his abilities to sort out the national mess
also held the simplistic notion. He declared the democracy, which he has
kicked out, was ‘sham’. In three years, he was recycling the same
politicians he had denounced and propped up a shaky coalition of diverse
interest groups on the shoulders of military. The chances of present
civilian set up to last even two years are very slim. If it lasts longer
than that it will be only due to the corruption of the politicians and
deliberate decision of the parliamentarians to work under the benevolent
patronage of the GHQ and never to question the will of the generals.
Politicization of Military
When military takes over the state, it
needs ‘civilian allies or backers for reasons of legitimacy, expertise, or
policy implementation’. Military attempts to address the legitimacy dilemma by
arranging for an electoral process which is closely monitored and if
needed adjusted by the soldiers. Ayub’s experiment of Basic Democracies,
Zia’s holding of elections in 1985 on non-party basis and present civilian
set up carved by General Musharraf are examples of attempts of military
leaders to give some semblance of legitimacy. In all these cases, army
chief was the final arbiter of all major policy decisions. Military
governments use civilians in areas, which need special skills like
economic affairs. Military leaders usually choose non-political
technocrats for such jobs. Veteran bureaucrat Aziz Ahmad worked with Ayub,
Mian Muzaffar Ahmad with Yahya Khan, Ghulam Ishaque Khan and V. A. Jafri
with Zia and Shaukat Aziz with General Musharraf to run the economic
sector and planning for development programmes. In case of Pakistan,
military rulers have used civilian bureaucrats for policy implementation
at all levels. All these measures inevitably involve soldiers with
political decisions.
In case of Pakistan, the political role
of the military has been institutionalized over the last fifty-five years.
The methodology has been redesigned according to the prevailing
circumstances. Pakistan army like any other army is a hierarchical
organization with a visible chain of command and proper methodology of
carrying out the orders of the military leaders. The military leaders have
used what is called a ‘managerial approach’. Army chief works with Corps Commanders and Principle Staff
Officers (PSOs) about carrying out the will of the organization. At higher
level, chief informs and consults his colleagues with reasonable amount of
debate and discussion about various decisions. This approach actually
strengthens the command and control of the military as an institution.
This helps the chief when he is negotiating or dictating to civilians and
when military is in direct control of the state helps to implement
policies with least friction.
Politicization of army officers is the
natural outcome of military intervention although the degree may be
different depending on the methodology of the ruling regime. Once the
military becomes the dominant institution, a new class of officers emerges
which elaborates military’s political role. This is the ‘military
intellectual’ class. In case of Pakistan, this class of officers
(exclusively senior officers) has attended Command and Staff College at
Quetta and National Defence College (NDC) in Islamabad. Increasingly,
officers belonging to two military intelligence organizations, Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) are visibly
found playing plain politics. In Pakistan, the most vocal proponents and
defenders of military rulers are the most politicized officers who have
been directly involved in political intrigues. When the military’s role is
expanded to nation building tasks, the political role of the military is
not seen as a defence of specific class or ethnic interest but as the
autonomous representation of the ‘national interest’. The external threat
from a larger neighbour was seen only in military terms, which resulted in
no meaningful dialogue about defence issues as generals kept everybody
else out of this area. To this, external threat was added the issue of
internal subversion by dissatisfied citizens. In this background, the
expanding role of the state’s intelligence and security apparatus is a
logical outcome as ‘internal threat’ is a significant one and military
assign itself the mission “to prevent the ‘internal enemy’ from
threatening the economic, social and political order”. In 50s and 60s Pakistan was closely allied with United
States through various defence pacts. A large number of officers were
trained in United States and it was quite natural for them to view the
world through the prism of cold war. The ‘anti-communist’ stand of the
officer corps was almost universal. Progressive and left leaning officers
were gradually eased out of the armed forces especially after the failed
coup attempt in 1951. This didn’t mean that ‘religious’ officers replaced
them. The senior brass was thoroughly westernized and secular in outlook.
The military brass came to the conclusion that the country’s strategic
interests will be served better with alliance with United States. In 60s
and 70s, there was close cooperation in defence areas with China. Although
China is considered a reliable friend by defence establishment, they are
not anxious to implement Chinese model for armed forces or society. In
80s, Pakistani military intelligence agency, ISI worked closely with
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in not so covert operations in
Afghanistan against Soviet Union. This interaction was a bit different than earlier
cooperation in 50s and 60s. There were limited number of officers (mainly
from intelligence and military police branches) who were trained in US
institutions and role of CIA operatives inside Pakistan was limited.
Different weapons and explosives experts from various branches of US armed
forces trained their Pakistani counterparts. Since 1980s, more officers
are from middle and lower middle class due to shrinking employment
opportunities for youth. In addition, after the disintegration of Soviet
Union and retreat of leftists, the links between Pakistan defence
establishment and US first became estranged and later completely cut off.
This new generation of senior officers, which is now at the senior posts,
is trained at facilities inside Pakistan. The general trend of the society
towards closer look at Islam has also touched the armed forces. Many
senior officers are practicing Muslims like civilians. This does not mean
that these officers have turned extremists. They are more nationalistic
and concerned about issues affecting other Muslim communities and consider
United States as an unreliable partner as far as Pakistan’s interests are
concerned. This trend is reflective of the change, which has occurred in
the society in the last two decades. This change further reinforced the
self-assigned role for the military to directly administer the state. The
army was now not only responsible for the state of Pakistan but as a
nuclear power has some obligation to the imaginary Muslim community (Ummah)
all over the world. September 11 and its international aftermath forced
the military brass to think more rationally and take into account the
ground realities which had been conveniently ignored in the past.
Military officers generally blame
civilians for politicization of the armed forces and Pakistan is no
exception. A former close associate of General Zia-ul-Haq, blaming the
civilian politicians states that it is due to ‘immaturity of political
parties’ that show ‘lack of vision in politicizing the defenders of the
country’. General Musharraf after his coup in 1999 also accused Nawaz
Sharif of trying to politicize the senior brass. The issue is not that
simple and one sided as generals try to put forward. Even a cursory look
at the fifty-five year history of the country gives a totally different
picture. It is actually the military rule, which politicizes the army
officers. Repeated military intervention has lowered the threshold for the
involvement of army officers in civil affairs. The fragmentation of
boundaries between civil and military life has resulted in now even middle
rank officers uttering partisan political statements. In Pakistan, with
each successive coup, the number of officers involved in political
activities has gradually increased. Ayub Khan after initial consolidation
co-opted various civilian groups to run the state, although various
political programmes of the regime were discussed in the armed forces.
When Ayub decided to introduce the Basic Democracies, the Navy Chief at a
navy commanding officers meeting discussed the programme. Yahya Khan’s tenure was too short and traumatic (separation
of Eastern Wing as independent country in 1971) to ensure entrenchment of
army officers but some of them became adept to playing politics. Zia’s
long haul gave enough time for gradual spilling of army officers in
political arena. Over the last three years, many officers of present
military government have gradually got their feet wet in the art of
politicking. When senior officers hob knob with politicians and involved
in making and breaking of political parties, it is quite natural that
these officers will make their own alliances for personal or institutional
reasons. This creates a very complex situation, further embroiling them in
political intrigues. Major General Rao Farman Ali was sent to East
Pakistan as political advisor of the Yahya regime and in this capacity was
involved in political manoeuvring. During 1970 elections, the Director of
IB, N. A. Rizvi collected Rs 4 million from ten leading industrialists to
help the candidates of different political parties. The money was given to
senior army officers in East Pakistan for election purposes. Farman was
the main link between politicians of East Pakistan and military
government. After the 1977 coup, General Zia brought Farman to his newly
established election cell to make use of the political intrigues he had
learnt in East Pakistan. Similarly, Zia brought Major General (later
General) Khalid Arif as his Chief of Staff (COS) due to his previous
experience with Martial Law duties. Arif had served as President of a
summary Military Court when he was Major in 1962. In March 1969, as Lt.
Colonel, he worked at GHQ and was part of the team, which finalized the
details of Yahya Khan’s take over. After 1969 Martial Law, he worked under
Brigadier (later Major General) Rahim Khan in the nerve centre of military
regime at GHQ. In his long military career, in the senior position, Arif
had commanded only a brigade for two short years. It is quite natural that
such experiences will result in sharpening of political rather than
military skills of an officer. In 1988, when Zia died in a mysterious
plane crash along with top military brass, the military decided to work
behind the scene. The blatant interference of senior army brass in
domestic political intrigues further complicated the situation rather than
solving problems. Army Chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg summoned Provincial
Chief Ministers to GHQ. He plainly told his audience that, “the PPP must
not win the forthcoming elections and Benazir Bhutto will be unacceptable
to the Army as Prime Minister”. He also reassured his audience that
Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM — a relatively new party representing
interests of the descendants of Muslim refugees who emigrated from India
in 1947. General Beg belongs to that community) was in his pocket. The task was assigned to Brigadier Imtiaz who served as
Additional Director of Political Wing of ISI in 1988. In this capacity, he
worked to cob an alliance called Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic
Democratic Front) against Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). A former aid of
Nawaz Sharif admitted that Brigadier Imtiaz helped even in coining Punjabi
slogans for the alliance. He became close to Nawaz Sharif during this time. PPP got
most of the seats and due to various factors military had to allow Benazir
Bhutto to become Prime Minister with significant limitations. In late
1989, opposition parties at the encouragement of military brass started to
work on a no-confidence motion against Benazir. In November 1989,
Brigadier Imtiaz and Major Amir (heading the Islamabad section of ISI) in
a clandestine move offered large sums of money to two members of PPP (Rao
Rashid and Arif Awan) to encourage other members of PPP to support
no-confidence motion. Brigadier Imtiaz who was no more with ISI was
sufficiently politicized and had his own interests at play that he
participated in this plan. The government with the help of Intelligence
Bureau (IB) trapped the two officers and recorded their conversation and
gave to army chief, who simply retired the two officers and no action was
taken against them. When Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister, he rewarded the two
officers by giving them prestigious posts. Brigadier Imtiaz was made
Director of IB while Major Amir was made Special Advisor to the Chief
Minister of North West Frontier Province. The question whether these two
officers were acting on their own on a personal agenda or had support of
some in the GHQ has never been answered. Lack of accountability of
politicized officers by military brass sends a wrong signal to the officer
corps. Some officers may want to play the game of political intrigue as it
may bring rich dividends. In 1990, when Benazir government was dismissed
and new elections were scheduled, ISI collected Rs 140 million ($6.5
million) and distributed to various politicians to influence the outcome
of the elections. It is inevitable that officers who are involved in the
political role of the military will have different perceptions about
various issues facing the country. Few examples will show how the views of
politicized officers are influenced by their assignments and perceptions
can change so quickly when they have to deal with complex problems
themselves. During Pakistan National Alliance’s (PNA) agitation against
Bhutto in 1977, one of the demand was withdrawing cases against Pushtun
and Baloch leaders who were being tried in Hyderabad on secession charges
and winding up of military operations in Balochistan. Bhutto referred this
particular demands to General Zia and military brass. There was a
unanimous opinion of military commanders against accepting this demand.
Zia had a meeting with leaders of PNA and vehemently opposed the idea. DG
ISI Major General Ghulam Jilani Khan also gave a presentation giving the
evidence against the detained leaders to Maulana Mufti Mahmud. After
Martial Law in 1977, when Zia himself had to handle the complex situation,
he dissolved the Hyderabad Tribunal, set everybody free and gave general
amnesty to Baloch insurgents. Arif calls this ‘Zia’s political
understanding and statesmanship’. When civilians are running the government (with all
limitations), military brass accuses them for being soft with India and
any attempt of reconciliation is seen with suspicion. The view takes a
U-turn when army is in charge of the country. Arif calls Zia’s decision to
attend the funeral of Indira Gandhi ‘an act of considerable acumen and
foresight’. General Musharraf did not approve of Nawaz Sharif’s attempts
to negotiate with India and skipped the function of reception of Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vernacular press hounded the Prime
Minister for his ‘soft’ position towards India. When Musharraf took over,
the difficult situation of the country now dawned on him and in next two
years, he went out of his way to try to open a dialogue with India.
Assignment of political role to serving
officers is not a simple and straightforward of normal military chain of
command issue. It raises an important question of how a junior officer is
supposed to act when asked by the senior to perform an essentially
political activity? The officer is professional and does not believe in
political role but ordered by the senior. Can he refuse the order? If yes,
then can he be punished through military law? If he obeys the order, is he
liable for his actions, which are carried out on the orders of senior
officers? Where lies the responsibility? These are the critical issues,
which need an in-house dialogue and discussion at the highest level at
GHQ. If military continues to perform the task of running the state, they
have to come up with a working formula, otherwise it will further confuse
the situation. The officers, who have joined politics after retirement,
have become highly politicized during their service and have been accused
of many transgressions. Most of these officers have been at senior
positions during 1971 crisis or have served with military intelligence
organizations. Just like politicians, when the politicized officers are
accused of some wrongdoing, it is quite natural that they will defend
themselves. Due to the nature of their profession, the accusation will be
related to defence or national security area. In their defence, the
officers tend to use arguments by using the rhetoric of patriotism and try
to label their accusers (usually politicians) as non-patriotic. This is
done to portray them in favourable light and cast doubt about others.
Recently, the over use of Islamic symbols and themes by these officers to
divert the onslaught against them are becoming more prominent. A few
examples will illustrate how this activity confuses the situation and
polarizes the society further. It is damaging not only to the political
process but also the institution of armed forces. When Gul was heading ISI,
three important events directly relating to the institution he was heading
occurred. In April 1988, the huge ammunition dump at Ojhri Camp in
Rawalpindi (a large amount of arms and ammunition was stored in the centre
of a major city against all normal military safety rules for onward supply
to Afghan resistance fighters) blew up resulting in huge loss of life and
property. In August 1988, army chief and President of the country General
Zia-ul-Haq along with top military brass died in a mysterious plane crash.
In February 1989, the ill-planned Jalalabad offensive was launched which
was a dismal failure with a large number of casualties. Gul has been
criticized on professional grounds about the Jalalabad operation but he
countered by blaming the civilian government of Benazir Bhutto and using
ideological rhetoric. The result was that critical evaluation of a
military operation gone wrong got bogged down into personal accusations
and counter-accusations. Nobody has yet even asked the question of any
responsibility about Ojhri Camp blast and Zia’s plane crash. Later, when
he was sacked, he added the anti-American flavour to the debate. After
retirement, as a private citizen, he has the right to express his opinion
about different issues, with which one may agree or disagree but that
should not cloud the basic concept of responsibility for one’s actions
while in service. Pakistan’s Afghan policy (run exclusively by ISI and
army) of the last two decades has been embedded in the rhetoric of
ideological and Islamic symbolism, preventing any rational and critical
analysis and lessons learned. The political and ideological camouflage by
various politicized officers have prevented any meaningful dialogue and
serious debate about various military operations and national security
policies, let alone any accountability. A very curious and strange
phenomenon has been operational in Pakistan, where wearing two, three or
four stars with associated perks and privileges is considered an
achievement without a grain of responsibility. The perverted logic, which
is used is that the officer deserve the lofty appointment but is not
responsible if something goes wrong during his watch.
In any society, the relationships
between armed forces officers and various civilians including politicians
are not an anomaly as long as the armed forces are not vying for direct
power. In case of Pakistan, due to repeated military interventions, both
politicians and senior army officers have used this relationship to mutual
advantage. When one looks closely, a very interesting picture emerges. Lt.
General Fazal Haq had close relationship with political leaders of all
parties including Wali Khan (Awami National Party), Mufti Mahmud (Jamiate-Ulamae-Islam)
and Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (PPP). Chief of National Democratic Party (NDP)
Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari used to be personal guest of Fazal Haq in the
Governor House whenever he visited Peshawar. Major General (Retd)
Naseerullah Khan Babar is a close friend of former Sindh military governor
Lt. General Jahandad Khan during Zia rule. As a senior leader of PPP, not
infrequently, arrest orders of Babar were issued. He would spend the night
in the Governor House and when he would come out in the morning, the
police will take him to another comfortable place. This pathetic exercise
was done when ordinary PPP workers were being tortured in different jails
and publicly flogged. Zia’s Air Force Chief Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan
had differences with Zia. This automatically brought him close to Benazir
Bhutto and PPP. He served as ambassador to Washington during PPP
government in 1989. This mutually beneficial relationship prevents any
accountability of politicians who have close personal ties with military
elite during military rule and any accountability of military brass during
civilian rule. This mutually corrupting influence has long-term negative
effects on the development of responsible political culture and has eroded
professionalism of the armed forces. On the other end of the spectrum,
mutually hostile relationship between some officers and politicians has
also unwanted consequences. When the differences between Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif and General Musharraf became apparent after Kargil operations
in 1999, a very difficult situation emerged. Several senior officers
aligned themselves according to the prevailing situation. Sidelining of
two Corps Commanders (Lt. General Tariq Pervez and Lt. General Saleem
Haider) by Musharraf who were perceived as having sympathies with Sharif
resulted in total breakdown of any trust between the Prime Minister and
army chief. Musharraf saw this act essential to keep cohesion of the
senior brass to confront civilian leaders while Sharif saw this move as a
deliberate effort to isolate him by removing all officers who may have
some soft corner for the civilians. Pakistan may have to wait a decade
before the details of October 1999 coup and the role of different civilian
and military players come into limelight. If past is any guide, one can
fairly easily visualize the scenario. While the initial takeover by the
military could be camouflaged under patriotic and idealistic symbols, ‘but
too often the military’s custodianship of government degenerates into
factionalism, extravagant defence budgets and corporate featherbedding,
and social irresponsibility’. Despite lofty ideals, this is unfortunately the legacy of
military rule.
The rise of intelligence and security
apparatus is the inevitable outcome of prolonged and repeated military
domination of the society. The political armies for effective control use
increasing internal and external surveillance for systematic information
gathering. It painstakingly builds up ‘the organization of permanent
supervision through informants or political commissars, and widespread
practices of repression, intimidation and political blackmail’. In case of Pakistan, there has been a meteoric rise of the
intelligence agencies in the last two decades. The clout of intelligence
officers in the society and military has dramatically increased. This has further complicated the political scenario. The
effect on military itself can be judged from the fact that a large number
of heads of MI and ISI have been sacked/retired before completing their
terms. The list of generals includes Hamid Gul, Asad Durrani, Javed Ashraf
Qazi, Javed Nasir, Ziauddin Butt and Mahmud Ahmad. In addition, increasing
role of officers with intelligence background in different sections of the
society after retirement is another landmark of the complexity of the
problem.
Militarization of Politics
Once the domination of the military in
a society is complete, the polity undergoes a radical change. ‘Military
leaders are thus wooed not only by incumbent elites but also by their
oppositions, each group seeking to advance its own interests by allying to
itself the managers of organized coercion’. The politicization of military, the sole legitimate arm of
state coercion further complicates an already confused environment. The
politicians who are against the incumbent civilian government, knowing the
real source of power, hobnob with the military brass to achieve their
objectives. They see the major source of support and potential threat from
the military. This means that they will look for officers who are loyal to
their political party and try to influence the promotions, postings and
transfers of these officers when they are in power. This results in
undermining of the cohesion of armed forces. Politicians, rather than
fighting their political duels at polling booths and in the legislative
assemblies, tend to take the short cut by creating such a situation where
military steps in to remove the civilian foes. In addition, the political
parties seeing the odds against the entrenched army officers in all areas
try to woo army officer to their ranks. This helps them in two ways.
First, it makes them acceptable to military brass as they have a fair
number of former army officers in senior positions. Secondly, it gives
them ammunition and legitimacy in criticizing the ruling military regime
to extract maximum concessions from the military rulers. Criticism by
Benazir Bhutto is generally labelled as unpatriotic activity by defence
establishment but the scathing criticism by the military member of PPP,
Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar does not get similar
treatment. Pakistani politics has seen an interesting phenomenon where
disproportionately large number of retired officers of armed forces are
finding place in political parties. A close look at the career of officers
who have joined the much hated and despised political arena gives an
insight into the dynamics of power politics in Pakistan. Major General
Akbar Khan (former Chief of General Staff — CGS) was convicted in 1951 for
the conspiracy to overthrow the civilian government and sentenced to
fourteen years imprisonment but was released after four years. Later in
his life, Akbar talked about his thinking in 1951. He stated that ‘we had
disagreement with the government about Kashmir independence, agreement on
ceasefire and delaying the formulation of a constitution by Liaquat Ali
Khan’. He added that although we have fought in Kashmir, the government
agreed to ceasefire ‘without asking us’. After his release in 1955, he joined Awami League of Hussain
Shaheed Suharwardy (he was member of central working committee). In 1958,
he was organizing a new political party named ‘Millat Party’, when Ayub
Khan took over and banned all political activities. In 1968, he joined
Pakistan Peoples Party and served as the member of Central Working
Committee. He lost the election in 1970 for the National Assembly but
served as Bhutto’s National Security Advisor and later Minister for
Internal Security. He also served as ambassador to Czechoslovakia and
labour advisor. Major General Sher Ali Khan who was sacked by Ayub served
as Minister of Information and National Affairs during Yahya Khan’s
government in 1970. Lt. General Umrao Khan (a close confidant of Ayub
Khan) joined Jamaat-e-Islami briefly after his retirement. Lt. General
Muhammad Azam Khan was a close confidant of Ayub Khan and served as
minister and Governor during first military regime. After his
disagreements with Ayub, when he was sacked, he openly supported Miss
Fatima Jinnah during 1965 elections against Ayub. Later, he led his own
faction of Muslim League called Jinnah League. Major General (Retd)
Tajjamal Hussain Malik (former General Officer Commanding of a Division
who was convicted for conspiracy to overthrow Zia government in 1980 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released when Benazir took power)
joined Tehreek-e-Istiqlal (headed by former Air Force Chief Air Marshal
(r) Asghar Khan). In six months, he got fed up and announced the formation
of his own party, Islami Inqilab Party (Islamic Revolution Party). Lt.
General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi (Commander of Eastern Command in East
Pakistan in 1971, where he surrendered to Indian forces and became
prisoner of war) when he came back from India at one time became head of
another faction of Muslim League (Qayyum Group). Major General (Retd) Rao
Farman Ali was in-charge of Political Affairs in East Pakistan in 1971.
The reason he was assigned this task that he had done an administrative
staff course which qualified him for political intrigues. His official
appointment was Chief of Staff to Governor. In this capacity, he had close
contacts with political leaders of East Pakistan. After his return from
India, he served as Chairman of Fauji Foundation. After Zia’s coup, he was
member of the election cell set up by Zia and was involved in meetings
with politicians. He lost the election bid in 1985 non-party elections.
Later, he joined National Peoples Party (NPP), a splinter group from PPP
orchestrated by the military government of Zia and headed by Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoi (a former colleague of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto). Lt. General
Khawaja Muhammad Azhar had served in ISI during Ayub regime as Colonel and
at one time was acting DG of ISI. In this capacity, he was involved in
surveillance of political and military foes of the regime, especially
during the crucial early part of Martial Law when Sikandar Mirza was
ousted. He had personally interrogated many prominent people who were not
considered loyal to Ayub. During Yahya regime he served as Quarterm/aster
General (QMG) and military governor of N.W.F.P. Later he became Secretary
General and Vice President of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan. Major General
Muhammad Hussain Ansari was GOC in East Pakistan in 1971. After the
surrender he spent few years in India as prisoner of war (POW). This
traumatic experience for many soldiers had its effects. A number of
officers during their sojourn as POW in India looked towards religion for
solace. A number of these officers joined Sufi organizations. When Ansari
came back from India, he was made Director of Lahore Development
Authority. He joined Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan and was elected to national
assembly in 1988 elections. He is in charge of Accountability Cell of the
party. Air Marshal Noor Khan was Air Force Chief when Yahya Khan took over
in 1969. In the loot for ministries during that time, he ended up taking
four ministries (Education, Health, Labour and Social Welfare) under his
wings. When the internal conflicts between ruling junta started to strain
the relationships, Yahya retired him and sent him as Governor of West
Pakistan (the Naval Chief, S. M. Ahsan was also retired and sent as
Governor of East Pakistan). He was elected to National Assembly in 1985
non-party elections from Attock. Colonel Abbasi was heading Azad Kashmir
Jamaat-e-Islami in 1977. In 1985, Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti, former
Corps Commander and close confidant of General Zia who was retired in
1980, toyed with the idea of forming a new political party (with the help
of Justice (Retd) Shaukat Ali who was head of Liberal Muslim League), but
seeing no response shelved it. Lt. General Fazal Haq was a close confidant
of Zia who served as Corps Commander and military Governor of N.W.F.P.. He
retired in 1985 and in 1987 was elected to Senate. In 1988 when Zia sacked
Junejo government, Haq became caretaker Chief Minister of N.W.F.P. In 1988
elections, he was elected to National Assembly. Lt. General Abdul Majid
Malik during Ayub regime as Major was involved with Martial Law work as
staff officer. He retired in 1976 and served as ambassador to Morocco. He
was elected to National Assembly in 1985 and 1988 elections and served as
Chairman of Anti-Corruption Committee. He joined the resurrected military
supported political party, Muslim League but later joined the Nawaz Sharif
faction of Muslim League. After the ouster of Nawaz Sharif by military in
1999, he joined the splinter faction of Muslim League named Quaid-e-Azam,
organized by intelligence agencies of Musharraf government. He is now
member of National Assembly after the 2002 elections.
Lt. General Javed Nasir worked closely
with Nawaz Sharif both during active service and after his retirement
though he was not a formal member of Muslim League. He is also actively
involved in the non-political, proselytizing Tableeghi Jamaat. Nasir is
not known for his intellectual brilliance or political acumen but he was
kept on board as he was the former super spy of Pakistan. It is quite
natural that he will have soft corner for Nawaz Sharif. After the nuclear
tests in 1998, he gave all credit to Sharif. He stated, “Allah was very
kind and put in his heart a momentous decision”. Even a common man on the street knows that no civilian
leader has any clue about the nuclear programme let alone making any
important decision regarding this area. Lt. General Hamid Gul is head of
his own small party while former army chief Mirza Aslam Beg leads another
small party called Awami Qiadat Party.
The working relationship between
officers of armed forces and political parties is an interesting area of
study in case of Pakistan. A closer look at Pakistan Peoples Party, a
party, generally viewed as against military rulers gives an interesting
insight into the dynamics of this equation. Former Army Chief General
Tikka Khan was for a long time Secretary General of PPP. Major General (Retd)
Akbar Khan worked closely with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in various capacities
and was member of Central Committee of the party. Major General (Retd)
Naseerullah Khan Babar (former Inspector General of Frontier Corps — a
paramilitary force responsible for defence of western border of the
country with Afghanistan) was the right hand man of Benazir Bhutto and
served as her Interior Minister during her two stints as Prime Minister.
Babar played a significant role in Pakistan’s Afghan policy (1988-1990 and
1993-96) despite that his responsibilities as Interior Minister were
restricted to internal law and order of the country. The former Provincial
head of ISI in Sindh province, Brigadier Aman is Secretary to Benazir
Bhutto. Another member of Central Committee of PPP is Major (Retd) Masud
Sharif Khattak who has served as Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB), a
civilian intelligence agency of the country. Major General (Retd) Ahsan
Ahmad served as Minister of Health and Population in Sindh during the
military government of Musharraf. In October 2002, he joined PPP.
Government alleged that he had been removed due to his malpractices and
corruption while Ahmad in a press conference criticized Musharraf for
destabilizing the country. Interestingly, after diligently serving as provincial
minister with all perks for a long time in a military government, the
change of heart was so quick that he resigned/sacked in the morning and
joined PPP in the afternoon. Major (Retd) Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao served
for a long time the PPP head in N.W.F.P. before deciding to venture into a
solo flight.
In 1977, after the military take over,
Zia faced a difficult dilemma and he had to postpone elections as pre-coup
conditions could not be allowed to come back. For obvious reasons, PPP
could not be allowed to come back in power while assessment by various
people aligned with Zia was that in case of elections, PPP would win
despite recent setbacks. Zia established an election cell run by two
serving generals (Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti and Major General Jamal Said
Mian) and two retired Major Generals (Rao Farman Ali and Ehsan-ul-Haq). In
this capacity, these officers held meetings with different political
leaders. Military regime has to work on re-engineering of the social and
political scene before it could give back some of the powers to civilians.
It was with this aim that the Muslim League was resurrected during Zia
time. The DG of ISI Major General (later Lt. General) Ghulam Jilani Khan
started to work with a large number of politicians who were opposed to
PPP. He was instrumental in connecting a large number of politicians with
Zia regime. Later, as Governor of Punjab province, he was solely
responsible for grooming a new political elite under the direct patronage
of military rulers. Nawaz Sharif along with most of his colleagues was the
product of this experiment. He gradually worked his way up from provincial
finance minister to chief minister and finally Prime Minister of the
country twice before being booted out by the army itself. Many colleagues
of Nawaz Sharif were retired army officers. Lt. General (Retd) Majid Malik
(served as federal minister for Kashmir Affairs), Lt. General (Retd) Javed
Nasir (former DG ISI who served as special advisor), Brigadier (Retd)
Imtiaz (served as Director of IB), Major (Retd) Amir (special advisor to
Chief Minister of N.W.F.P.), Major (Retd) Nadir Pervez (served as Minister
of State for Interior after 1985 elections and Minister of State of Water
and Power after 1990 elections), Colonel (Retd) Mushtaque Tahir Kheli
(political secretary). In addition, many relatives and sons of senior
officers have worked closely with Nawaz Sharif. During the present
military government, the Corps Commanders held regular meetings with all
political leaders. The political wing of ISI headed by Major General
Ihtesham Zamir was instrumental in the formation of the Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)
group before elections in October 2002, which consisted mostly of former
colleagues of deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. After the military
take-over, almost all of his former colleagues gathered under the
benevolent patronage of military, made a new party and got elected to new
assembly in 2002. After elections, several senior officers were involved
in political manoeuvring to instal military’s nominated political party.
The party, which Nawaz Sharif led, had two third majority in the National
Assembly in 1996 with 140 seats. After cleansing and restructuring, Nawaz
Sharif’s party has now only 14 seats in the assembly. This tells a lot
about the sham called democracy in Pakistan under the guidance of
military. After the 2002 elections, the military has used the carrot of
perks and privileges and stick of accountability to line up politicians of
different hue and colour to support its nominees. After the October 2002
elections, ten members of PPP rebelled and voted in favour of General
Musharraf’s nominee for Prime Minister (Zafarullah Khan Jamali). Out of
ten dissident members, six were awarded with cabinet posts out of which
two were retired army officers (Major (Retd) Tahir Iqbal and Major (Retd)
Habibullah Warraich). The exercise has been done in such a clumsy manner
that it has created a hilarious situation. Pakistan is the only country in
the world the Interior Minister of which is on the Exit Control List
published by his own ministry and wanted in cases of corruption. Two more
Federal Ministers (Minister of Power Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and Labour
Minister Abdul Sattar Laleka) are also forbidden to leave the country, as
they are wanted by National Accountability Bureau in various corruption
cases. Another interesting phenomenon, which has emerged in Pakistan, is
that family members of former senior military officers are increasingly
finding place in the political arena. Ayub Khan’s son Captain (Retd)
Gauhar Ayub has been elected member of national assembly and served as
foreign minister during Nawaz government). Ayub’s two sons-in-law were
also members of national and provincial assemblies. General Akhtar Abdur
Rahman’s (former DG ISI and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee)
son Humayun Akhtar is a multimillionaire businessman and now minister of
commerce and General Zia-ul-Haq’s son, Ijaz-ul-Haq was member of National
Assembly. The last fifty-year experience of Pakistan has given ample proof
that military’s guardianship has a ‘debilitating and corrosive’ effect on
the political system of the country. ‘In many instances it stifles sorely
needed change and reinforces social inequality and injustice’. The
reason is that all military take-overs have been geared toward maintenance
of status quo rather than attempts to change fundamental anomalies of the
structure through radical reforms. Even the prospects of success of
radical reforms by the military without any popular participation are very
limited. The best-case example of such failure is that of Egypt under
Gemal Abul Nasir.
Conclusion
The political role of the military has
its negative effects in long term, which may not be visible, in short
term. In case of Pakistan, there has been no radical coup and no violent
showdown between different interest groups (with the exception of Bengali
nationalism which resulted in separation of Eastern wing with the help of
Indian arms). Even military rulers understand the limitations of overt
coercion and repression. They use ‘parallel power mechanisms provided by
intelligence services, paramilitary, private or criminal armed
entities’. Over the last two decades, Pakistani military leadership has
used informal types of coercion. Private armed groups run by religio-political
parties were not only used in the military’s foreign policy agenda in
Afghanistan and India in 1990s but were selectively used to pressurize the
civilian governments. In 2002, the military leadership has learnt the hard
lesson of futility of such shortsighted policy decisions. The role of
intelligence apparatus has been institutionalized while paramilitary force
(Rangers) has been rapidly expanded. This approach has resulted in two
negative consequences. First, it has eroded the cohesion of armed forces
and damaged its institutional integrity. Second, the political entities
have become more polarized making any reconciliation very difficult.
In the last fifty-five years, repeated
military take-over have added new complexities into the already fragile
state of Pakistan. After every coup, political manoeuvrings of military
brass becomes essential, as pre-coup conditions cannot be allowed to stage
a come back. This had resulted in two unfortunate consequences. One is
politicization of the officer corps and second is militarization of the
politics. Military guided civilian governments are neither more clean nor
efficient than any other government. Political institutions of a country
are reflective of the society. They do not prop up in vacuum. They are
formed by interaction of various forces including general public,
judiciary, press and other segments of society. They evolve with the
evolution of the society and are carefully nurtured and pruned according
to the needs of the society to serve its purpose. Painstaking efforts by a
select group of self-righteous senior officers to implant a model on the
nation from above based on their thinking and training has never been
successful in the modern history of the world. The fifty-five year history
of Pakistan has amply shown that such attempts have further polarized the
society and added new complex factors on national scene rather than
solving old problems. Some fundamental dilemmas facing the nation have to
be discussed at various forums to reach a ‘minimum’ consensus about basic
elements of running the state with some agreement on legitimacy, rules of
succession and role of various groups in this setup. Both civilian and
military leaders have to accept the fact that for smooth running of the
state ‘the areas of exclusive policy authority for each’ and ‘the areas of
shared policy authority’ needs to be agreed upon. The balance between
these two authorities constitutes civil-military relations. Without
addressing these issues simultaneously, it will be very difficult to break
the cycle of crisis, which is plaguing the country. The establishment of
effective political authority has two main ingredients:
-
the aggregation of consent and
-
control over the means to organized
coercion.
Even if the political parties are able
to achieve the difficult task of aggregating the consent which will bring
political organization and legitimacy but the armed forces are not
subordinated to the direction of state, the stability of the political
process will be a mirage.
Notes:
Claude Emerson. Welch and Smith K. Arthur (Ed.)
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations" (North
Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 6
Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups
and Government" (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977),
p. 54
De Kadt, Emanuel. The Military in
Politics: Old Wine in New Bottles? in Koonings, Kees & Kruijt, Dirk (Ed.).
"Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy"
(London & New York: Zed Books, 2002), p. 315
Welch & Smith.
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations", p. 65
For details of the attitude of
Pakistani officer corps towards politics, see Hussain, Hamid. Back to
Barracks - Pakistan Army’s experience of withdrawal from active control of
the state. Defence Journal, September 2002
Nordlinger.
Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups
and Government", p. 118-19
Welch & Smith.
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations", p. 66
Nordlinger.
Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups
and Government", p. 59
Koonings.
"Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy", p. 339
Nordlinger.
Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups
and Government", p.
Koonings.
"Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy", p. 23
For details of cooperation between
CIA and ISI, see Hussain, Hamid. Forgotten Ties: CIA, ISI & Taliban.
CovertAction Quarterly (Washington, D.C.), Number: 72; Spring 2002), pp.
3-5
Arif, M. Khalid. General (Retd).
"Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997" (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 366
Quadir, F. Iqbal. Vice Admiral (Retd).
Pakistan — A Political Experimental Station. Defence Journal, May 2002
Lt. General Fazal Haq’s (who attended
the meeting) interview with General Khalid M. Arif cited in Arif, Khalid.
Khaki Shadows, p. 352-53
Lodhi, Maleeha. "Pakistan’s Encounter
With Democracy" (Lahore: Vanguard Books), p. 139-40
PPP Information Secretary Salman
Taseer released the tapes to public in August 1992.
Former Army Chief General Mirza Aslam
Beg and former DG ISI Asad Durrani have admitted this in an affidavit
submitted to Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court has not given
its decision about the case which has been pending since 1997
Arif. "Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997", p. 196
Ibid, p. 420
Welch & Smith.
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations", p. 72
Koonings.
"Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy", p. 339
For details of Pakistani intelligence
organizations, see Hussain, Hamid. Lengthening Shadows. CovertAction
Quarterly, Number: 73; Summer 2002, p.18-22
Welch & Smith.
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations", p. 54
Interview of Major General (Retd)
Akbar Khan in Hassan, Ali. Generals aur Siyasat. Urdu (Generals and
Politics) (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991), p. 292-93
Nasir, Javed. Lt. General (Retd)
After The Nuclear Fever is Over. Defence Journal, July 1998
The News (Online Edition), October 24, 2002
Welch & Smith.
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations", p. 72
Koonings.
"Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy", p. 343
Welch and Smith.
"Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations", p. 16
Ibid, , p. 53.
