|
License to Kill: The Israeli Special Forces
by Saleh Abdel Jawad
This is dedicated to the
Palestinian soldier from the national security forces who stopped me on
October 6 next to the Ramallah governorate and said, This is a strange
country. They say there are Jews roaming around in cars with government
license plates (Palestinian license plates).
Definition
The special forces or
mustarivim in Hebrew comprises of four selective units, two
belonging to the Israeli army the first, the Duvdevan (Hebrew for
cherry) which work in the West Bank and the second Shamshon
(Samson) in the Gaza Strip. The third unit belongs to the border
police and the last which works strictly in the Jerusalem area belongs to
the police.
These units undergo special
training and do not follow the same instructions for opening fire as the
regular forces. Their members receive military and psychological training
so that killing is a routine and easy procedure. Usually they work under
the guise of young men or women dressed in Arab attire although they may
also wear official Israeli military attire either in full or partial
uniform. At the particular moment when these units strike, specifically in
crowded areas, they wear a certain visible mark that allows them to
proceed without being shot at by their colleagues, such as donning bright
green strips on their hats or wearing the same color or style hats.
The goals
For certain forces to freely
access the heart of Palestinian populated areas that are not accessible to
the regular army. Usually, their goals focus on secretly eliminating or
capturing wanted persons and gathering information in order to cause
suspicions, mutiny and chaos amongst Palestinians.
Victims of the Special
Forces
During the years of the
Intifada, and especially from April 1988 to the middle of May 1993 these
forces killed around 160 Palestinians, 40 percent of whom were wanted and
approximately 18 percent of those who wrote slogans on the walls. The rest
were Intifada activists, especially masked persons or those who carried
axes or knives. Some who were mere passersby when the special forces were
carrying out these operations were also killed.
Training of the Special
Forces
In all, members of the special
forces receive 12-15 months military training. The first part of their
training takes about eight months, which is the period through which every
new soldier in the Israeli army must pass. During this period, the soldier
learns military regulations, how to shoot, physical training and training
on maintenance, dismantling and reassembling of weapons.
During the second part of
training, the soldier receives training for four and a half months at the
Adam camp, located north of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. It is
training exclusively for ground troops, which is given to every member of
the elite units in the Israeli army. The candidates for this course are
selected from between the outstanding soldiers that showed specific skills
in the first training course. Also, acceptance in these units is only
after the soldier volunteers to join and after he passes a psychological
examination that proves he is able to work under difficult circumstances
and that he is willing to carry out the killing and elimination of hostile
components without difficulty (i.e. without hesitation, conscience, etc.).
Persons who have leaned Arabic in school and who look Arab and who are in
good physical condition are also preferred.
In this period, the soldier
receives additional training in certain weapons such as silencers
paralysis bombs, etc and in special skills such as jumping and climbing
fences. They are also trained in combat tactics and in individual combat
such as judo, karate etc. and also in how to infiltrate Arab areas and to
open fire intentionally and on the spot to target the enemy in the
least amount of time possible and without subjecting the attacking force
to danger.
During the third phase of
training, which is over a period of six weeks, the soldier goes through a
course in combating terrorism school, which is in the same
previously mentioned camp. The main goal of this course is to build up the
attack instinct of the trainee and to learn how to use weapons inside
cities, populated areas and demonstrations. Training concentrates on the
necessity of the trainee to be sure of his ability to kill through
practical and psychological training in shooting at close range or even
just centimeters away from the wounded or dead victim to ensure that the
task was carried out fully - or at least to make sure that the wounded
person cannot impede the work of the attacker or be able to subject it to
danger during the operation.
During the Intifada, dozens of
these operations were carried out against wanted persons such as leaders
in the field. These operations were documented by local human rights
organizations (Al Haq, The Arab Studies Center) and Israeli (BTselem)
and foreign (Middle East Watch) centers.
This aggressive instinct is
nurtured and developed into a natural and mechanic response from the
trainee through continuous and repetitive shooting at target models that
look like Arabs (wearing kuffiyehs, masked, etc.). The other aspect is
represented in ideological endorsement against the enemy to strip him of
his humanness and humanity so that the act of killing is more like hunting
or is simply a game.
In this regard, one soldier
who worked in these forces spoke of the overall atmosphere in these units:
I used to see the soldiers fooling around in their room, playing as
if they were shooting at a target. They would follow the procedure they
were taught in the anti-terror school: run, slam to a halt, open
fire, run, halt, open fire, and then run up to the body of the target and
fire a bullet at close range to ensure death. This was the procedure
they were taught time after time, in training. It is really important,
this ingrained training because when you are under pressure, and you are
scared, it is the thing that you have practiced until they are part of
you, that you do instinctively, without needing to think.
In short, in addition to
training in certain skills, this training, which is implemented in special
forces in a number of countries and which is based on the harsh training
methods of the American special forces, is aimed at making the members of
these forces an effective killing machine with no mercy or hesitation.
There are many documented cases from Palestinian or Israeli eyewitnesses
on the killing of wanted persons after they have been wounded, where the
perpetrator neither thinks twice nor hesitates.
This method of mechanical and
swift killing resulted in the deaths of innocent people and even members
of the Special Forces themselves or sometimes collaborators that accompany
them. Three collaborators were killed in three different operations and no
less than five members of the special forces were killed by friendly fire
(the most recent example being during the attempt to eliminate Abu Hanoud,
supposed head of Hamas military wing, in the village of Asseera Al
Shamaliya and in which three of their men were killed.) However, the best
example of this is the operation which led to the killing of Eli Eisha in
the village of Bartaa Al Sharqiyya on 8/7/92 at the hands of his own
colleagues. In their explanation of the killing during an investigation by
the Israeli army they said:
Because it was dark, we
thought he was our wanted person. One of us shot him from behind. Then
another one of us shot him in the chest. But he was still alive even after
he fell, so he got closer to him and shot him twice in the head.
The fourth stage of training
is related to intense training for a period of one month in the art of
disguise, acting and deception. Professional actors from acting institutes
and theaters train them in acting and make-up techniques and in the use of
certain clothing so they can disguise themselves as Arabs especially since
most of them, like we mentioned earlier, already have Arab features. They
are trained in disguising themselves as beggars, Arab workers, villagers,
Arab women Bedouin or peasants, etc. After they complete their
training they are required either individually or in a group, to
experiment with what they have learned in the real world. They are sent,
unarmed, to different areas in Israel or in Jerusalem to mingle with the
Arab or Israeli public to test their disguising skills. For example they
dress up like beggars in the central bus station in Tel Aviv or Haifa or
as Bedouin women in the Beer Sheva market or as worshippers in Al Aqsa
mosque.
The fifth and last stage of
training, which includes improving their Arab language skills is usually
over a period of three weeks at the Israeli army intelligence base near
the Galiot-Tel Aviv-Haifa junction. They learn the Arabic language and how
to speak in colloquial Palestinian Arabic. They learn the terms used by
Arab youth, compliments, thanks and prayers, which would make them appear
as if they were natives. Part of the training is said to involve awakening
trainees in the middle of the night such as to see that they respond in
Arabic. They are also introduced to the common and prevalent traditions
and aspects of the Arab culture and some religious rituals such as reading
the Fatiha, pretending to pray and learning about the major newspapers
etc.
This training however is
superficial and is much different from the type of training received by a
different group of Mustarivim, which we do not have the opportunity to
discuss here. Their mission is to live in the midst of Arab populations
either permanently or temporarily, such as the spy Eli Cohen or the beggar
who used to beg for several years on Al Hamra Street before the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon.
Usually, these people are
older, have more experience and are more fluent in Arabic. So, for this
reason, we sometimes find that the Special Forces that enter Palestinian
cities are accompanied by Arab collaborators whose job is to talk to the
people, to drive the car, etc. Although we do not have adequate
information, it is only natural to believe that they also carry ID cards
with Arab names. Also, from the reports about members of the Special
Forces who were wounded or killed, and according to eyewitnesses, we can
say that they are usually in the beginning of their twenties. This was
apparent when the head of the Special Forces belonging to the border
guards in the Jenin area was killed during an armed confrontation with two
wanted Palestinians in the eastern neighborhood of Jenin. He was only 27
years old.
Methods of Work
At the beginning of the first
Intifada, when the Israelis realized that the foreign press was starting
to take interest, they begin to work under the guise of international
television agencies in rented cars so as to turn the public opinion
against foreign journalists, thus depriving the Palestinians of
international coverage. These practices did not stop until there was an
official protest from the Foreign Journalists Union in Israel. Then the
Israeli tactics changed. They began using cars with Arab license plates in
order to enter into the heart of Arab communities to carry out their
operations. Sometimes they disguised themselves as travelling vegetable
vendors in Volkswagen trucks or as workers in Ford transits. When a group
of Black Panthers (Fahad Al Aswad, the Fatah paramilitary
organization that became preeminent in the first intifada] was eliminated
in the Yasmineh quarter of the Old City of Nablus, they were dressed up as
peasant women.
Special Forces missions
expected in the present situation
The available and leaked
information from Israeli newspapers indicates that there has been a major
investment in these forces since the tunnel events of 1996. Therefore, we
should expect to see a growing activity of these forces in the coming
stages. Also, there is no doubt that the work of the special forces is
more difficult in comparison with the situation in the previous Intifada
in light of the concentrated deployment of Palestinian national security
forces in liberated cities and the presence of an unknown amount of
weapons in the hands of the Palestinian populace. There have been a few
failed and difficult incidents for these forces as in the case of Aseera
Shamaliya, as well as in Surda (where the Special Forces killed a
73-year-old mukhtar of the village.) So we believe that their activity in
the coming period will focus on villages and roads and on setting ambushes
for people who shoot at settlements and military bases.
In the case of cities, the
Special Forces will most likely disguise themselves as national security
forces and will use cars with PA license plates. Or they will disguise
themselves as members of the Fateh tantheem and especially as masked
persons. This will change their work methods and will create methods
unknown until now. The best two defense mechanisms towards such a
phenomenon are of a preventative nature:
First: Denying the
enemy any intelligence information. This requires the implementation of
the maxim the walls have ears. It also requires that we resist boasting
about transferring information about people involved in eliminating
collaborators and about certain suspicions.
Second: To always be on
high alert and readiness; change places where one sleeps at night and not
to get accustomed to any routine behavior.
In addition, the best way to
confront this phenomenon in cities is by preventing their entrance into
these cities from the start. This would require a radical change in the
methods used at the military checkpoints until now, which allows for easy
infiltration into Palestinian cities. It is very important that highly
aware and alert people are put at the checkpoints and swift, stringent but
polite inspection of cars is conducted. We also need to be able to close
off cities quickly in order to prevent these elements from carrying out
their missions and swiftly leaving. We must also change the way in which
the members of our national security forces stand at the checkpoints
because the present method is completely inappropriate in dealing with
these forces, which are heavily armed and have an acute ability to kill.
There must be two people who
are carrying out the inspection and at the same time a hidden force behind
a protective cover with their weapons aimed at the car being inspected, in
order to deter these elements of even thinking about entering the cities.
If they do succeed in entering, this will lead either to them achieving
their goals and/or incurring losses in their ranks in the midst of an
angry public, thus justifying a military attack on cities, like the
incident with the two soldiers lynched in the Ramallah police station. (In
this case, it was widely perceived at the time the incident took place,
that the soldiers were in fact a Special Forces Unit, though it is most
likely they were not.)
From another aspect, we
believe that in addition to the goals of this latter group, these forces
also have new goals. For example, eliminating leaders in the field; hence,
Israel achieves a major moral victory and reinforces the concept of the
long arm of the Israeli army. Or they may attack political leaders to make
it appear like it was the result of internal strife. They may blow up
national security headquarters and make it seem as if it resulted from
preparing explosives to use inside Israel.
In conclusion, there is no
doubt that we are in the phase of encountering a new and unique kind of
confrontation. This phase calls for a high level of awareness and
alertness and strict regulations, which if implemented, will greatly
lessen political and human losses.
The element of awareness and
alertness adopted by Hizbullah in Lebanon led to major losses in the ranks
of forces very similar to the Special Forces. It led to a halt in their
activities despite their massive capabilities. Notes: This article relies upon
already published materials, most notably A License to Kill: Israeli
Undercover Operations Against Wanted and Masked Palestinians,
Middle East Watch, July 1993, Btselem File Biiloy Hayihidot
Himyohodot Hamishtikhim (The Activities of Special Forces in the
Territories) May 1992, Yehidot Hamustarivim (The Mustarivim Units)
Yesh Gvul, Debbi Meda, 1992 (?), Report on Wanted Persons,
(Unpublished), December 1992.
(Dr. Saleh Abdel Jawad
is Head of the Department of
History and Political Science at Birzeit University. This article was written on
October 15th, 2000 and was submitted to a Palestinian newspaper as well as
a notable Jerusalem NGO, but was refused publication. It was eventually
published by Al Quds newspaper on December 2, 2000 after some of the
conclusions it made were confirmed by the events of the Intifada.)
Source:
by courtesy & 2001 Arabic Media Internet Network (AMIN) & Saleh Abdel Jawad
by the same author:
|
