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- The 1991 Gulf Massacre
- The Historical & Strategic Context of Western Terrorism in The Gulf
- by Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed
-
- II.I The Shah
- II.II The Iranian Revolution
- III.I Befriending Tyranny
- III.II Arming Iraq
- III.III Friendly Relations
- IV. Protecting Order in the Gulf
- IV.I The Domestic Scene in the U.S.
- IV.II The International Scene
- IV.III U.S. War-Mongering
- IV.IV U.S./Western War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
-
Introduction
Western policies toward
Iraq provide illuminating insight into the structure of the contemporary
order, and the motives behind its construction. In 1991, the Western
powers united to attack Iraq in what was known as the first Gulf War.
Simultaneously, the international community imposed devastating sanctions
and embargoes on the country, which by now have virtually destroyed it. By
1998-99, the United States and the United Kingdom initiated a new bombing
campaign against Iraq, and since then have continued to maintain a
substantial military presence there.
To comprehend the reasons and realities behind
Western policies towards Iraq in the 1990s, it is essential to understand
the overall direction of Western interests and strategy in the Middle East
as such. This paper analyses the historical and strategic context of
Western policies in the Middle East in general – utilising the example of
Iran as a case study – and also attempts to relate this context to
contemporary developments – this time utilising the example of Iraq as a
case study. The objective of this paper is to analyse these two cases in
relation to an understanding of the West’s basic interests in the Middle
East, to clarify the basic principles and strategies that constitute
Western foreign policy.
I. The Manipulation of the Middle East
The
general tenore of Western interests in the Middle East can be gleaned from
various declassified secret documents. In 1945, the United States had
explicitly confirmed its desire to maintain control over the Middle East in
joint coordination with its partner, the United Kingdom:
“[O]ur petroleum policy towards
the United Kingdom is predicated on a mutual recognition of a very extensive
joint interest and upon control, at least for the moment, of the great bulk
of the free petroleum resources of the world... US-UK agreement upon the
broad, forward-looking pattern for the development and utilisation of
petroleum resources under the control of nationals of the two countries is
of the highest strategic and commercial importance.”[1]
The
long-term implications of such leverage over the Middle East were
understood. For instance, two years later, Britain expressly noted that the
Middle East was “a vital prize for any power interested in world influence
or domination”, since control of the world’s oil reserves also means control
of the world economy.[2]
Accordingly, a 1953 internal U.S. document articulates American aims in the
Middle East without ambiguity: “United States policy is to keep the sources
of oil in the Middle East in American hands.”[3]
Clearly then, the United
States aimed to dominate and control Middle East affairs to ensure its
monopoly over regional resources, namely, oil. Within this U.S. scheme, it
was envisaged that the United Kingdom would play the role of
“junior partner in an orbit of power predominantly under
the American aegis”,[4]
while the other Western European powers would be brought in as collaborators
in this process: “[I]t is essential that we should increase our strength in
not only the diplomatic but also the economic and military spheres. This can
best be done by enrolling France and the lesser Western European powers and,
of course, also the Dominions, as collaborators with us”.[5]
This would be achieved by opposing any movement threatening Western
domination of the region, particularly what is referred to as “Arab
nationalism”, a term referring to the desire of the indigenous populations
to determine their own political and economic destinies, particularly their
own resources. Thus, in 1958, a secret British document described the
principal objectives of Western policy in the Middle East:
“The major British and other Western interests
in the Persian Gulf [are] (a) to ensure free access for Britain and other
Western countries to oil produced in States bordering the Gulf; (b) to
ensure the continued availability of that oil on favourable terms and for
surplus revenues of Kuwait; (c) to bar the spread of Communism and
pseudo-Communism in the area and subsequently to defend the area against the
brand of Arab nationalism.”[6]
Thus we find that shortly
after the First World War, turning their eyes towards the Middle East, the
Western powers aimed to dismantle Ottoman Turkey, which had been the Muslim
caliphate for four centuries. The region encompassed by the Ottoman
caliphate included and integrated the areas of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,
Palestine, Jordan and much of Saudi Arabia. Islam was naturally the basis of
unity of the caliphate, and to counteract this unity the Western powers
perpetuated local divisions among the Arabs. This was achieved by relying on
pro-West Arab leaders with local tribal or religious followings to promote
the division of the Ottoman empire. None of these leaders, however, had a
claim to popular leadership.[7]
The plans of how to sponsor
uprisings were improvised by British officers in the Arab Bureau in Cairo.
According to Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office, British aims were to
divide Arabs not unify them. Thus, despite the essential publicised
pretences of supporting Arab unity, the British secretly signed the 1916
Sykes-Pikot Agreement with France, thus making official the task of
manufacturing small impotent states in the Middle East, and sharing in their
control. The contents of this agreement were revealed in 1921 when the
Bolsheviks retrieved a copy. Oil was, of course, a major determinant in the
West’s creation, division, control and support of Middle East regimes, and
this factor was officially recognised in the 1920 San Remo Treaty, and in
the illegal 1928 Red Line Agreement, involving the British and French
sharing of the oil wealth of former Turkish territories. Here, percentages
of future oil production were allocated to British, French and American oil
companies.[8]
The Western powers
eventually succeeded in breaking up the Arab world into several impotent
client regimes, an exceedingly chaotic and bloody programme that included
the literal creation of twelve previously non-existent nations. The
arbitrary creation of borders within what was formerly a single empire,
defined the fledgling nation-states and successfully carved the region into
several divided segments. Iraq was just one of these. In all of these
fictional nation-states, pro-West leaders were forcefully installed to
execute Western instructions. Since the objective of this programme included
unimpeded access to regional resources (oil) in opposition to the wishes of
the populations, it necessarily involved the provocation of force to
manipulate the political environment and ensure the establishment of
impotent client-regimes whose social and economic administration was
subservient to Western interests. This inevitably resulted in the
impoverishment and repression of the Arab people under their newly formed
illegitimate governments. Due to this programme which involved a series of
political, economic and cultural manipulations, these regimes became
dependent on the West for their sheer survival in all significant respects.
It is worth noting that the historical context of Iraq/Kuwait conflict
therefore lies in the British decision during the early years of this
century to slice off a chunk of Iraqi land in the name of various
imperialist desires that have now ceased to be relevant, but which were part
and parcel of the West’s policy of fracturing the Middle East.
By thus creating fictional
divisions and utilising existing ones, the West manufactured false states
and nationalities, and played them off against one another - meanwhile
exploiting all of them.[9]
After the Second World War, the United States, in accordance with its
strategic policy plans, replaced the United Kingdom in becoming the dominant
power in the Middle East. By the 1970s, the CIA had successfully established
close political and economic ties with regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Morocco, Jordan and Iraq, despite their atrocious records of repression.[10]
To this
day, the Western powers under the leadership of the United States continue
to prop up the same illegitimate regimes created in the 20th
Century in contradiction to basic humanitarian principles, to fulfil
strategic and economic interests. Middle East specialist Mamoun Fandy of
Georgetown University’s Center of Contemporary Arab Studies observes that:
“Securing the flow of affordable oil is a cornerstone of
U.S. Middle East policy. The U.S. strategy of dual containment of Iran and
Iraq, designed to ensure that neither Iraq nor Iran is capable of
threatening neighboring Gulf countries, is inextricably linked to
Washington’s oil policy… Uncritical U.S. support for autocratic Gulf
monarchies and their human rights abuses have weakened both U.S. policy and
the oil regimes. It undermines U.S. policy by demonstrating the hypocrisy in
American rhetoric about democracy and human rights and weakens the regimes
by creating the perception among Gulf subjects that their countries are
being ruled in the interests of an outside power.” [11]
The dire implications
of this hypocritical anti-humanitarian policy have been harshly
criticised by the American academy of scholars and Middle East
specialists, Committee On The Middle East (COME):
“U.S. policies in the Middle East have for too
long been determined by the power and money of special interest groups, as
well as by narrow nationalist economic exploitation. This has led to a
grossly hypocritical situation in American foreign policy, in dealing with
the nations and peoples of the Middle East. While the U.S. government
constantly professes a strong belief and commitment to democracy, human
rights, and national self-determination, far too often the same U.S.
government actually supports tyranny, repression, massive arms sales,
despotism, and ongoing subjugation”.[12]
II. Defending Western Values in Iran
II.I The Shah
The case of
Iran supplies a clear illustration of the profit-orientated nature of
Western foreign policy and its consistent opposition to basic humanitarian
principles, primarily because during the era in which the West retained
close ties to the country, it was governed by a brutal dictator. During this
period in the 1970s, Iran was under the reign of a monarchy which at that
time was ruled by the renowned Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlevi. The Shah
had been directly installed by the Western powers in a covert operation
masterminded by the American CIA and British MI6 through a military coup.[13]
The Shah
had been installed in place of the democratically elected Iranian leader,
Mussadeq, whose policies were unfavourable to Western interests - Mussadeq
had, for instance, planned on nationalising oil operations in Iran, i.e.
employing the domestic resources for the benefit of the indigenous
population, rather than the control and benefit of foreign investors. The
Federation of American Scientists provides a lucid description of this
process: “Shah-an-Shah [King of Kings] Mohammad Reza Pahlevi was restored to
the Peacock Throne of Iran with the assistance of the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1953” as well as British intelligence (see note 13). “The CIA
mounted a coup against the left-leaning government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq,
which had planned to nationalize Iran’s oil industry” and “subsequently
provided organizational and training assistance for the establishment of an
intelligence organization for the Shah. With training focused on domestic
security and interrogation, the primary purpose of the intelligence unit,
headed by General Teymur Bakhtiar, was to eliminate threats to Shah” from
the indigenous population. [14]
This
entire episode took place during the Cold War. Accordingly, it was
legitimised under the guise of the fight against Communism, supposedly
to prevent Communist elements within Iran from taking power.[15]
The fact of the matter, however, was that there was negligible danger
of a Communist takeover. Indeed, this was privately recognised by the
United States and the United Kingdom as is clear from now declassified
secret documents. For example, the UK ambassador had observed in
September 1952 that: “… [T]he communists have... played a largely
passive role, content to let matters take their course with only
general encouragement from the sidelines... they have not been a major
factor in the development of the Mussadeq brand of nationalism.”[16]
Similarly, the U.S. embassy noted in March 1953 that “there was little
evidence that in recent months the Tudeh [the Communist Party of Iran,
which had close contacts with the Soviet Union] had gained in popular
strength”.[17]
As for the possibility of a successful Tudeh-sponsored Communist coup
that the West could have feared, the U.S. State Department itself
dismissed this idea, noting in a January 1953 intelligence report that
“an open Tudeh move for power... would probably unite independents and
non-communists of all political leanings and would result... in
energetic efforts to destroy the Tudeh by force”.[18]
Thus, the
Western-sponsored coup was actually a bid to eliminate “the Musaddeq brand
of nationalism”, that had included the plan to nationalise Iranian oil,
bringing it and the rest of Iran’s resources out of the grip of Western,
particularly British and American, investors. Once the Shah - a pliant
Western puppet - was installed, the normal policies of plundering Iranian
resources could resume. In a candid report, the New York Times
revealed the U.S./Western elite sentiments toward the Shah’s violent
restoration: “Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an
object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number
which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism” with the view to bring “rich
resources” out of Western control, so that the general population may
benefit. “It is perhaps too much to hope that Iran’s experience will prevent
the rise of Mossadeghs in other countries”, who may similarly wish to
eliminate massive poverty, “but that experience may at least strengthen the
hands of more reasonable and more far-seeing leaders”, who will henceforth
keep to their Third World box; playing their subservient role of repressing
their people, while providing cheap labour and resources to their Western
masters. [19]
The Shah implemented economic policies in accordance with the
interests of Western investors, thus ensuring that political repression
resulted in the siphoning of the country’s wealth to a minority elite.
Astute observers note that the Shah’s reforms “favored the rich,
concentrated on city dwellers, and ignored peasantry. The profits derived
from oil and natural gas were not used efficiently but were spent on showy
projects and the latest in military technology.” The result was that “an
even greater gulf yawned between the Westernized rich and the traditional
poor.”[20]
British historian Mark Curtis, a former Research Fellow at London’s
Royal Institute for International Affairs, observes that an agreement was
signed the year following the coup establishing a new oil consortium in
which the U.S. and the UK both had a 40 per cent interest. The consortium
controlled the production, pricing and export of Iranian oil. Though
Britain’s share was reduced from the level of complete control it had prior
to Musaddeq, it was nevertheless far greater than it would have been under
the latter’s nationalisation plans. However, the U.S. had achieved the
greater substantial economic stake and political influence in the country,
including a significant stake in oil.[21]
American
investors and the Iranian elite alike both profited immensely from the
Shah’s “White Revolution”. Yet while Western investors thus enriched
themselves on Iranian resources, the country’s own population suffered
horrendously. As the state had grown richer, the people had grown poorer.
British historian and religious affairs commentator Karen Armstrong reports
that:
“There was rampant consumerism in the upper echelons of
society, and corruption and deprivation among the petty bourgeoisie and the
urban poor. After the oil price increase in 1973-4, there was tremendous
inflation, owing to lack of investment opportunity for all but the very
wealthy. A million people were unemployed, many of the smaller merchants had
been ruined by the influx of foreign goods, and by 1977 inflation had even
begun to affect the rich… During these years the shah’s regime became more
tyrannical and autocratic than ever.”[22]
Twenty years after the Western-backed coup the top 20 per cent of
households accounted for nearly half of all consumption expenditure,
whilst the bottom 40 per cent accounted for 15 per cent of consumption
expenditure and less than 12 per cent of total income. Mark Curtis
comments: “Some of those who failed to benefit from the ‘extreme
concentration of wealth’ in Iran - for example, the poor migrants and
squatters in Tehran - were forced to engage regularly in a ‘desperate
contest for shelter and land’; in a system that was in large part the
result of the considered actions and priorities of Anglo-American
power.”[23]
John Foran,
assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California, similarly
elaborates in his award-winning study Fragile Resistance:
“The system was replete with officially sanctioned corruption,
bribe-taking, and greed, from the Shah to his sister Ashraf to the minister
of court Assadullah ‘Alam on down through the officer corps and economic
elite, with each maintaining a mini-court of his or her own, surrounding
themselves with clients and attaching a portion of all major contracts in
the economy.”[24]
The extent
of the deepening poverty within Iran as a result of the Shah’s regime,
propped up by the Western powers, can be discerned from the heartfelt
observation of a young Iranian peasant:
“Yes, we need schools and doctors, but they are just for
the rich. I wish I didn’t even know doctors existed. Before, we were
ignorant, but now we know that pills and shots can help us. But we can’t buy
them, so we watch our children die from sickness as well as hunger. Before,
the elders said if a child died, it was from the will of God (dasti khudda),
but now I think it is the fault of the government (dasti-dowlat).” [25]
Naturally then, the Shah’s socio-economic policies were deeply
unpopular among the Iranian population. For the Shah to maintain
power, he had to control an increasingly agitated and resentful
populace, and this implied pursuing policies of brutal repression –
policies that were supported and, indeed, directed by America and
Britain. According to Amnesty International (AI), the Shah’s regime
succeeded in slaughtering over 10,000 Iranians, estimating that there
were between 25-100,000 political prisoners in 1976. AI thus observed
that: “[The] Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the
highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of
civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief. No
country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran”.[26]
Barry Rubin noted that “prisoners were subjected to horrendous
torture, equal to the worst ever devised”, in a system in which “the
entire population was subjected to a constant, all-pervasive terror”.[27]
Not only was this not a cause of concern to the Western powers, it was
a cause of closeness between the Shah and the West. As U.S. Iran
specialist Eric Hooglund reports: “The more dictatorial his [the
Shah’s] regime became, the closer the U.S.-Iran relationship became.”[28]
The United States and United
Kingdom, however, were directly responsible for the repression committed
under the Shah’s regime – not merely for establishing his power while
encouraging and consenting to his policies, but also for creating and
guiding the SAVAK secret police under the Shah’s command which perpetrated
the aforementioned atrocities. SAVAK, created by the United States and
trained primarily by Israel with significant British input, was even
instructed in torture techniques by the CIA. The British SAS was also
responsible for training the Shah’s Special Forces.[29]
The Federation of American Scientists reports that SAVAK, formed “under the
guidance of United States and Israeli intelligence officers in 1957”,
“developed into an effective secret agency”, its job being to ensure the
effective subjugation of the Iranian population to the rule of the Shah.
“An elaborate system was created to monitor
all facets of political life. For example, a censorship office was
established to monitor journalists, literary figures, and academics
throughout the country; it took appropriate measures against those who fell
out of line. Universities, labor unions, and peasant organizations, among
others, were all subjected to intense surveillance by SAVAK agents and paid
informants. The agency was also active abroad, especially in monitoring
Iranian students who publicly opposed Pahlavi rule.”
The agency’s “torture
methods” passed on to it from its U.S., Israeli and British masters,
“included electric shock, whipping, beating, inserting broken glass and
pouring boiling water into the rectum, tying weight to the testicles, and
the extraction of teeth and nails.” The extent of its terrorisation of the
indigenous population is clear from the fact that it even had “at least 13
full-time case officers running a network of informers and infiltration
covering 30,000 Iranian students on United States college campuses… The head
of the SAVAK agents in the United States operated under the cover of an
attache at the Iranian Mission to the United Nations, with the FBI, CIA, and
State Department fully aware of these activities.” [30]
Iranian scholar Reza Baraheni observes that SAVAK’s aim was to “spread
a deep sense of fear, suspicion, disbelief, and apathy throughout the
country.”[31]
This objective was successfully attained. The Shah’s regime of
“torture and intimidation, made people feel that they were held prisoner in
their own country, with the connivance of Israel and the United States.”[32]
The Western powers were very pleased with their creation’s brutal
activities. America’s former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for
instance, referred to the Shah as “that rarest of leaders, an
unconditional ally”.[33]
Kissinger also described the tyrant as “a pillar of stability in a
turbulent and vital region”, a “dedicated reformer” with the most
“noble aspirations”. “The least we owe him is not retrospectively to
vilify the actions that eight American Presidents - including the
present incumbent - gratefully welcomed”, namely, the
institutionalisation of mass poverty, torture, murder and corruption.[34]
At a ceremonial dinner hosting the Shah in November 1973 President
Jimmy Carter delivered a moving address in which he described the
Iranian regime as “an island of stability in a turbulent corner of the
world.”[35]
In a report submitted to President Eisenhower’s National Security
Council in 1953, U.S. policymakers summed up their approval of the
dictatorship:
“Over the long run, the most effective instrument for
maintaining Iran’s orientation towards the West is the [Shah’s] monarchy,
which in turn has the army as its only real source of power. U.S. military
aid serves to improve army morale, cement army loyalty to the Shah, and thus
consolidate the present regime and provide some assurance that Iran’s
current orientation towards the West will be perpetual.” [36]
The Western powers
exploit other countries in the Middle East - and other areas of the
world - in much the same way, developing close political ties and
using those to secure economic relations which are favourable to the
West and to the Eastern dictators with whom they are working;
relations which also happen to be highly detrimental to the masses who
live under the grip of these regimes. Countries that have been
regularly subject to such counter-democratic Western procedures
include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Bahrain,
among numerous others. Their goal is to further American/Western
domination of the Middle East and to secure a rich supply of
appropriately priced oil, which inevitably results in huge profits as
well as effective control of the world economy. “Mutual Anglo-American
support”, Curtis explains, “in ordering the affairs of key nations and
regions, often with violence, to their design has been a consistent
feature of the era that followed the Second World War.”[37]
It is clear that the purpose
of such policies lies in the fact that the main Western interest in the
Middle East is to ensure that there is no development of what the West
describes as ‘radical nationalism’ - a technical term meaning nationalist
forces that refuse to obey Western orders – with the view to protect the
major Western interest in the region: control of the Middle East’s energy
resources which are the largest and cheapest in the world. In earlier years,
the West was able to intervene directly to ensure such control. However, as
the world has become more complex and Western capacity to intervene directly
has reduced, the West has turned to surrogates. This strategy of utilising
regional surrogate regimes to play a subservient role within a wider matrix
of Western interests was formalised in the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine.
According to this doctrine, the United States, now leading the Western
powers, would be committed to maintaining what the infamous U.S. statesman
and war criminal Henry Kissinger called the “overall framework of order”.
Regional powers would pursue particular goals within this overall framework
of subservience. With regard to the extremely crucial Middle East region -
primarily the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, where most of the oil
is - the broad plan was that Israel and Iran under the Shah would play the
role of “guardians of the Gulf”, i.e. the principal regional surrogates.
This plan was outlined by the U.S. Senate’s ranking oil expert, Senator
Henry Jackson, in May 1973. Jackson stressed the necessity of “the strength
and Western orientation of Israel on the Mediterranean and Iran [under the
Shah] on the Persian Gulf”. Israel and Iran were “reliable friends of the
United States” who, along with Saudi Arabia “have served to inhibit and
contain those irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab states...
who, were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed to our
principle sources of petroleum in the Persian Gulf”, which are needed
primarily as a reserve and a lever for control of the global economy. [38]
II.II The
Iranian Revolution
In the 1960s, open
opposition to the Shah’s regime began to grow tremendously. More and more
students were attending the course in Islamic ethics by the late Ayatullah
Khomeini at the Fayziyah Madrasah in Qum. He would often sit on the floor
beside his students and openly criticise the government. In 1963, Khomeini
spoke from his pulpit in his official capacity against the Shah’s regime.
Karen Armstrong records that:
“At a time when nobody else dared to speak out
against the regime, Khomeini protested against the cruelty and injustice of
the shah’s rule, his unconstitutional dismissal of the Majlis, the torture,
the wicked suppression of all opposition, the shah’s craven subservience to
the United States, and his support of Israel, which had deprived
Palestinians of their homes. He was particularly concerned about the plight
of the poor: the shah should leave his splendid palace and go and look at
the shantytowns in South Tehran… Reprisals were swift and inevitable. On
March 22, 1963… SAVAK forces surrounded the madrasah, and attacked it,
killing a number of students. Khomeini was arrested and taken into custody.” [39]
Some naive
commentators attribute the unfolding Islamic movement within Iran
spearheaded by Ayatullah Khomeini as well as many other religious
scholars, intellectuals, and writers, to an insincere desire to gain
power and establish an autocratic Islamic regime. This view arises
from sheer ignorance of the complex developments within Iran at that
time, particularly the new ideas and visions of political Islam being
explored even by Western-educated Iranian philosophers such as Dr. Ali
Shariati (1933-77). [40]
Indeed, Khomeini’s outspoken opposition to the Shah’s regime almost
led to his death. He only narrowly escaped execution because a senior
mujtahid Ayatullah Muhammad Kazim Shariatmadari (1904-85) saved him
from this fate by promoting him to the rank of Grand Ayatullah, making
it too risky for the regime to kill him without provoking massive
protests.[41]
His radical thesis on Islamic Government, was thus not written to
simply legitimise his own rise to power, but rather to provide an
Islamic political alternative that was relevant and meaningful to the
Muslim masses of Iran. When he first wrote his landmark book,
Hokomat-e- eslami, (Islamic Government), he had not anticipated an
imminent revolution. On the contrary, he thought that it would be
another two hundred years before Iran would be capable of implementing
such a system.[42]
In fact, the revolution occurred much earlier.
The revolution entered a new
stage on 9 January 1978, when four thousand students poured on to the
streets of Qum, demanding a return to the 1906 constitution, freedom of
speech, the release of political prisoners, the reopening of Fayziyyah
Madrasah, and permission for Khomeini, who had been exiled since 1964, to
return to Iran. The Shah’s police opened fire into the crowds of unarmed
protestors, killing 70 students. [43]
For the Shah, this was the beginning of the end. Millions of Iranians
responded to the massacre with outrage, and the uprising against his regime
escalated. In different subsequent marches hundreds of demonstrators were
killed in the following months as the Iranian people protested against his
reign. In one gathering at Jaleh Square of around 20,000 people on Friday 8
September, martial law was declared and all large gatherings were banned.
The demonstrators had no knowledge of the ban which was declared at 6AM that
day. The Shah’s soldiers responded to their refusal to disperse with
rifle-fire, resulting in the killing of as many as 900 civilians. The
massacre only inflamed the anger of the Iranian people further as crowds
began raging through the streets in protest while the Shah’s forces
continued to fire at them from tanks.[44]
The U.S. response to
such events is instructive. At 8AM on 10 September, President Jimmy
Carter called the Shah from Camp David to reassure him of U.S.
support. Several hours later, the White House officially confirmed the
conversation and affirmed the ongoing “special relationship” between
the U.S. and Iran. The White House added that despite the President’s
regret for the loss of life, he had expressed hope that the campaign
of political liberalisation just begun by the Shah would continue. [45]
A clearer statement of support for state terrorism can barely be
imagined. Highly relevant in regard to the U.S. role is an astute
series of Washington Post reports by American journalist Scott
Armstrong, which is based in part on government documents. According
to Armstrong, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
continually urged the Shah to employ military force to crush the
mounting popular opposition against his dictatorship. U.S. State
Department sources indicate that Brzezinski even drafted a letter to
the Shah “which unambiguously urged him to use force to put down the
demonstrations”, although State Department officials recognised that
this would lead to the deaths of tens of thousands of Iranians. After
the September 1978 massacre of demonstrators on ‘Black Friday’,
“American policymakers viewed the Shah’s willingness to use force as a
good sign,” reports Armstrong. U.S. admiration for the sort of brutal,
dictatorial and anti-humanitarian policies habitually employed by
military juntas to enforce regional U.S. hegemony was reconfirmed by
then U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan who objected when the Shah’s
forces lessened their human rights abuses against the Iranian people.
He found that “the Shah’s new directives to his security forces, such
as instructions to desist from torture... are disorienting” - clearly
because the practice of torture by U.S. client-regimes serves well to
subjugate the masses and is therefore ‘orienting’. Sullivan expressed
his distress at the results of the command to refrain from torture,
since the Shah’s security forces were thereby “being prevented from
using the time-honored methods of arrest, long imprisonment and
manhandling - if not worse - to get at the threat” (report of 1 June
1978). Indeed, the U.S. clearly played a role that was unequivocally
supportive of human rights abuses. U.S. General Robert Huyser, for
instance, was dispatched to Tehran to urge Iranian generals “that the
military should be pushed into action”, and should employ military
force to capture the oil fields.[46]
By
mid-January, the revolution had succeeded. The Shah had fled and his
appointed Prime Minister Shahpour Bhaktiar was forced by the massive
protests to allow Khomeini to return. From here onwards, a complex new
process of political development and turmoil began, and Khomeini was
voted in as Iran’s new leader almost unanimously by the Iranian
population in democratic elections whose authenticity, like the entire
revolution, shocked the Western powers. As Karen Armstrong observes,
“Western people were also forced to note that Khomeini never lost the
love of the masses of Iranians, especially the bazaaris, the madrasah
students, the less-eminent ulema, and the poor.” [47]
Indeed, for this reason the
economic hardships suffered by the new regime were embarrassing, especially
since “for religious reasons”, the government had “put social welfare at the
top of its original agenda on coming to power…
“Khomeini did his
best for the poor. He set up the Foundation for the Downtrodden to relieve
the distress of those who had suffered most under the Pahlavis. Islamic
associations in the factories and workshops provided workers with
interest-free loans. In the rural areas, Construction Jihad employed young
people in building new houses for the peasants, and in agricultural, public
health, and welfare projects, especially in the war zones… In 1981, the
Majlis had proposed some important land reforms, which would ensure a fairer
distribution of resources.”
Unfortunately, these efforts had been “offset by the war with Iraq, which
had not been of Khomeini’s own making.” [48]
III. The Iran-Iraq War: Still Defending Western Values
The
Western powers were horrified by the 1979 revolution regardless of its
domestic popularity. It implicated their expulsion from Iranian
territory and the subsequent insecurity of elite interests in that
region, including America’s strategic designation of Iran as a
‘guardian of the Gulf’ subordinate to U.S. orders. The Islamic nature
of the revolution gave the West further reason to fear. The Western
powers anticipated that the events in Iran might pose a model for
other Muslim nations in the region whose people suffered similarly
under Western-backed dicatorships. In this respect, the Iranian
revolution bore the potential to severely damage U.S. hegemony in the
Middle East. As Professor John Keane comments:
“To the surprise of most observers Islam did the
unthinkable. It showed that a late twentieth century tyrant, armed to the
teeth and backed by western investors and governments, could be toppled by
popular pressure, and that the new Islamic regime installed by such pressure
could stand politically between the two superpowers without being committed
to either.” [49]
The solution was to
attempt to crush the revolution of Iran before it bore fruit. The
objective was to illustrate to other countries in the region what is
liable to happen to those who attempt to pursue an independent course;
in this case, by building up the very same Iraqi regime that is
ruthlessly condemned today, and pushing the new war-machine into a
devastating confrontation with Iran that would cripple the newly
formed Islamic Republic. With the fall of the Shah’s repressive
U.S.-friendly regime, a “pillar” of US policy was lost. Therefore, a
new “guardian of the Gulf” was required to keep Middle East oil “in
American hands”. Iraq represented many possibilities in this regard.
There was the possibility of infiltrating Iraq; of overthrowing the
new government of Iran; of Iraq becoming a replacement for the former
Iranian “guardian of the Gulf”; and of course the lucrative
opportunities for investment. Once Saddam’s Iraq was removed from the
terrorism list, the new U.S. plan could begin actualisation.
Throughout this period, the disregard for human rights, democracy and
peace consistently manifested itself in the traditional manner. The
London Guardian reports that the war “which Saddam Hussein
started” continued with “encouragement from the Americans, who wanted
him to destroy their great foe, Ayatollah Khomeini. When it was over,
at least a million lives had been lost in the cause of nothing,
fuelled by the arms industries of Britain and the rest of Europe, the
Soviet Union and the United States”. [50]
III.I Befriending
Tyranny
Before the inception of the
Iran-Iraq war, America had made moves toward extending the hand of friendly
relations to the Iraqi regime under the rule of Saddam Hussein. In a
television interview, then National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
stated: “We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the
United States and Iraq”. He emphasised that: “We do not feel that
American-Iraqi relations need to be frozen in antagonism”.[51]
On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein initiated his offensive against Iran
with U.S. consent. Referring to the tacit U.S. influence in this connection,
former National Security Council aide Gary Sick reports that there was a
strategy of “letting Saddam assume there was a U.S. green light because
there was no explicit red light”.[52]
Other reports are even more revealing, referring to U.S. involvement in a
covert operation for a “blitzkrieg” against Iran, launched from Iraq. This
was to be led by several of the Shah’s ex-generals “to form a provisional
government [in Iran] under Iraqi tutelage”.[53]
On 26 February 1982, the U.S.-Iraq special relationship was officially
sealed - Iraq was removed from the U.S. terrorism list. As was later
admitted by the leading Defense Department counterterrorism official, “no
one had any doubts about his [Saddam’s] continued involvement with
terrorism... The real reason [for taking Iraq off the terrorism list] was to
help them succeed in the war against Iran.”[54]
This was followed by
intensive support of Iraq during its devastating war with Iran, including
the use of chemical and biological – and other – weapons of mass
destruction, military training and instruction, and the provision of
intelligence. According to the Los Angeles Times, “the United States
turned a blind eye when Iraq used American intelligence for operations
against Iran that made rampant use of chemical weapons and ballistic
missiles, according to senior administration and former intelligence
officials”, while the “combination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and
American intelligence eventually helped turn the tide of the eight-year war
in Baghdad’s favor.” A former U.S. intelligence official familiar with the
American role admitted U.S. awareness that Iraq “used chemicals in any major
campaign… Although we publicly opposed the use of chemical weapons anywhere
in the world we knew the intelligence we gave the Iraqis would be used to
develop their own operational plans for chemical weapons.” Another
administration official stated: “They [the Americans] built this guy up and
let him do whatever it took to win. And that included the use of chemical
weapons and ballistic missiles.” U.S. intelligence sources went so far as to
provide data to Iraq on Iran’s equipment and troop strength. Former
intelligence officials have stated clearly that Washington was well aware
that Iraq began using chemical weapons in 1983 and intensified their use in
1986. By 1988, Iraq’s use of gases had also repeatedly been documented by UN
specialists.[55]
According to another former
U.S. intelligence official: “It was all done with a wink and a nod... We
knew exactly where this stuff was going, although we bent over backwards to
look the other way.” Washington knew Iraq was “dumping boatloads” of
chemical weapons on Iranian positions, he added. Policy at the time,
according to another former Reagan official, recognised that: “Hussein is a
bastard. But at the time, he was our bastard.” In 1986, as the Iran-Iraq war
began to turn decisively in Iran’s favour the pace of U.S. intelligence
information to Iraq escalated as part of a bid to restore Iraq’s edge. The
United States was not alone in this endeavour. In advance of the Faw counter
offensive, France, Egypt and Jordan provided help in reorganising and
re-training the Iraqi military.[56]
The United Kingdom was also
heavily involved. Throughout the devastating eight-year war, the British
government assured its public that it was not selling “lethal equipment” to
either side. However, evidence given to the inquiry by Lord Justice Scott
into arms sales to Iraq, has revealed that this alleged policy was for the
purpose of public deception only. In reality, Britain was one of the 26
countries - including the United States, France and other Western nations
along with their Middle East client-regimes - which sold the greater bulk of
arms to Saddam’s genocidal regime.[57]
American arms specialist William D. Hartung - Senior Fellow at the World
Policy Institute - observes that despite recent efforts by the U.S. defence
industry and the Clinton administration to argue that the United States did
not arm Iraq in the period leading up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, there is
ample documentation (some of which shall be discussed here) demonstrating
that the Reagan and Bush administrations supplied critical military
technologies that were put directly to use in the construction of the Iraqi
war machine. Further strong evidence discussed by Hartung indicates that the
“executive branch’s failure to crack down on illegal weapons traffickers or
keep track of third party transfers of U.S. weaponry allowed a substantial
flow of U.S.-origin military equipment and military components to make their
way to Iraq.”[58]
III.II Arming Iraq
Leading American analyst
Bruce Jentleson - Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy,
Professor of Public Policy & Political Science, and formerly of the U.S.
State Department Policy Planning Staff as Special Assistant to the Director
- reports that huge amounts of military aid were poured into Iraq. [59]
With Iraq off the terrorism list and export controls on dual-use
technologies (i.e. with both civilian and military applications) therefore
less restrictive, 60 Hughes MD-500 ‘Defender’ helicopters, and then 10 Bell
Helicopters - models which were widely employed in the invasion of Vietnam -
were sold to Saddam’s regime. Other helicopter sales followed, such as 48
that were said to be for “recreation” purposes. These were subsequently
employed to bomb and gas Kurdish civilians.[60]
A total of 241 licenses were
approved for dual-use exports to Iraq in the last two years of Reagan’s
Administration; only 6 were denied. The nature of these exports was
conspicuously such that they could be put to military use. Bruce Jentleson
notes, for instance, that precision tools for “general military repair”
ended up being used to upgrade SCUD missiles for longer-range firing. Quartz
crystals and frequency synthesisers as “components in a ground radar system”
were used for missile guidance systems. Fuel air explosive technology was
exported, although it was capable of producing bombs ten times more lethal
than conventional bombs. Indeed, exports “were knowingly sent to Iraqi
nuclear installations”, according to a former White House official.[61]
The Iraqi Ministry of
Industry and Military Industrialisation (MIMI) was a notorious example of
this. Having been created in April 1988 to bring together civilian and
military projects, the United States was fully aware that MIMI was linked to
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. Yet it was regularly
inundated with dozens of dual-use technologies, licensed for export by the
U.S.[62]
Another typical example was NASSR (Nassr State Establishment for Mechanical
Industries), which from the 1970s onwards was well known to be an important
military installation. By 1987, the United States knew of a ballistic
missiles programme in operation there. Yet the Department of Commerce
continued to licensed exports for dual-use technologies to this
installation.[63]
Dual-use technologies supplied to military installations such as MIMI, Sa’ad
16, and others, as well as directly to the Iraqi military, included:
equipment for the Arab Company for Detergent Chemicals (a front for chemical
weapons); bacteria samples to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and
University of Baghdad (both linked to “biological warfare, support and
numerous other military activities” by the CIA); communications and tracking
agreement for Sa’ad 16; helicopter guidance, helicopters, engines and fight
equipment for the Iraqi airforce; computers to the Iraqi navy; and so on. [64]
Douglas Frantz and
Murray Waas of the Los Angeles Times report that in 410 of 526
cases with potential nuclear applications, export licenses were
approved. According to U.S. Congressman Henry Gonzalez, two of every
seven U.S. non-agricultural exports to Iraq between 1985 and 1990
accrued to its expanding military-industrial complex.[65]
The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams confirmed
that U.S. technology was used by Iraq in its weapons programme - not a
surprise considering that dual-use U.S. technologies were being
systematically and knowingly licensed to military installations
undertaking exactly these kinds of programmes. According to the head
UN/IAEA inspector: “The simple answer to the question of whether U.S.
produced equipment and technology has been found to be part of the
Iraqi nuclear weapons program is yes”.[66]
Examples of this include the equipment discovered by UNSCOM from 11
American companies in Iraqi missiles and chemical weapons plants. Some
of the 17 bacterial and viral cultures licensed by the U.S. were also
found at the Salman Pak site that was party to “a major military
research program... concentrating on anthrax and botulism”.[67]
As the torrent of military
and financial assistance continued to pour into Iraq, Saddam was busy
applying this aid - which came to him not only from the U.S., but from
France, Germany, Britain, among others - in systematic human rights abuses.
According to former U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, the first reports of
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran - “drifted in”.[68]
As was the case with Saddam’s other flagrant violations of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol Banning the Use of Chemical Weapons in War, his use of chemical
weapons against Iran was extensively documented by the UN.[69]
The UN found evidence that Saddam had used chemical weapons four times
during the Iran-Iraq war. The other three were in April 1985, February-March
1986 and April-May 1987. Saddam was also busy violently oppressing his own
people, cracking down particularly on the Kurds of northern Iraq -
including, for instance, according to Amnesty International, the abduction
and torture of about three hundred children from Kurdish families.[70]
In 1987, a U.S. Senate staff delegation to Kurdistan discovered the ravaging
effects of Saddam’s policy towards the Kurds in Iraq, reporting “hundreds of
villages levelled”; the countryside was described as having “an eerie
quality to it. Fruit trees, graveyards and cemeteries stand as reminders of
the absent people and livestock.”[71]
In February 1988, Saddam
instigated an even more massive campaign against the Kurds. His troops
employed the traditional methods of destruction. By 16 March 1988, the Iraqi
air force was strafing Halabja with mustard gas and nerve toxins. “Entire
families were wiped out and the streets were littered with the corpses of
men, women and children”, reported the Washington Post. “Other forms
of life in and around the city - horses, house cats, cattle - perished as
well”.[72]
An estimated 5,000 people were massacred. As Professor Jentleson observes,
this death toll is proportionate to over a half million deaths in a city the
size of New York. The U.S. response to all the above is instructive. Such
atrocities did not suffice for the United States and its Western allies to
cease military assistance to the regime. Even the Halabja atrocities only
led to the token tightening of a few export controls related to chemical
weapons manufacture and the production of what amounted to an effectively
meaningless condemnatory resolution in the UN Security Council. These
gestures were apparently propagandistic in purpose, since they unfortunately
did not amount to any significant reduction in U.S./Western military
assistance to Saddam’s regime.[73]
Indeed, the possibility of
sanctions being imposed on Iraq due to the massacres was deliberately
blocked by the U.S. Administration, because they would “undermine relations
and reduce U.S. influence on a country that has emerged from the Persian
Gulf War as one of the most powerful Arab nations”.[74]
Rather than impose sanctions, the very opposite was done. Bruce Jentleson
observes that after the Halabja massacres, the U.S. was granting new
licenses for dual-use technology exports at a rate more than 50 per cent
greater than before Saddam’s gassing of the Kurds. Between September and
December 1988, sixty-five licenses were granted for dual-use technology
exports - this averages out as an annual rate of 260 licenses: more than
double the rate between January and August 1988 (which involved the granting
of 85 licenses, amounting as Jentleson notes to a 128 annual rate).[75]
The tremendous escalation of exports occurred in spite of the fact that
inspectors of the U.S. Customs Service had “detected a marked increase in
the activity levels of Iraq’s procurement networks. These increased levels
of activity were particularly noticeable in the areas of missile technology,
chemical-biological warfare and fuze technology”.[76]
In January 1988, reports of
Iraqi germ warfare capabilities in the open specialised press emerged.
According to a respected American analyst, “there were growing indications
in late 1988 that Iraq was producing a botulin toxin in military quantities,
or some similar agent”. A U.S. government official was more forthcoming:
“Everybody knows the Iraqis are trying to develop biological weapons”.[77]
Nevertheless, from 1985-9, seventeen licenses were approved for exports of
bacterial and fungal cultures to Iraqi government agencies.[78]
This occurred in spite of a human rights appeal to the UN Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, issued by Amnesty
International, pointing clearly to the “grave fears that in the aftermath of
the [Iran-Iraq] war a further significant deterioration in human rights
could occur in Iraq”. Amnesty noted that Saddam’s regime was conducting “a
systematic and deliberate policy... to eliminate large numbers of Kurdish
civilians”.[79]
This AI report was issued just three days before the Iran-Iraq cease-fire of
20 August 1988. Further domestic chemical attacks on an unprecedented scale
were initiated by Saddam only a few days later. Yet as noted above, the
aftermath of these attacks did not result in a reduction in U.S. licensed
exports of dual-use technologies, but on the contrary resulted in their
increase.
III.III Friendly
Relations
The U.S. not only provided
Saddam’s regime with military aid, but also with financial aid, huge
investment, and abundant trade. For example, American CCC credits had grown
to exceed $1 billion per year.[80]
The U.S. had become a major customer for Iraqi oil, importing by 1987 30
million barrels. This was still minimal in comparison to later imports: In
1988 - the year of the most conspicuous domestic atrocities instigated by
Saddam’s forces – U.S. imports of Iraqi oil had rocketed to 126 million
barrels. This figure should be compared to the 1981 figures when the U.S.
had not imported even a single barrel of Iraqi oil. The disparity
constituted a momentous increase of over 400 per cent, with U.S. purchases
bringing in $1.6 billion. The U.S. was essentially purchasing one out of
every four barrels of Iraqi oil exports.[81]
Jentleson points out that American oil companies also began receiving a
discount of $1 per barrel below the prices being charged to European oil
companies. This amounted to approximately $37 million in the last quarter of
1988 and another $123 million through the first three-quarters of 1989. The
per-barrel discount was later increased to $1.24 in January 1990, resulting
in savings of another hefty $241 million on imports (the US was so
enthusiastic about these that they continued for over a month after Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait).[82]
Iraq became the twelfth
largest market for American agricultural exports in the 1980s; for some
crops (e.g. rice) the country became the number one export market. Iraq was,
in fact, second only to Mexico as a beneficiary of CCC export credit
guarantees. In addition to the $1.1 billion the previous year and $3.4
billion cumulative since fiscal year 1983, another $1.1 billion in
guarantees were scheduled for the fiscal year about to arise. The U.S.
Agricultural Department was unsurprisingly optimistic about “Iraq’s enormous
market potential for U.S. agricultural exports”.[83]
As has already been seen, business was also flourishing on the manufacturing
and dual-use technology export front. Jentleson reports that in sectors such
as petroleum, electricity generation, petrochemicals, steel, and
transportation, billions of dollars in contracts were being fervently
signed.[84]
One of the groups which was
particularly active in ensuring that the U.S. did not impose sanctions on
Iraq was the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum, established in 1985, whose president
Marshall Wiley was a lawyer and former U.S. Ambassador to Oman as well as
former ranking U.S. diplomat in Baghdad.[85]
According to Bruce Jentleson, companies that were members of this group -
whose influence was crucial in preventing sanctions (providing yet another
example of the preference of Western governments for elite interests as
opposed to human rights) - included those involved in importing discounted
Iraqi oil (Amoco, Mobil, Exxon, Texaco, Occidental), defence contractors
(Lockheed, Bell Helicopter-Textron, United Technologies) and others (AT&T,
General Motors, Bechtel, Caterpillar).[86]
This clearly illustrates that the the United States is influenced most
significantly in its policies by the interests of corporate elites - the
military-industrial complex and multinational corporations - at the expense
of the human rights and decisions of the masses throughout the world. These
elite sectors possess the most powerful leverage over policy; and the
results, as is now quite evident, are globally catastrophic.
Fellow at the Institute for
Policy Studies, Phyllis Bennis, a Middle East expert based in Washington,
describes the anti-humanitarian nature of the U.S.-Iraq alliance, an
alliance based solely on strategic and economic interests:
“Long before the invasion of Kuwait, one might
have wondered about the US-Iraq alliance. Certainly it was partly tactical,
aimed at preventing outright victory for the ascendant Islamic Republic of
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. Certainly it reflected the three long-standing
goals of US policy in the Middle East: protection of Israel, control of
access to oil and stability. One might have wondered why US officials
willingly, if not eagerly, turned a blind eye to the Iraqi regime's crimes.
It wasn’t as if they didn’t know of Iraq’s repressive rule, its Anfal
campaign to depopulate Kurdish villages and its use of internationally
outlawed poison gas against both civilians and Iranian soldiers. Human
rights violations are common throughout the region - arbitrary arrests and
detention, torture, house demolitions, repression of dissidents, persecution
of Communists - and Iraq’s government was right up there with the best.
Washington knew of Iraq’s violations, but expressed little official
concern.”
[87]
U.S./Western policy
then is simply not premised on concern for human rights. On the
contrary, Western strategic and economic interests are the driving
force of foreign policies that are systematically anti-humanitarian
and counter-democratic.
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