A Practical Look at Settlements From the Israeli
Point of View
by Israel Shahak
In
contemplating the negative effects of the West Bank Jewish settlements
on any land-for-peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, we
have an obligation to look beyond what we consider just or support as
legal to what is politically possible, at least in the foreseeable
future. Since, for a variety of reasons, I don't believe that the U.S.
government will put really significant pressure on Israel in the
foreseeable future, it is important to examine what a great majority of
the Israeli public would agree to, without great difficulty, regarding
the settlements.
Incidentally,
in Israeli eyes "really significant pressure" means a delay or
halt in the delivery of new American weapons, especially aircraft, to
Israel. All the rest is of secondary importance.
The last
time any such pressure was employed was by then-Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in 1975 to force then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to
a withdrawal of some 20 miles in the Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli public
may therefore be forgiven if, after 23 years, with Israel much richer
and stronger now than it was in 1975, it does not take a renewal of such
steps seriously.
In those
circumstances any positive change of Israeli policies on the settlements
will have to be undertaken with the help of a strong section of the
Israeli public. For evaluation of the chances of such a development one
has to ignore the very small groups on the left which strongly oppose
the settlements (for example "Peace Now") and the stronger but
still-not-able-to-dictate-policy National Religious Party (NRP), which
is totally devoted to settlements.
What is most
important are the views of the bulk of the public as represented in the
Knesset by about 100 out of 120 Knesset members. This majority includes
Likud, Labor and other important parties whose basic views are by now
quite similar.
In order to
understand their common position, which I will refer to as "the
Israeli view" for the sake of brevity, one has to comprehend that
the settlements in occupied territories do not appear in the Israeli
view as one entity. Israelis draw sharp distinctions among them which
usually are ignored outside Israel.
There is
first the distinction between the settlements within "Greater
Jerusalem" and elsewhere. When speaking of "Greater
Jerusalem," I am using an Israeli urban and social term and I am
ignoring the municipal borders of Jerusalem based on the 1967
annexation. I refer, simply, to what ordinary Israelis regard as
"living in Jerusalem," which means living in a place which has
good bus connections with West Jerusalem so that one can go by bus for
shopping or evening entertainment there and return home by bus before
midnight. More than 250,000 Israelis, about 5 percent of the Israeli
population, live in such areas beyond the "Green Line" (the
cease-fire line of June 1967), while the population of all other West
Bank and Gaza Strip settlements (I exclude the Golan Heights from this
discussion) amounts to only about 80,000.
The
removal of small Jewish settlements can be done, especially by a
right-wing government.
Those
80,000, moreover, are not solidly packed in a small area closely
connected with a big Israeli city as are the Israelis of "Greater
Jerusalem," but divided into many mostly small settlements. (For
example, Kiryat Arba, the religious militant settlement overlooking the
West Bank city of Hebron, has fewer than 6,000 inhabitants.)
Even more
important is the simple fact that for a long time the majority of
Israelis have regarded living in "Greater Jerusalem" as being
"normal," while to live in any of the other settlements is
regarded--even by those who regard settling as laudable--as abnormal.
Indeed, the small numbers of settlers in all the other settlements, in
spite of the money and other forms of government support poured into
them for so long, testify to the great unwillingness of the majority of
Israeli Jews to settle in the occupied territories, except in the area
of "Greater Jerusalem."
It follows
that while it can be predicted that the bulk of Israelis, and the
parties representing them, will strongly oppose changes in the area of
"Greater Jerusalem," or concessions on the settlements of
"Greater Jerusalem," the opposition to removal of settlements
(especially small ones) outside the area of "Greater
Jerusalem" would be much weaker.
No More
"Sacred" Grounds
Indeed, even
the National Religious Party or the Gush Emunim settlers no longer dare
to appeal to the Israeli public to preserve all the settlements on
grounds that they are "sacred." Their appeals, as of December
1997, are limited to their claim that the Palestinian Authority has
contravened the agreements it signed with Israel, especially the Hebron
agreement, and therefore it should not be granted
"concessions" on any issue until it "keeps" those
agreements.
The second
important distinction which has to be considered is between the
settlements themselves and land confiscated (by various dishonest means
which I will not discuss here) by the State of Israel and
"attributed" to the settlements. It is true that among
religious Jews (about 20 percent of Israeli Jews) and, to a lesser
extent among traditional Jews (about 60 percent of Israeli Jews),
removal of Jewish settlers by Israeli soldiers from their homes will
encounter strong emotional and political difficulties.
However,
such removals have been carried out previously in 1982 in the
settlements of northern Sinai by the government of Menachem Begin under
the supervision of Ariel Sharon. Therefore, although the removal of
small Jewish settlements will cause great difficulties to whatever
government carries it out, it can be done, especially by a right-wing
government.
By contrast,
a return of Palestinian land outside the area of the settlements and not
cultivated by the settlers presents only minimal difficulties. Contrary
to Israeli propaganda, the area of land cultivated by settlers outside
the Jordan Valley area is quite small.
As is well
known, at least in Israel, about 70 percent of the West Bank area has
been confiscated by Israel. It has become Israeli "state land"
held, according to Israeli apartheid laws, solely for the benefit of
Jews, whether citizens of Israel or of other countries, and because of
that denied to Palestinians. (Even the Palestinians who have
collaborated with Israel are denied the right to live on this land or in
settlements and so are Palestinian citizens of Israel, even those who
have served in the Israeli army.)
However,
only about 16 percent of confiscated West Bank areas have been settled,
and 54 percent are empty, although formally "attributed" to
individual settlements or settlement blocks. For the great majority of
Israeli Jews, there is a great difference between returning empty land
to its Palestinian owners and dragging Jews out of their homes. The
ordinary Israeli Jew, in my view, will agree quite easily to the first
act but can be persuaded to agree to an actual expulsion only with
difficulty.
It is
therefore quite possible, whatever any Israeli government maintains, to
begin returning those uncultivated lands to their owners without too
much resistance from a majority of Israeli Jews. Such an act would, in
my opinion, constitute a better "confidence-building measure"
in the eyes of the majority of West Bank Palestinians than any act so
far proposed or carried out.
The fact
that such an act, relatively easy to carry out, has not been proposed
should raise some doubts about the real intentions of all the parties to
the Oslo process and its aftermath, but first of all about the real
intentions of the Israeli establishment.
Let me
conclude by pointing out that I am not discussing here principles or
rights but acts which, in my view, are possible in the present
situation. Politics is the art of the possible, and although people
should be true to their principles they can, at the same time, also try
to do what is politically feasible to alleviate suffering and bring
some, admittedly insufficient, modicum of justice to a very unjust
situation.
(Dr. Israel Shahak, a
Holocaust survivor and retired professor of chemistry at the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, is chairman of the Israeli League of Human
Civil Rights.)
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Source:
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by courtesy & © 2001 Israel
Shahak & WRMEA
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- by the same author:
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