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- After the Taliban Victories
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- by Nasim Zehra
It is
unlikely that even the man who spoke the words realized how soon they
would come true. In New York at the September 15 closed door meeting of
the Six-Plus-Two Group on Afghanistan United Nations’ special envoy to
Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell had alerted the Group members of the
possibility of a Talibaan take-over of the Badakhshan by onset of this
winter. What was the world community prepared to do? Step in to prevent
the advance of the Talibaan or remain a spectator as Ahmad Shah Massoud,
the formidable Afghan commander with significant support in the region and
in the West, is ousted from Badakshan as well? The military and political
fall-out of a Talibaan victory on the region was also raised. There was
little that the UNSC or the 6-Plus-2 Group could devise for arresting
Talibaan military advance.
Wisely in
New York the sanctions route was not pursued. Defying the UN sanctions
imposed last October under resolution 1267, the Talibaan have still
continued to take whatever military and political steps they have
considered important for retaining and expanding political and military
power. However, a more plausible engagement route with the Talibaan needs
to be devised by the international community; factoring in Afghanistan’s
ground realities and the failed US and UN policies on Cuba, Libya, Iran
and Iraq.
Since
Vendrell spoke Ahmad Shah Masood, has been pushed to the Panjsheer Valley
surrounded on three sides by Talibaan forces. The Talibaan forces are now
heading towards the Farkhar Valley in the northeastern Takhar province.
However, demolished roads and blown up bridges and fear of surprise
interdiction’s by Massoud’s forces, make it difficult for the Talibaan
forces to advance rapidly. On September 30 the Farkhaar gorge, is
strategically important since it lies on the highway which connects
Taloqaan with Badakhshan, the opposition’s main strong-hold. Capture of
the gorge was possible after a few of Masoud’s commanders joined the
Talibaan — a fact acknowledged by opposition spokesman to a BBC
correspondent on September 30.
Compared to
their earlier offensives the Talibaan seem to be moving ahead at a
measured pace. Earlier they had twice captured Taloqaan and Jab-ul Siraj
but every time taken back by Massoud’s forces. In this round the
Talibaan are proceeding at a measured pace, have been instructed through
Mulla Umar’s edict to not enter peoples’ houses and antagonize local
populations. Over the last six weeks three important districts in the
Kunduz province have been captured including Khawajagarh; serving as a
main supply route between Kulyab and Taloqaan and Massoud’s fortified
and well-stocked military base for the last twenty years.
Massoud’s
main supply points with Tajikistan including Dasht-e-Arshi, Imam sahib and
Sher Khan Bandar, a river port, have also been choked. Key strategic loses
have included Taloqaan, Burka, Nehreen, Ishkmash, Hazarbagh, Khawajagarh
and three districts north of Kunduz. In addition to supply routes, the
landing strips of Khawajagarh and Taloqaan used for military supplies, are
now with the Talibaan. Massoud continues his hold on Farkhaar, his
military stronghold. His forces currently control parts of Takhaar and the
entire Badakshaan province.
Talibaan
forces have held on to Taloqaan after capturing Khawajagarh towards the
north. In the south is the Farkhaar Valley. However, the route is
difficult to negotiate since the road and the bridges have been blown up
and the area is heavily mined. The Farkhaar Valley, south of Taloqaan, is
the last obstacle between Badakhshan and the south. However, an imminent
Talibaan attack on Badakhshan is unlikely. At present the Talibaan are
focusing on consolidating their latest gains. In the case of Badakhshan
the Talibaan hope that local uprisings and commander defections will
enable them to capture Badakhshan, without a major battle. Some areas
including Kishan and parts of Zeybak, are controlled by commanders
supporting former Mujahideen commanders including Gulbadeen Hikmatyaar and
Maulvi Sayyaf. In the past these commanders have neither supported Massoud
nor the Talibaan. However, a militarily ascendant Talibaan force may
appear attractive allies for these commanders. A successful offensive in
Badakhshan will enable the Talibaan forces to control the 600 kilometer
Afghanistan-Tajikistan border area extending from Darwaz to Wahkhan.
Meanwhile,
in preparation for a future Badakshan offensive, there are reports that
some Talibaan had crossed into the Badakhshan via Chitral. Talibaan have,
however, denied using the Chitral route. Talibaan are unlikely to face
force shortages in any future offensive. For them men are in no short
supply. A Talibaan supporter clams that “All it takes is for Mulla Umar
to order Talibs to the front from each of the 27 provinces and an over
20,000 strong reinforcement would arrive.” Unconfirmed reports also
indicate that a potentially powerful commander Mulla Afzal Nooristani,
from the Nooristan area may declare support for the Talibaan. Mulla
Nooristani, six years ago had declared an independent Nooristan covering
parts of Laghman and adjoining areas. He can now control the route to the
north from where Massoud gets his supplies through Chitral.
Within the
immediate context a major military turn around in favour of Massoud
appears unlikely. Neither through a positional battle nor through close
quarter combat. A brilliant guerilla commander, described by a US
official; as “one of the greatest guerilla warriors since Ho Chi Minh”,
Massoud knows that a guerilla fight waged from the Panjsheer Valley
against a people on heights could be indeed a losing one. Mass scale
destruction of men and Valley would follow. The population in the Valley
is estimated to be about 150,000. Massoud has a fighting force of around
7,000 which he would not like to involve in a close quarter battle. The
Talibaan by contrast engage in close encounters attacking the opposition
like human torpedoes.
A positional
battle too, given Massoud’s guerilla orientation, low troop morale,
shortage of supplies, disbursed forces, heavily mined routes and destroyed
road networks can be ruled out. The shrewd commander will likely opt for
only interdiction of adversary men and material, instead of any major
offensive. Given the current military scenario the possibility of
Massoud’s temporary withdrawal to Kulyab, therefore, cannot be ruled
out. According to unconfirmed reports, around late nineties Massoud
financed the construction of a residential colony to accommodate 5,000
people.
Multiple
factors militate against immediate and large scale reprisals by Massoud.
His current military strength, the morale of Massoud’s men, the relative
decrease in peoples’ support, the difficult logistics situation, the
heavily disrupted communications network, the defection factor and finally
the unlikelihood of Massoud’s friends in the neighbourhood to come to
his military rescue openly. Not because the Talibaan’s recent military
successes in the North have effected a change in their openly anti-Talibaan
policies. Instead prompted by these military successes political
expediency must dictate at least initially a pseudo-softening of their
anti-talibaan stance. Already reports from the Turkmenistan capital
Ashkabad indicate that the Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, a dogged
critic of the Talibaan is now more accepting of the Talibaan reality. He
is beginning to blame “certain quarters” for exaggerating the Talibaan
threat. During recent meetings with the Afghan ambassador and Pakistani
officials in Islamabad Uzbek diplomats have expressed the need to improve
Afghan-Uzbek relations.
The Talibaan,
meanwhile, maybe confronted by an increasing sabotage operations to create
panic within the people and the government. Sabotage is a tool that the
opposition can use to counter Talibaan’s military gains. For example
recently in Herat around ten men carrying automatic guns under their
jackets were picked up by Afghan intelligence men. According to some
estimates around 1,500 such ‘free-lance’ saboteurs are currently
inside Afghanistan planning sabotage and murders. However, the small
pockets of anti-Talibaan uprisings in Kunar , Samangaan and Sar-i-Pul,
which have existed for at least five years are unlikely to pose any major
military of political threat. These pockets could only snowball into
trouble zones if the Talibaan face a major military defeat at the hands of
its principle opponents.
Vendrell’s
concerns were in-keeping with his concerns and, as the Talibaan
maintained, the ‘false allegations he had voiced. His comments during
his August 14 Kabul press conference. The Talibaan Foreign Minister, Wakil
Ahmad Mutawakkil, has said the United Nations’ special envoy to
Afghanistan has undermined his own role as a mediator.
Mr
Mutawakkil criticised the envoy, Francesc Vendrell, for blaming the
Talibaan for starting the current round of fighting.
He said the
Talibaan would be justified in withdrawing co-operation from the UN peace
process.
In the last
two weeks of fighting the Talibaan have made significant gains in the
north of Afghanistan, capturing several towns and cutting off a critical
Northern Alliance supply route.
But the
Talibaan foreign minister said again that the gains were made in defensive
actions.
This was not
the conclusion reached by Mr. Vendrell.
He said the
Talibaan were responsible for starting the fighting and were being
supported by Pakistan.
Threat
Mutawakkil
said the UN envoy was wrong and it was not proper for him to make such a judgment.
He said it
would harm Mr. Vendrell’s role as a mediator in the Afghan crisis.
This is an
important issue, earlier in the year the Security Council threatened
sanctions against the Talibaan if it launched any new offensive.
Like in many
other conflict zones in the world, there is no tradition of ceasefires
among the Afghan men fighting for power. Once the excitement and
‘fruits’ of the gun-powder language are imbibed, ceasefires become
irrelevant. Ceasefires are attractive for the losing group. Ever-since the
1979 Soviet invasion, the period of the Afghan resistance and subsequently
of the civil war has been marked by no accommodation gestures or
ceasefires.
Even the
so-called 1992 withdrawal of the Soviet army was in fact a Soviet
roll-back forced by the Afghan resistance.
(ME Against
My Brother)
Earlier in
its August 24 closed door meeting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
all members, led by Russia, blamed the Afghan government for problems
within and around Afghanistan. However, Moscow was unable to gather
sufficient support with the UNSC for imposing new sanctions on the Afghan
government. Instead the members, including the US, advocated strengthening
and implementation, of existing sanctions before proceeding with new
measures. The sanctions issue is unlikely to come up before early next
year. The release of a moderately critical UNOCHA-authored report on the
effect of UN-imposed sanctions on Afghanistan may also have influenced the
UNSC’s decision to parry the sanctions issue. During their meetings
though, the 6-Plus 2 Group on Afghanistan and the UN Security Council
appears have ignored the report during their September discussions in New
York.
The UNOCHA
report which builds a strong case against sanctions, is critical of
sanctions on two counts. One that they are augmenting the suffering of the
Afghan people. Two that they are not working; in fact may also indirectly
be strengthening the present Afghan government. A decision on what the
next steps that the UNSC and the 6-Plus-2 Group should take on
Afghanistan, will be taken after they receive the UN Secretary General’s
special envoy Francesc Vendrell’s report and recommendations based on
the latest developments in Afghanistan. Vendrell currently in the region
will present his report in New York on November 1.
While the
military situation may keep changing there is an abiding reality linked to
the current situation in Afghanistan. The attempt at ‘engineered
termination’ of the Talibaan government. Myths pass for truth when the
‘powerful’ do the myth-making. Often the powerful players in
international politics behave like rich spoilt kids. Because they dislike
an ‘element’ a ‘player’ factor that emerges on the international
scene they wish its termination. First through propaganda and name-calling
in popular media, then through political economic pressures and finally
through use of force. ‘Engineered termination’ by the economically and
militarily powerful players does not always succeed.
However,
often they also do succeed. Like the CIA did in the ouster of the Iranian
President Mossedegh in the fifties, of the Chilean leader Salvador Allende
and of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in the nineties. There are times when
they do not as in the case of the Fidel Castro in Cuba. Deadly and often
crazy plans by the CIA including an attempt to bring about his death
through a poisoned cigar have failed to achieve Castro’s removal from
what the Americans have referred to as their “backyard.” Similarly the
American bombing of Libyan President’s tent in the eighties and the
British MI-5’s assassination attempt to get Moammar Qaddafi assassinated
have not worked. The heavily sanctioned and regularly-bombarded Iraq’s
President Saddam Hussain too remains intact despite being high on the
American hit-list. The more recent attempt by the Americans and its NATO
allies to engineer the removal of Slobadan Milosevic has not worked.
Russia’s Vladimir Putin, consistently opposed to NATO’s Kosovo and
Belgrade bombing has chosen to defy the more powerful international
players led by the Americans.
Russia
remains committed to the concept of zone of influence, if not satellite
states of the Soviet days. Hence somewhat similar to its declaration that
its security parameters on its west extend to the Oxus river, it would
like to retain some influence in countries to its east. Putin has
committed economic aid to Milosevic and has established normal relations
with Milosevic’s regime. Milosevic has been declared a war criminal by
the War Crimes tribunal set up after the Kosovo war. Yet Washington
leading the anti-Milosevic drive has opted to not use the IMF lever to
dissuade Putin from aligning with Milosevic. Putin’s Russia is a
recipient of a multi-year multi-billion dollar package.
Hence in the
game of ‘engineered termination’ there are limits what economic
pressures and covert and overt use of force can achieve. Few examples
demonstrate this limit as powerfully as does the Afghanistan example. Many
key players in the international community are keen on the current Afghan
government’s political demise. Means applied for their ‘termination’
have been diverse; ranging from bombing of so-called terrorist camps on
August 20 1998 by the American government to transfer of 700 metric tons
of weapons to the Talibaan adversaries by Iran, from major military
support by Russia and Uzbekistan to anti-Talibaan commander Ahmad Shah
Massoud and from sending in of saboteurs to subvert the Talibaan rule to
imposing sanctions on a war-ravaged society. Perhaps the most telling
illustration of how desperate many in the international community have
been to ensure the exit of the Talibaan is the fact that the man who
barely feels secure in Afghanistan, who lives mostly in Tajikistan and
whose commander controls less than 10% of the Afghan territory will
address the UN millennium summit as the President of Afghanistan!
Many myths
about the Talibaan have been manufactured. That they are exporting
‘Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, that they have ignited and are
now perpetuating Russia’s Chechen problem, that Pakistan is responsible
for their survival, that Afghans are not returning to Afghanistan because
of the continuation of the civil war etc. Because these myths have
systematically and successfully been injected into the mainstream media
with a global reach, these myths are integral to the mainstream discourse
on Afghanistan.
That the
Talibaan as a political force in their current form hold virtually no
promise for Afghanistan, that they have opted for an un-Islamic approach
towards women, that their social policies are a deterrent to the return of
most educated Afghans, that the competence level required to run a country
is almost non-existent, can hardly be denied. However, how societies react
to such situations is also context-specific. The Afghans living inside
Afghanistan, hit by a 21-year-long period of war and low level civil
strife, are unlikely to respond with the anger and outrage to the Talibaan
worldview that we outsiders plus the Afghans who have lived outside
Afghanistan for the last 20 years would. For the Afghans inside
Afghanistan, they view the Talibaan in relative terms. More importantly
what other Afghan political forces are better, indigenous and ones they
can relate ? Maybe the world’s cruel sanctions on these war-ravaged
people make them more angry, even more defiant. Like media reports
suggested that the bombing of Belgrade made the Serbs more defiant.
There are
issues of power dynamics, of politics and of sociology which are more
compelling definers of a situation. One dimensional analysis and
subsequent prescriptions are never valid as policy options. Washington and
Moscow need to understand this. Washington, given its distance from
Afghanistan perhaps can be more reasonable on Afghanistan but for its
one-dimension Afghan policy centering around the Osama question. Having
created a national consensus that Osama is the real monster behind all the
terrorism that targets the Americans, any Washington administration will
find it difficult to become flexible on the Osama issue. Washington
expects flexibility from the Afghan government which has continuously
reiterated its own position. On October 4, 1999 while talking to the then
DG ISI General Ziaud Din and to the Additional Secretary of the Foreign
Office Mulla Umar conveyed his own difficulty on Osama. “He is like a
chicken bone, I can’t swallow it and I can’t throw him out, “Mulla
Umar explained.
The Afghans
appear determined to not succumb to any external pressure. It is almost as
if they have got used to the suffering; they resent it and those who they
believe are responsible for it. But they are not willing to concede to any
pressure. The impact or rather the absence of the kind of impact the
Americans had wished the UN sanctions would have, is a case in point.
UN
Sanctions
On August 22
the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Islamabad
released a well-researched report on the impact of UN sanctions on
Afghanistan. The report entitled “Vulnerability and humanitarian impact
of UN Security Council sanctions in Afghanistan” identifies Afghan
refugees as HCR’s “biggest caseload” with Iran and Pakistan jointly
hosting 2.6 million of them. It underscores the problems that the
sanctions have caused and by extension how they prevent the return of
Afghan refugees into Afghanistan.
While the
report acknowledges that “continuing conflict” and policies of the
authorities discourage Afghan refugees from returning to Afghanistan it
also states that “Afghans do not return in large numbers” also because
of “the difficult economic situation, the on-going drought and limited
social services.” In fact on interviewing heads of 3,270 returnee
households according to the Report it was found that “27% of the
returnees did not hold regular jobs, 21% found their houses completely
destroyed,14% faced problems with land mines or unexploded ordinance, as
many 46% did not have access to any kind of health services, and 79% of
the families with school-age children did not have any kids at school.”
The report
documents the problem of food shortages, the heavy reliance on food-aid,
the absence of male bread-winners, the limited possibilities available for
women’s employment, child labour, women begging for survival. According
to the report for Afghans returning to Afghanistan there are very few job
opportunities outside the subsistence economy on the one hand and the
criminalized economy on the other.”
In an anti-Talibaan
international environment led by Washington and Moscow, the report, is
indeed a brave attempt made by UNOCHA to candidly document the “direct
impact” of the UN Security Council sanctions imposed in November 1999.
The report identifies five specific impacts of the sanctions.
One, the
drastic curtailment in the movement of goods and people have stopped
air-travel linked trade given that the official airline Ariana can no
longer fly outside of Afghanistan. This has resulted in a loss of income
and inability to procure quality medicines at low prices. Two, the
lowering of safety standards of Ariana since loss of revenue has forced
the management to stop paying overtime to its maintenance staff. Three,
communications of Afghans with relatives abroad has been greatly
disrupted. Where previously 10,000 letters were being sent daily , today
the postal system stands disrupted. Four, the lack of air-links with the
outside world has restricted the work of the relief agencies specially in
the health sector. Five, according to the report is “the extent to which
ordinary Afghans feel isolated and victimized.” Elaborating on this
point the report indicates that “There is a widespread perception that
the UN has set out to harm rather than help Afghans. There is a strong
sense of bitterness and bewilderment in that Security Council action is
perceived as targeting an innocent population. Most people take it as
self-evident that SC sanctions have disrupted trade, pushed up prices ands
caused suffering.”
The report
concludes that there is “no public opinion as such in Afghanistan, in
that there are no representative institutions and no civil society
mechanisms through which international coercion might be translated into
public debate and domestic pressure for policy change.”
Clearly the
international community’s attempt to engineer the termination of the
Talibaan government is unlikely to succeed in the near future. No amount
of pressure on the Pakistan government to apply unreasonable economic and
political pressure on the Afghan, will convince Pakistan to opt for what
would essentially be a counter-productive policy. Constructive engagement
with the Afghan government is the best policy option available to
countries genuinely concerned about peace and stability in the region and
beyond.
Source:
by courtesy & ©
200
1
Defence Journal (Pakistan) & Nasim Zehra
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