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Reflections on Palestinian Strategy
by Jerome Segal
The most powerful argument
that has been offered in favor of continuing the current Intifada is not
the example of Hezbollah in Lebanon the situation in Palestine is far too
different to warrant such “reasoning by analogy.” Rather, the most
powerful argument, is that if Sharon succeeds militarily, then he succeeds
politically and strategically. It is argued: If Sharon can bring an end to
the violence, then he will remain in power in Israel. If he remains in
power, then there will be continued expansion of settlements and continued
refusal to end the occupation, share Jerusalem and reach an accord on
Palestinian refugees. Alternatively, if the Sharon government is
ultimately replaced by a government willing to resume negotiations
starting from where the Taba talks broke off, then there is reasonable
likelihood that a complete peace agreement, covering all issues, can be
reached.
What is most striking about
this argument is that it places the Intifada within a political context.
Implicitly it recognizes the limits of force. Even if the Intifada were to
cause Israel to withdraw from significant parts of the territories and
dismantle isolated settlements, Israel would retain large areas of the
West Bank, it would continue to hold Jerusalem, and would continue to
resist an accord on refugees. To deal with these issues, there must be
negotiations and a political settlement. And for this to occur, there
must be a new Israeli government.
There are two quite different
situations in which Palestinian violence has, in the past, contributed to
the collapse of an Israeli government. The first was when Israel was
governed by a right-wing government which was not willing to seriously
negotiate, and when that government was opposed by left-wing parties which
were serious about negotiations. This was the situation when Prime
Minister Shamir was in power during the first Intifada which ultimately
led to the election of Prime Minister Rabin. The second situation was
when the left was in power, and despite efforts at negotiation, was unable
to provide Israelis with personal security. Under these conditions
Israelis turn to the right. Thus, Peres was defeated by Netanyahu, and
Barak by Sharon.
The present situation however,
conforms to neither pattern. At present Israel has a unity government, and
most Israelis, whether on the left or the right believe that Palestinians
are not truly interested in ending the conflict, and thus conclude
comprehensive negotiated agreement is out of reach. Hence the differences
between left and right on permanent status issues becomes irrelevant.
Under present conditions, escalating violence does not turn the average
Israeli away from Sharon and towards an opposition party. Rather,
escalating violence confirms, in the minds of Israelis, that it is
impossible to negotiate an end to the conflict. And while Sharon may not
be successful in ending the violence, he is viewed as the most powerful
Israeli figure. Rather than being replaced because of violence, escalating
violence causes Israelis to rally to their leader, believing that the only
response to violence is more violence.
Israeli commentators regularly
talk about “the mask having slipped from the Palestinian face.” Indeed,
Barak now takes credit for this “exposure.” This has two versions. On the
first version, it is claimed, the mask has slipped from the face of the
Palestinian leadership. It has revealed an Arafat who is not prepared or
ready to make peace. On the second version, it is said that the mask has
slipped from the face of the Palestinian people. Either way, it is
believed that the Barak government made very substantial compromises, that
the Palestinians flatly rejected them, and instead chose the current
warfare. Even among the Israeli peace movement, there is widespread
uncertainty as to why an agreement was not reached. And as one moves
across the political spectrum, increasingly the view that the Palestinian
do not want peace, but only the destruction of Israel, becomes the
dominant view.
The coalition government,
bringing Peres and Sharon together, was possible because they came to
agree on one conclusion: that it is impossible to reach a final
comprehensive peace with the Palestinians at this time. Those such as
Yossi Beilin, who reject this view stayed out of the coalition.
A military strategy such as
the current Intifada, cannot succeed unless Israelis can again be brought
to believe in the seriousness of Palestinian claims that they do accept
the two-state solution, that they are willing to live in genuine and
lasting peace with Israel, provided there is a Palestinian state in
virtually all of the West Bank and Gaza, with its capital in Jerusalem and
with some recognition of the rights of refugees.
One might conclude from this
that what is required is a two-pronged strategy, one that involves armed
struggle, constantly reminding the Israelis that there is a price to be
paid for continued occupation, and one that puts forward a peace
initiative, reminding Israel that its deepest needs for peace and security
can be attained if it is willing to end the occupation.
But what does a two-pronged
strategy mean? Does it mean that violence and peace diplomacy have to
occur at exactly the same time? Certainly, it cannot mean that, for
incidents of violence cause peace efforts to lose their credibility. And
they undermine the political standing of the peace makers on the other
side. For a diplomatic strategy to succeed, there must be some degree of
calm, some taste of the future of peace. Might it not suffice for a two
pronged strategy that negotiations and violence alternate, that at some
point violence stops, just so that a peace initiative might be taken
seriously? Going further, might it not suffice that there is an awareness
that if diplomacy fails then there will be a return to violence? And if
this is sufficient, (and I think it is) then the current Intifada has
already succeeded. It has made its point. Israelis now know that
negotiations cannot go on indefinitely. If they do not succeed then they
will be replaced by violence.
The claim that an end to
violence means that Sharon will stay in power indefinitely is false. The
Labor-Likud unity is based on the assumption that it is impossible, at
this time, to resolve the final status issues, no matter who is Prime
Minister. If a Palestinian peace initiative can dispel this belief, the
unity will collapse. Indeed, if Peres believed that there was an agreement
that he and Arafat could sign, it is likely that he would seek to bring
down the government. Moreover, if there is a powerful peace initiative,
with a Palestinian proposal that can be accepted by the Israeli left, then
the Bush administration will soon find itself in the same position that
George Bush Sr. found himself when Prime Minister Shamir was in power:
hoping for a new Israeli government.
Even if a Palestinian peace
initiative fails to bring peace, it will establish the context within
which any escalation of violence will be perceived, both by the
international community and by the Israeli public. If it is believed that
a credible peace offer by the Palestinians is on the table and that the
Sharon government has turned its back on it, then Sharon will be blamed
for the violence that occurs. On the other hand, if there is no
Palestinian peace initiative, then there will be widespread sympathy for
the Israelis. The general perception will be that they have tried peace,
and now have no alternative.
The Peace Initiative
The most powerful diplomatic
step that the Palestinian leadership could take is to present to the world
a detailed peace agreement that it is prepared to sign. It should do this
publicly, going over the heads of the Israeli government, directly to the
Israeli people. It should say, “This does not give us full justice, but it
is what we are prepared to settle for. Are you willing to pay this price
for peace?”
Today, most Israelis do not
know what Palestinians really want in order to end the conflict? Some
say, “The Paonly want our destruction.” Others say, “I don’t really know
what they want.”
The distrust is now so
profound that proposals that express only the ideas of academics will have
little benefit. Indeed, even a repeat of the Yossi Beilen-Abu Mazen
exercise will not produce the desired effect unless President Arafat was
to unequivocally say that he would support such an agreement.
Let me conclude by offering a
sample of what such a proposal would look like. I offer it as a starting
point, but it expresses my sense of an agreement that would be accepted by
many Israelis, and would clearly establish to Israelis and to the
international community, that the Palestinian side is prepared to end the
conflict provided that a balanced agreement is achieved.
A General Framework for
Peace Between Israel and the State of Palestine
1. A contiguous Palestinian
State will come into being within 90 days of this framework taking affect.
With the implementation of this framework, Israel and the State of
Palestine will be at peace, and will enter into a formal peace treaty
establishing the end of the conflict.
2. An international body will
be established to monitor implementation of this agreement.
3. Palestinian sovereignty
will encompass 98% of the West Bank and all of Gaza. It shall also include
all of the Palestinian residential and commercial areas in East Jerusalem.
Undeveloped areas within East Jerusalem shall be Palestinian territory.
4. Once the State of Palestine
is established, it will take full responsibility for maintaining order
within its territory and for ensuring that there are no attacks on Israel
or Israeli citizens.
5. The State of Palestine will
maintain only a small armed forces and limited weaponry. It will not
enter into military alliances with any states that have not similarly
entered peace treaties with Israel.
6. The State of Palestine will
control its own immigration policy, and its own international borders,
including borders with Jordan and Egypt and on the Mediterranean. It will
permit the stationing of international observers at those borders to
verify compliance with agreed upon restrictions in the import of advanced
weaponry.
7. Palestine will agree to
Israel annexing 2% of the West Bank to include Israeli settlements. In
exchange, in equal amounts, and of equal quality, Israel will agree to
Palestinian annexation of Israel territory, the exact location of which
will be negotiated.
8. Israel will remove from
territories of Palestinian sovereignty all Israeli citizens, unless
exceptions are expressly agreed to by Palestine. Settlement areas to be
vacated will be turned over to the Palestinian government intact and in
good condition.
9. Within the Old City of
Jerusalem, Palestine will have sovereignty over the Christian and Muslim
quarters of the city and over those areas of the Armenian quarter within
which Palestinians reside. Israeli will have sovereignty over the Jewish
quarter of the Old City and those areas of the Armenian quarter in which
Jews reside.
10. The Wailing Wall shall be
under Israeli sovereignty, as shall the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of
Olives.
11. The State of Palestine
will exercise full control over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. No
Israeli police or security personnel will be permitted on the Temple
Mount/Haram al-Sharif. The Palestinian authorities will have absolute
power to limit access to the Al-Aksa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
Within this framework, the two sides agree that ultimate sovereignty
belongs to God. It is further agreed that no excavations or archeological
endeavors will be undertaken at or within the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif
without the consent of both states. It is further agreed that no person
will be denied, on grounds of religious belief or national identity,
access to peacefully and non-disruptively visit the plateau area. The
State of Palestine will ensure that no disturbances on the Haram will
interfere with the ability of Jewish worshipers at the Wailing Wall.
12. With respect to
Palestinian refugees, the two sides agree that the refugees shall be
offered a wide range of options including resettlement within Israel as
well as in other states. They will also be provided with resettlement
assistance and with compensation for property not returned to them. Once
it is ascertained how many refugees have opted to resettle within Israel,
the two sides will negotiate a mechanism for implementation, with it being
agreed that the pace of resettlement within Israel will in no way
undermine the existing demographic balance between Jews and non-Jews
within Israel. To accommodate these concerns the Palestinian side is
willing to agree that no more than 25,000 refugees would be resettled
within Israel per year. This limitation will not apply to refugees
settling in areas of Israel (2%) that will be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty that being a Palestinian decision alone.
13. Both sides will recognize
the other’s capital. The Palestinian capital, Al-quds will be established
in the area of East Jerusalem, and Israel’s capital, Yerushalayim, in West
Jerusalem.
Readers will no doubt disagree
with specific parts of this plan. I put this forward not as a perfect
proposal, and certainly not as something that only makes sense in this
specific formulation. Rather, it should be seen as a reference point. Here
is something that spells out a price for peace that many Israelis would be
willing to pay provided they believed that true and lasting peace would
result. If these specifics do not capture the answer to the question “What
will the Palestinians accept to end the conflict?” then modify it so that
it does. The key is to be able to say something definitive, authoritative
and realistic to the Israeli people, and to the people of the world.
Mr. Jerome M. Segal is
a research scholar at the University of Maryland's Institute for
Philosophy and Public Policy. He is a co-author of Negotiating Jerusalem.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001
Arabic Media Internet Network (AMIN) & Jerome M. Segal
by the
same author:
Right of Return Confusions
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