Israel's
Discriminatory Practices Are Rooted in Jewish Religious Laws
by Israel Shahak
The rabbis
of Safad, joined by the Chief Rabbi Bakshi-Doron issued a judgment
prohibiting Jews living in the Land of Israel to lease or sell any real
estate property to non-Jews. These rabbis are on the State of Israel's
payroll. Yet all too clearly, their judgment contravenes Israeli state
laws proscribing public expressions of racism and utterances hurtful to
human dignity.1
Nonetheless,
the rabbis of Safad did not invent this prohibition. The racist ruling
is part and parcel of Jewish religious law (halacha).
Furthermore, all the rulings of Jewish religious law concerning
non-Jews, and incidentally, also Jewish women and some other Jewish
sectors, are racist and discriminatory. Yet for years such rulings have
been routinely invoked by rabbinical courts which are a recognized part
of the State of Israel's judiciary.
Two examples
show what the application of such laws may involve. According to Jewish
religious law, both non-Jews and Jewish women cannot validly testify in
rabbinical courts. True, Jewish women are permitted to testify in a few
strictly limited matters considered "female affairs." If a
case involves "a major judicial effort," however, a Jewish
woman's testimony is perforce invalid,2 because "all
women are lazy by nature." But even in cases not involving a
"major judicial effort" when Jewish women can testify, a
problem appears when the testimony of a Jewish woman is contradicted by
the testimony of a Jewish man. Jewish religious law solves this problem
by the formula that "a testimony of 100 Jewish women is equivalent
to a testimony of a single Jewish man." 3
The second
example concerns the definition of the term "harlot" in Jewish
religious law. "We have learned by tradition that the term 'harlot'
as designated in the Torah means any woman who is not a daughter of
Israel (i.e., not born Jewish), or a daughter of Israel who has had
intercourse with a man she is forbidden to marry" (Maimonides, The
Book of Holiness, Forbidden Intercourse, Chapter XVIII, Law 1,
translated in Yale University Judaica series). According to this racist
definition, all women who happen to have been born non-Jewish are
automatically considered to be "harlots." On the basis of this
definition every female converted to Judaism is still considered by
Jewish religious law to be a "harlot"—and as such forbidden
to marry a Jewish "priest" (i.e., a supposed descendant from
the Biblical "Aaron the priest").4 It is easy to
imagine what the Jews would have said if any religion or movement
branded all Jewish women as "harlots" and maintained that they
remain "harlots" forever only because they were born Jewish.
Lands
defined as owned by the State of Israel can be leased only to Jews.
All too
clearly the enforcement of such laws in the State of Israel is
irremediable unless the religion is separated from the state. It is
impossible, and in my view even improper, to demand that Orthodox rabbis
not issue rulings conforming to Jewish religious law which has for them
an incontestable validity as the Word of God. But it is reasonable to
demand that those who do not believe in the sanctity of Jewish religious
law know what is its real content. The secular Jews should not fall prey
to an indoctrination presenting "the Jewish morality" as
supposedly enshrined in Jewish religious law, or extolling compatibility
between the norms of historical Judaism and modern democracy. As Jews,
we should be aware of the undeniable historical fact that for long
centuries the entire Jewish nation really believed that all non-Jewish
women were "harlots" and that the religious Jews in Israel
still so believe.
What is
really surprising is that people so seldom realize that laws of the
State of Israel pertaining to the use of land are no different in
essence from the rulings of the Safad rabbis. The State of Israel has
turned most of the land, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, into
"state land." After these lands are defined as owned by the
State of Israel they can be leased only to Jews. The right to lease such
lands is denied to all non-Jews, without a single exception. This denial
is enforced by placing all state lands under the administration of the
Jewish National Fund, a branch of the World Zionist Organization, whose
racist statutes forbid their lease or any other use to non-Jews. It is
easy to see that such Israeli regulations are nothing but an effect of
corresponding rulings of Jewish religious law, just as secular
anti-Semitism is often an effect of secularization of religious
anti-Semitism.
On closer
inspection it turns out that almost everything the State of Israel does
or says in its relations with non-Jews is an effect of such a
secularization of religious notions. As an example let me give the
recent spontaneous pronouncement by senior officials of the Housing
Ministry in justification of their policy of supporting the Jewish
settlers who squat in houses that the ministry builds. In such cases the
ministry's policy is to spend public money for connecting such houses to
the electricity, water and sewage networks. When asked why they do it,
the Housing Ministry officials answered that "it was inconceivable
to leave the Jews without electricity or sewerage, no matter what they
do."
Gentile
Villages
It is not
difficult to point to Arab villages in Israel (let alone in the occupied
territories) whose residents have been left for decades "without
electricity or sewerage," often until the present day. It is not
difficult to point to the striking contrast between spending tax money
for construction of magnificent public buildings in the center of Jewish
Gush Etzion (in the West Bank) or Jewish Gush Qatif (in the Gaza Strip)
and the dilapidation of Druze villages in Israel which are not being
granted budgets for the most essential amenities, even though a large
majority of their residents serve in the Israeli army. We are often told
of "an alliance of blood" between the Druze and the Jews. For
all such talk, however, the Druze are Gentiles, which automatically
turns them into frequent victims of discrimination, both by Jewish
religious law and Israeli policies.
There are
well-intentioned people who believe that this situation could be
significantly remedied if the Knesset enacted more laws against
discrimination, or if the Supreme Court passed more verdicts against it.
In fact, there is no basis for such hopes because the State of Israel
has a multitude of ways of circumventing legal obstacles. The Supreme
Court verdict which ordered the government to let the Arab villagers of
Baram and Ikrit return to their villages has never been made effective5
and the Meretz ministers in the present government did not help these
villagers either. Racist and inciteful pronouncements of Jews against
non-Jews, especially against Arabs, abound in the State of Israel. Yet I
do not recall a single instance of a Jew being convicted for such an
offense, although many Arabs have been convicted for incitement against
the Jews. I do not deny the existence of major differences between
Israeli laws and Jewish religious law. But the most important of these
differences seems to be that the manner of drafting the Israeli laws
permits obfuscation of what Jewish religious law states with bluntness.
Official
racism and discrimination pervade all walks of life in Israel. Israel is
not the only state which robbed the natives of their land, whether in
the West Bank after 1967, or by more legal means in Israel in the 1950s
and 1960s. In those decades most land owned by the Arab citizens of
Israel (let alone the refugees) was in effect filched from them. There
are many states which in the past were systematically engaged in land
robbery. The U.S., for example, robbed Indians of their land,
transforming most of it into state land. Nevertheless, this land is now
available for use by any U.S. citizen. One of the differences between
Israel and other states is that the latter might have practiced racial
or ethnic discrimination in a specific period of time in the past,
whereas in Israel such discrimination still is practiced.
We need to
recognize that in Israel the real issue is discrimination not only
against the Palestinians (including those who serve in the Israeli army,
police and Shabak), but against all non-Jews. This discrimination has
the same character as that which the anti-Semites want to apply against
the Jews. Unless we understand those realities, we will not be able to
change them. But these realities include the fact that Israel practices
systematic discrimination against non-Jews because it defines itself as
a "Jewish state mandated to preserve its Jewish character."
Until the
beginning of the Jewish Enlightenment6 all Jews firmly
believed that non-Jews should be discriminated against whenever
possible. It now turns out that the Jewish Enlightenment failed to
change the attitudes of all, or perhaps even of most, Jews in this
respect. Many completely irreligious Jews still believe that for the
sake of the Jewish tradition which commanded discrimination against
non-Jews, the latter should be discriminated against in the "Jewish
state" forever.
Of course
this argument cannot justify discrimination against non-Jews. On
the contrary, it closely resembles the arguments of anti-Semites in
favor of continued (or renewed) discrimination against the Jews, to the
point of virtual identity.
Challengers
of the view that adherence to tradition justifies discrimination can be
divided into two completely different categories. Some argue that a
racist and discriminatory tradition is to be denounced in any event,
even if in the past it helped provide a state or society with some
cohesion. The advocates of this view assign to justice a priority higher
than to tradition and are accordingly willing to oppose their own or
their ancestors' tradition if it conflicts with the principles of
justice. According to this view, social reforms should aim at a removal
or change of such traditions. I fully concur with this view.
Religion
as Nationality
But there
also exists a second category of challenge to tradition. Its advocates
can be recognized by their refusal to adhere to universalist values and,
even more typically, by their hypocritical and self-interested recourse
to democratic principles. A good example of that is the behavior of a
great majority of diaspora Jews. They have always been vociferous in
demanding equal rights for themselves. Of course, in this they have been
right. Accordingly, they are right when they become enraged at opponents
abroad of equal rights for Jews and proponents of at least some
anti-Jewish discrimination who invoke the need for social continuity and
respect for tradition. For example, the current official definition of
the concept of a "Frenchman" in France or a "Turk"
in Turkey, includes the Jews of these countries. But in France before
the French Revolution the Jews living in that country were not
considered French, whether by officialdom or by common people. Likewise,
before the reforms of Kemal Ataturk, neither the Jews nor the Christians
living in Turkey were regarded as Turks. Now, both the French fascists
and the Turkish Islamic extremists want to re-enact the traditional
definition of nationality in their respective countries: a definition in
which nationality is roughly co-extensive with religion.
Let me sum
up. A solution to the problem of discrimination against non-Jews by the
State of Israel seems to me much more important than the peace process.
Such a solution, however, in turn depends on the rejection of the
linkage between Israeli policies and Jewish traditions. At the same
time, we must never lose sight of the fact that all the problems
stemming from the linkage between the state and its national character
also exist in all other Middle Eastern states, with the exception of
Turkey. All these states define themselves officially as either
"Arab" or "Muslim" or both. Needless to say, I
oppose the concept of an "Arab state" or a "Muslim
state" no less than the concept of a "Jewish state." This
is why I believe that the separation of religion from the state in all
Middle Eastem countries is a precondition of a true and durable peace
between them. Before the struggle for such a separation is crowned with
at least a partial success, we can at best expect only truces and
cease-fires, even if some of them would be dignified by naming them
peace treaties.
This applies
not only to the Arab-lsraeli conflict but also to all other Middle
Eastern conflicts. Needless to say, a truce is preferable to a war, but
it should not be regarded as a "solution." A true peace in the
Middle East can be made only between the citizens of democratic states
rigorously applying the principle of equality before the law, resting on
adherence to universalist values. Such a peace can only be established
by looking forward, not backward.
Notes:
1
Plenty of such laws exist, but since only the attorney general has the
right to charge people who seemingly contravene them, they are almost
always applied against the Arabs and hardly ever against the Jews. For
example, the late Nazi Meir Kahane was never charged for calling Arabs
"dogs" as was his custom.
2
The example given in halacha is that a Jewish woman can testify that a
single dish or several dishes are kosher. But if she testifies that many
dishes prepared for a big reception are kosher, her testimony is invalid
on the assumption that her laziness and resultant reluctance to make a
major effort could make her lie if they really were non-kosher.
3
Although this ruling is provided in the English translation of the
authoritative Talmudic Encyclopedia (under the entry "Yisha,"
"woman"), it cannot be found in any of the numerous books
dealing with Judaism in English or other foreign languages.
4
In the U.S. this ruling is accepted by the Orthodox and the
Conservatives, i.e., by the majority of American Jews. Needless to say,
neither they nor the Reform Jews (who do not accept it) ever discuss the
matter in their English-language publications.
5
The verdict was issued in 1951. Ben-Gurion's response was to order the
Israeli air force to bomb the two villages on Christmas Eve of that
year, with the adult male villagers rounded up and forced to watch from
the nearby hill as their houses were being demolished. Such practices
are possible because Israel has two systems of laws, both equally in
force. One comprises various "emergency regulations" which are
hardly ever applied against the Jews, and the other relatively liberal
laws applied whenever the Jews are concerned.
6
In the 1780s. It spread rapidly in France, Britain and Holland, slowly
in Germany and the Austrian Empire, but it began in the Russian Empire
only in the 1860s and in the Ottoman Empire even later.
(Above is an
abridged translation of an article by the author published in the
Israeli newspaper Davar on March 15, 1995. Dr. Israel Shahak, a
Holocaust survivor and retired professor of chemistry at the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, is chairman of the Israeli League of Human
Civil Rights.)
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001 Israel
Shahak & WRMEA
by the same author:
