I've been clearing out my basement, and I came on
a boxful of The Nation. It was raining, and I settled in
for a few back issues, reading by the window. I found a rather
striking pattern of intellectual behavior, and I've chosen one
article out of many examples; this one is perhaps the clearest.
David Corn’s
"Impaired Intelligence"
[9-23-02] uses the
rhetoric of error to discuss FBI and CIA obstructionism. Nearly all the
print journalism in the U.S. since 9/11 has done the same, cocking an
eyebrow at "mistakes," "failures," "screw-ups, miscalculations and
oversights." To do so is to appear critical of these agencies while
continuing to goose-step down the corridors of the Ministry of Truth. When
Mr. Corn observes that House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees
are "traditionally cozy with" the intelligence agencies, can he possibly
be ignorant of the continuous presence of intelligence agents and former
agents on those committees? This is better called obstruction of justice,
not mere coziness.
The bad faith here is all too familiar. Most 9-11 coverage
eerily evokes the reams of utterly forgettable journalism produced in the
wake of 11-22-63, that taboo subject whose cultural radioactivity has
kept one otherwise excellent journal semi-toothless for decades . Back then,
writers in your pages spoke of "discrepancies, inconsistencies, gaps" and
"minor flaws" in the Warren Report (editorial, 12-28-63); they praised the
Report, calling it "admirable" and "an at times brilliant job" (Herbert
Packer,11-2-64). Another Nation editorial of that era laments that "the
American public was gradually coming to the conclusion that the CIA was a
self-perpetuating, ever-growing, tax-eating organization of spies,
schemers and bunglers, with a few murderers thrown in."
We now know that the pre-assassination "intelligence
failures" described by the post-assassination press were absolutely
deliberate falsifications and planted, false leads pointing in directions
agreeable to Langley and Washington. Though Oswald the patsy had a bulky
file in the cabinets of the CIA and FBI several years before 11-63, those
agencies "failed" to use the information therein for any legitimate
purpose. For example: in October '63, a balding, middle-aged, heavy-set
man identifying himself as Lee Harvey Oswald contacts an assassinations
specialist named Kostikov in the KGB at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.
This "mystery man" appears in a CIA-MEXI surveillance photo looking
absolutely nothing like Oswald. When the Mexico City Station rather
urgently requests a file photo – any file photo – of Oswald, CIA HQ
"fails" to send one. Instead it says it will ask the Navy for photos
(Oswald’s career begins in the Office of Naval Intelligence). Five weeks
later, the President of the United States is murdered, and CIA HQ has the
wit to tell CIA-MEXI that "We have asked Navy for photos again, but
Mexi can see Oswald's picture sooner on the press wire.".

Unidentified Oswald impostor entering Mexico City Cuban Embassy
October 1, 1963
Had CIA-HQ (or the ONI, which never responded) sent
a file photo of the young Oswald in a timely fashion –i.e. prior to the
assassination – it would have been immediately clear to the Mexico City
Station (and its Chief, Winston Scott) that a fraud was in progress. The
whole point is that over a month before the murder of the President,
somebody used LHO's name in an impersonation in order to create an
incriminating paper trail linking the eventual patsy to the Soviets and to
Castro. It was this framing of Oswald with a false link to the KGB
that allowed Hoover and his allies to crush any genuine investigation,
since, as Johnson told Earl Warren and everyone else at the time, the
"truth" could precipitate a nuclear war. Without the impersonation and its
phony LHO-KGB link, the successful cover-up would never have been
possible. I owe this story and my understanding of it to John Newman,
whose lucid account is at:
http://www.jfklancer.com/backes/newman/newman_1.html
An equally powerful account with new information and
argumentation can be found at Rex Bradford’s government document archive,
History Matters:
http://www.history-matters.com/siteguide/siteguide_essayindex.htm
Click here or on the
photograph to see the larger version

Click
here or on the photograph to see the larger version
So: the failure to pursue compromising leads is not always
some passive hiccough in the system. When Mr. Corn says that FBI "didn't
pursue leads"; that CIA "failed" to notify FBI about Al Quaeda affiliated
US residents; when he affects the alarmingly naive understatement that the
Agency's "problems are probably worse than described," he risks the same
kind of semi-passive complicity that we have learned to associate with the
worst of national crimes (the ones that make us say, "this happened
because good people did nothing"). In the final five paragraphs of that
article from 23 September 2002, Corn wonders aloud whether and how the
intelligence community will ever reform itself and overcome its "flaws."
He ought to know ---surely he does know--- the reason why CIA and FBI
remain hidebound and bizarrely unresponsive despite the decades separating
us from the deaths of J. Edgar Hoover and Allen Dulles. Those men drew
their colleagues and protégés into a dark well of official lies and
legally actionable perjuries so deep that no agent can climb out and live
long. Several CIA agents and their contacts, along with six high ranking FBI agents, you recall, were murdered in 1977, just prior to the House Select Committee's first hearings. "Reforming" the unaccountable
secret police services (whose worst official fear remains mere
"embarrassment") is nearly impossible because the Agency and The Bureau
are still lying about so many domestic political murders and their grim
international consequences. Until those lies are openly acknowledged (not
just decisively refuted by critics, who remain largely invisible in the
corporate media), don't expect Congress, Justice, or anyone else to blow
the lid off the cesspool.
Was it mere negligence that caused the FBI to rebuff the
August 2001 request from a Minnesota agent, that Moussaoui should be
investigated "to make sure he doesn't take control of a plane and fly it
into the World Trade Center" (see the Daily News, 9-25-02)? When massive
military escalation and appropriations swiftly followed the JFK murder,
many of us asked, "who benefited?" As David Corn points out to his credit,
there have recently been "several billion dollars added post 9-11 to the
classified $30 billion-plus intelligence budget." This line of reasoning
leads to some horrific conclusions, of course. If it seems to you like
inconclusive speculation, I hope you're right. Still, I invite the Nation
and others to do what is so rarely done: read the new information as it
trickles out, and remain interested long enough to perceive the
entailments of these awful revelations before they fade from public
memory. Mike Ruppert of From the Wilderness has done just that on his
website,
www.copvcia.com, from a
position of nearly unique expertise. Though Ruppert’s evidence is
multi-sourced and compelling, David Corn has recently seen fit to dismiss
it with something approaching contempt. Ruppert’s response is posted on
www.copvcia.com
.
In a time of
accelerating Constitutional crisis, the phrase "intelligence failures"
bears more than a whiff of rotting journalistic integrity. One look at the
volumes stacked floor to ceiling in the "true crime" section --- Gary
Webb, Peter Dale Scott, Rex Bradford, Sylvia Meagher, Philip Melanson,
Walt Brown, John Judge, Sander Hicks, Nafeez Ahmed, Gore Vidal, and a
hundred other authors --- makes it patently clear that crime and failure
are not the same thing.