The constitution of Pakistan is being re-engineered again. Well, one
must not be surprised or cry about this activity, as this
has been a trend in the ruling system of Pakistan since the
first peace of document "Objectives Resolution"
was produced on March 12, 1949. Though the ‘causes’ and the ‘needs of the time’
are given whenever this poor document is altered but the
fact of the matter remains the same that every ruler has
used the constitution to control the situation in their
favour and remain in power.
To understand the shortcomings in the
governance and the democracy in Pakistan, one must
find explanations for the weaknesses in political tolerance and
identity. Analytically, there appear to be sets of reasonably
autonomous and enduring beliefs and values within Pakistan that have
important consequences in the societal and ultimately political
spheres. Popular expectations of authority, in particular toward
those who govern, must be understood and presumably altered if
Pakistan is to realize the kind of system that permits a sustainable
democracy. Legal provisions and better people seeking public office
are important, but progress in building civic virtue or civic spirit
will also have to occur. In the absence of such a culture, factional
anarchy and authoritarian rule remain thrive.
Historically, the political culture in Pakistan is a
strong product of its past that links to the pre-partition British
Rule. What Pakistan's leaders knew best from this inheritance was
the so-called viceregal system that made little or no provision for
popular awareness or involvement. The system was designed to rule
over a subjected population and intended to keep order and collect
taxes. In fact, what the British bequeathed was often a
contradiction between theories of governance and their practices.
Ideals of representative government and equality before the law were
incomplete transformations. The territorial issues and border
conflicts with India, the socio-cultural differences within the
country, struggle for a share of power between the states and the
early death of the founder of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah are those
realities which not only politicized the policy-making elites and
their willingness in introducing the fair democratic procedures but
also encouraged the non-democratic elements including the army.
Consequently, even after half a century the country could not get
cleaned from the feudal, tribal and
punchayat systems and
sectarian segregations and the public has been left untutored in the
kind of vigilance usually needed to hold political leaders
accountable.
Pakistan was without a formal, written constitution
until 1956. The democratic myths that so often sustain a system were
thus only weakly instilled, and precedents were created that
undermined those few parliamentary and democratic norms that could
be drawn upon. It did not help that in the early years non-party
prime ministers were appointed by the head of state rather than by
those who had to appeal to an electorate. Mass involvement in
politics, if defined by rallies and periodic opportunities to vote,
certainly increased over the years. Street demonstrations helped to
bring down governments, namely Ayub's in 1968, Yahya Khan's in 1971,
and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's in 1977. Yet while these actions
strengthen feelings of efficacy, none can be easily equated with
democratic processes.
The weakness of democratic practices in Pakistan can
be explained in many ways. Some observers stress constitutional and
electoral provisions among institutional factors said to have
undermined responsible and responsive government. Others point to
the quality of Pakistan's leadership over most of Pakistan’s
history, namely, that Pakistan has been let down by unprincipled
political figures motivated by raw ambition, material gain and
vested interests.
The subsequent education of people to accept democracy through
meaningful participation in their political affairs is minimal.
Without wide public awareness and an effective public opinion, the
political system gives wide berth to ambitious and corrupts
political leaders. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the two times
democratically elected prime ministers, are the perfect examples of
the corruptions at the leadership level. Instead of including a
broad citizenry in the political process, power is concentrated in
the hands of an elitist bureaucracy and over-ambitious military. The
country's semi-feudal system with its sets of obligations and
hierarchy provided similarly inhospitable soil for building a
democracy. The traditional power brokers, the wealthy, large
land-holding families, are prepared to give their allegiance to
anyone who promised to protect their material interests and way of
life.
The civilian government succumbed to military rule that sought to
legitimize itself with the public by attacks on democratic ideals
and political institutions in hopes of leaving them in disrepute as
well as decay. Despite the revival of democracy from time to time,
it is predictably held in suspicion. One of the tenets of civil
society, the concept of a legitimate opposition, naturally won
little acceptance among competing political elites or within the
larger public. These outpourings marked a breakdown in law and
order, and reflected above all an absence of trust in authority.
Such anomic movements may have heralded demands for better
representation but in themselves were more the signs of frustration
and anger than of belief in a more pluralistic, tolerant political
system.
The election of 1970, the first to be held on the basis of universal
suffrage, appeared to be a watershed for democracy. Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto -who was the creation of a military ruler, Ayub Khan -
provided the strongest hope for a politics that would involve the
masses and socialize them to democratic and socialist ideals. The
mass mobilization of the electorate by his Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP) succeeded in communicating with many rural voters. People
listened to Bhutto and other political leaders not only at rallies
but over radio and television. The issues of the day were
articulated forcefully and clearly, such that voters had meaningful
choices to make. And these masses demonstrated that they could throw
off, if it really served their interests - the feudal assumptions
that usually shaped their attitudes and actions. Yet rather than
build up his popular movement on the democratic ideals of supremacy
of the people, in power Bhutto shed much of the regime's populist
ideology and strongly personalized his rule rather than working
through participatory institutions and educating the public to their
value. By his 1977 re-election campaign, he had come to rely on
feudals and discarded many of the political allies who had stood
with him earlier. Above all, Bhutto had failed to deliver the fair
governance and a true democracy. While he had opened up for the
future the possibility of more participatory politics, the civic
virtues that would be needed to buttress it were in the end
discredited.
Pakistan could indeed become a crucible for
determining whether extensions of democratic practice are likely to
provide a successful means of accommodating militant Islamic
political movements. The country's experiences suggest that militant
Islamic parties may be moderated when given a democratic option - an
honest opportunity to compete. The popularity of Islamic parties in
many cities and towns, according to this reasoning, is largely of a
protest variety, coming from the denial of a more open political
process. However, many analysts also seriously question the
compatibility of Islamic doctrines with more liberal conceptions of
democracy. Very likely the best reason to insist on the
appropriateness of democratic values and institutions is that, from
an ideological-constitutional standpoint, democracy does not
represent an alien goal. Pakistan was founded on many of these
precepts, and as ideals they continue to resonate widely. Such basic
ideas as representative government and rule of law remain part of
the Pakistani society's aspirations for itself. To be sure, there
has been a rejection at the emotional level of some aspects of
western culture and disgust with secular political institutions.
Replacement with authentic Islamic institutions is the widely
accepted ultimate objective. The kind of
civil society and underlying culture appropriate for Pakistan should
not be expected to mimic western experiences. Any democracy in
Pakistan will have to take into account certain Islamic
prescriptions and other legacies.
Experiencing and mixing western democratic system with Islamic laws
will continue to create more loopholes in the ruling mechanism.
In general, opportunities for a fair governance, true democracy and
civil society in Pakistan can only flourish when
democratic practices are allowed to prevail under the supremacy of
unchanged constitution. The repeated dismissal or overthrow of
elected regimes, alterations in the constitutions that suit to
existing ruler, leaves no positive memory and little chance for
institutions to adapt and supportive values to root.
Though the elections sometime are tainted by design or overzealous
officials, the regular elections will ultimately provide democratic
practices to the contestants in which losers accept defeat and
winners are magnanimous in victory, the greater the chances for an
electoral process capable of surviving inevitable challenges. The
inefficient and incapable politicians may continue to participate
and seek power but the people of Pakistan will also
learn and understand better the democratic values and
responsibilities over the period.
The writer
is a Sydney-based freelance journalist and a political analyst.
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