- Road Map
by Hanan Ashrawi
The
American-cum-Quartet
draft
road
map
for
a
permanent
two-state
solution
to
the
Palestinian-Israeli
conflict
has
already
come
up
against
its
major
Israeli
roadblocks.
Beyond Sharon's initial
dismissive attitude, Israeli responses have ranged from a total rejection
of the June 4, 1967 borders, to the negation of the establishment of the
Palestinian state, to the refusal to cease settlement activities and
dismantle any settlements, to the rejection of any binding timetables, to
the elimination of any aspect of monitoring or third party involvement, to
further demands and preconditions specifically designed to abort the
initiative (including collection of Palestinian weapons, arrest of
"suspects," the total cessation of "violence," the political "elimination"
of President Arafat, comprehensive Palestinian "reform," among other
dictates).
By now, Israeli tactics have
become all too familiar. After sabotaging the substance, Israel proceeds
to raise procedural and technical objections with the aim of prolongation
and obfuscation. Thus with the parties totally bogged down in
micromanaging the most obscure detail and side issue, Israel buys more
time to create more facts to render the whole exercise entirely
irrelevant.
In the meantime, the US would
have bought the artificial "calm" it needs to carry out its regional
designs (beginning with Iraq) and placating the Arab world by creating the
impression of "engagement" and commitment to the implementation of the
presidential "vision" of a two-state solution.
Meanwhile, Israel is off the
hook, continuing its business-as-usual policy of studied cruelty against
and systematic destruction of Palestinian reality and lives while
voraciously gobbling up more land and feeding the settlers' insatiable
appetite for intimidation, violence, and expansion.
Regardless of the motivation
and/or obstructionism, the road map requires a serious Palestinian
assessment and response from the conceptual, procedural, and substantive
point of view.
Conceptually, the plan still
assumes that gradualism in the form of a phased approach
is capable of designing a process that can produce results. Past
experience has provided us with sufficient evidence that the failure of
the peace process was due in large part to its non-incremental gradualism
that allowed for prolongation and stalling while giving the powerful party
time and opportunity to create facts that would undermine the objective.
Only an acceleration of the timeframe would prevent the
negative exploitation of the time bought by Israel by deliberate
obstructionism.
This is especially true of a
process that is "Performance-Based" instead of relying on
clear and objective criteria, requirements, and timelines. Given the
asymmetry of power, Israel will continue to hamper Palestinian
"performance" by using its unhampered military power to create
insurmountable obstacles and to provoke extreme responses and reactions. A
clear example is Israel's use of the policy of assassination to create
further instability, violence, a sense of victimization, and a cycle of
lawlessness and revenge. A performance- driven road map will lead only in
the direction of an Israeli-driven disaster.
Combined with
conditionality, especially as defined by the Israeli occupation,
the process becomes subject to an endless reservoir of Israeli
preconditions that are essentially impossible to fulfill, given the fact
that Israel can pursue a policy of destroying precisely those conditions
that would prevent Palestinian "compliance." The repeated assaults on the
Palestinian leadership, and the presidency in particular, with arrogant
attempts at "delegitimizing" or rendering "irrelevant" the elected leader
of the Palestinians are the most blatant evidence of such tactics.
Combined with the policy of siege, humiliation, and deprivation the
conditions of "acquiescence" become entirely unattainable.
The disparity
in conditions and lack of parity in framing the rights and
responsibilities of both parties stem from ignoring the
culpability of the occupation (hence the occupying party) in the
first place. The unbridled use of force by the Israeli occupation forces
and the inherent racism in the mentality of subjugation has rendered
reciprocity completely inapplicable and unfair. Never
before has the victim been held accountable for the conditions of his/her
own victimization while the perpetrator's demands become the criteria for
gauging the victim's behavior. "Self defense" for the occupation is an
oxymoron, in the same way as "blaming the victim" is unjust and illogical.
Violence against civilians is morally reprehensible and repugnant
regardless of the identity of the perpetrator, but it becomes even more so
when the act of commission is a result of official government policy in
"defense" of an indefensible occupation and is being carried out against a
whole captive and defenseless occupation. Thus demanding "normalcy" in the
midst of a situation of abnormality becomes a flight of fancy.
Furthermore, the glaring lack
of arbitration and clearly defined mechanisms of
accountability would render the role of third parties
largely symbolic, hence ineffective. The Quartet is given the role of
facilitating Palestinian reform, elections, and Palestinian-Israeli
security cooperation and coordination, while it is instructed to establish
a "monitoring mechanism" (phase I, second stage) to be "enhanced" in
"monitoring transition" in phase II. Both International Conferences (phase
II and III) are to be convened by the Quartet; the first is for the
purpose of supporting Palestinian "economic recovery" and to launch
bilateral negotiations "on the possibility of a state with provisional
borders"; the second is designed to "endorse" bilateral agreements and to
launch further bilateral negotiations "toward a final, permanent status
resolution in 2005."
Both the timing
and the unspecified mandate of the "monitoring mechanism"
betray a feeble effort at doing too little too late. The rapidly
deteriorating situation on the ground, the entrenchment of violence and
extremism, and the loss of confidence with an increase in hostility and
distrust, all require immediate and effective concrete engagement in the
field. With "occupation on the rampage" being reinstated as the norm, and
with the "security fence" (along with feverish settlement expansion)
creating an apartheid situation in the projected Palestine, the most
appropriate separation and de-escalation mechanism becomes the deployment
of fully empowered international forces in the occupied territory. The
dual objective of devolution of occupation and evolution of statehood
requires direct third party supervision and viable involvement with a
mandate for arbitration and accountability.
Clearly, the logic of the
previous peace process has proved to be a failure, not least in its
insistence on bilateralism as a means of "conflict
resolution" in a situation of such glaring power bias and disequilibrium.
If multilateralism is the global mechanism for collective
responsibility, particularly in peace-making and in ensuring a global rule
of law, then the "monitoring mechanism" of the road map must embody such
an approach both in form and in substance. Such logic requires rethinking
the Quartet (and its selective partners in the "octet" and the Arab
addenda). The UN must remain the reference to (not the partner of) state
and multi-state actors; full Arab partnership must be ensured throughout
(and not just in a perfunctory and occasional manner); and behavior on the
ground must be subject to scrutiny and immediate intervention.
In this way, the
micromanagement of and interference in Palestinian
realities would become legitimate as a form of positive
intervention in an ongoing conflict that is rapidly spiraling out
of control and in engineering a workable and fair solution. Thus
violations of Palestinian democracy and negative intervention in internal
realities in such issues as ignoring presidential elections and insisting
on an "empowered Prime Minister" would be avoided and left to the
independent domestic agenda and requirements. Similarly (and without
addressing all the minute details of Palestinian institution-building and
reform), the narrow and specific focus on "legal reform," constitutional
commission, Election Commission, restructuring of security forces, travel
of Palestinian officials, etc. would be replaced with the more expansive
approach of providing the proper conditions for the Palestinians to engage
in a nation building process unfettered by Israeli impediments and
sequential conditionality. The Palestinian constituency for peace and
democracy must be empowered by democratic means.
Israel, on the other hand, and
as the occupying power, must be held accountable in accordance with the
Fourth Geneva Conventions and other relevant international charters and
agreements. Means of enforcement rather than abstract questions of
applicability are the real issue. Israel's implementation of UN
resolutions (for example, withdrawal in accordance with UNSC resolutions
1402, 1403, and 1435) are issues of immediate compliance
rather than persuasion and rewards. Selectivity in citing
the Tenet work plan and the Mitchell report (however inadequate) will also
become an encouragement for further Israeli contempt and non-compliance.
The most dangerous
implications of this approach are in its handling of the Israeli
settlement policy. Although numerous UN resolutions and
international conventions and agreements (and even American statements)
have repeatedly designated settlements as being "illegal" and an "obstacle
to peace," nevertheless Israel has been allowed to pursue its settlement
building, subsidizing and expansion unchecked. With the violence and
lawlessness of the settlers and with the fragmentation of Palestinian
territory and the extraterritoriality inherent in the "by-pass roads,"
Israel is not only escalating the conflict; it is making the solution
impossible. By asking Israel to dismantle "settlement outposts erected
since the establishment of the present Israeli government" (phase I, first
stage), then to "freeze all settlement activity consistent with the
Mitchell report (phase I, second stage), then to carry out "further action
on settlements simultaneous with establishment of Palestinian state with
provisional borders (phase II), the road map allows for sufficient
prolongation to enable Israel to destroy any chance of a two-state
solution or a just peace. The charade of disappearing/reappearing outposts
attests to the inadvisability of beginning confrontation over isolated and
minor locations when the massive settlements are the ones that should be
addressed first. Any "freeze," of course, will be met with the same
disdain disregard as sealed the fate of the Mitchell report. Finally, the
vague language on "further action" certainly affords Israel the
opportunity to abort any final agreement.
Prejudicial and illegal
Israeli measures in Jerusalem also require firm and
immediate intervention pertaining to the siege and isolation, settlement
activity, closure of Palestinian institutions, home demolition,
withholding of building permits for Palestinians, and ID confiscation. By
restricting all mention of Jerusalem to the reopening of "East Jerusalem
Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian economic institutions,"
the road map makes sure that there will be no "East Jerusalem" to speak of
once permanent status talks are launched in phase III and with the
convening of the second International Conference. By that time, the
historical, political, cultural, demographic, and territorial identity of
East Jerusalem would have been distorted beyond recognition-and certainly
beyond its designated role as capital of Palestine.
The state with "provisional
borders," while a unique invention, still offers no promise and no
guarantees that the interim would not become permanent. Sharon
has openly "accepted" the idea of a Palestinian "entity" (call it what you
will) on 42% of the West Bank (minus Jerusalem) and Gaza with a
possibility of an additional 6-8% in final status. Unless the road map
clearly spells out the June 4, 1967 borders as being the
boundaries of the Palestinian state, the whole exercise runs the risk of
generating further conflict and serving Sharon's plans of further land
theft and expansionism.
While the preamble laudably
refers to clear principles, criteria, UN resolutions, and agreements as
the foundations of the road map, it is not clear that the mechanisms
themselves are consistent with these references. "The settlement [that]
will end the occupation began in 1967" may do so by restoring the land to
its rightful Palestinian owners, by allowing for Israeli annexation of the
land, or by a combination of both. However, taken in their entirety, the
terms of reference as a whole must be translated to shape
the conduct and outcome of negotiations. It cannot be acceptable to revert
to the tired dictum that anything the parties agree to will be considered
an implementation of the relevant resolution. Nor are resolutions to be
interpreted and/or amended to suit the stronger party. The Arab initiative
contains within it a comprehensive and legal formula for an acceptable
settlement, and can thus serve as the touchstone for any solution.
The vast majority of the
Palestinian people remain committed to a peaceful resolution and to the
two-state solution despite the Israeli government's persistent attempts to
destroy both. These options, however, are rapidly becoming unattainable if
the current conditions are allowed to continue and to deteriorate. Already
voices calling for the one-state solution, whether in the form of a
bi-national state or a secular democratic state, are gaining support and
credibility. If the current hard line government in Israel persists in its
destructive policies and measures, such a solution will become the only
option as the de facto outcome of its extremism. The other side of the
coin of "Greater Israel" replacing all of historical Palestine (and more)
is that of "One Palestine." In the meantime, the painful suffering and
tragic loss of life will continue, while both peoples and the whole region
are made to pay the price of Sharon's revival of Zionist fundamentalism.
- Source:
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by the same author:
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