There’s nobody like the British. The things they get
excited about!
A terrible thing has happened. Their Prime Minister lied
to them! The whole country is in an uproar.
And - how awful! – the intelligence services have trimmed
their findings to suit their political boss. Astounding!
In Israel, the United States and most other places around
the world, this would hardly rate a paragraph on an inside page. The Prime
Minister lied? So what else is new?
On the contrary, if the Prime Minister had been caught
telling the truth, now that would have been a sensation. What, he spoke
the truth? The Prime Minister? What’s going on? What is he up to?
And the intelligence services? In children’s tales, spies
risk their lives to uncover secrets and save their country.
How wonderful! And what a pity that it has so little to do
with reality.
The intelligence services do indeed look for facts, but
mostly for the facts that suit their political bosses. They submit reports
to governments, but woe betide the service chief whose report does not
suit their agenda. In short, there is hardly an intelligence report that
is not trimmed to suit the powers that be, that does not twist the facts
or is not an outright lie.
That explains the successive failures of the intelligence
agencies in almost all countries and in almost all emergencies.
A few notorious examples should suffice:
A German communist named Victor Sorge, who was spying in
Japan, provided Soviet intelligence in 1941 with a detailed report on the
imminent German attack on the Soviet Union, with the exact time to the
minute. Stalin refused to accept this report and threatened to send to
Siberia any intelligence officer reporting such nonsense. As a result,
hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers were killed or captured when
the German attack ("Operation Barbarossa’) materialized exactly on time.
This was so incredible, that a modern Russian historian has invented an
original explanation: Stalin was just about to attack Hitler when he was
forestalled at the last moment.
Or the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 1941.
American intelligence had many indications that the Japanese were
intending to destroy the US Pacific Fleet. But when the attack actually
came, the American navy was totally unprepared. That was so strange, that
another conspiracy theory gained credibility: President Roosevelt
practically invited the Japanese attack, so as to be able to drag his
unwilling country into the war.
Before the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers, there
were several warnings, but all of them got stuck in the intelligence
pipelines. This has lent credibility to another conspiracy theory: that it
was all organized by the Mossad, who had even warned the Jews working in
the Towers no to report to work on that particular day.
The failures of Israeli intelligence make an impressive
list. On the eve of the establishment of the state, the intelligence
services (or their forerunners) did not foresee the attack of the Arab
armies that almost destroyed the new state in its infancy. In May 1967,
the intelligence services were flabbergasted when Gamal Abd-al-Nasser sent
an army into Sinai (and started the chain of events that led to the June
1967 war). The Egyptian revolution of 1952 caught Israeli intelligence
unawares, as did the Iraqi revolution of 1958, as did the Khomeini
revolution in Iran, in spite of the fact that the Israeli intelligence
services practically had the run of the country in the Shah’s Iran.
The most notorious example was, of course, the eve of the
October 1973 war. Israeli army intelligence knew everything: the Egyptian
war plan and the assembly positions of all Egyptian units. It saw them
taking up these positions. It overheard dozens of messages that should
have left no doubt whatsoever that the attack was imminent. A day before
the war, a highly placed Egyptian who was spying for Israel confirmed the
reports about the coming attack. And yet, the Israeli army was taken by
surprise when the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal without effective
opposition.
The official investigation into this intelligence failure
gave birth to the Hebrew expression "conceptsia" – meaning that army
intelligence ignored all the obvious facts because it was trapped in its
own "concept" that the Egyptians were quite unable to attack.
This is a natural phenomenon. According to "Gestalt"
psychology, a person tends to absorb information in line with the existing
pattern in his mind and tends to ignore information that contradicts it.
Like other people, intelligence operatives have
preconceived ideas and prejudices. Bits of information that do not fit in
just do not pass through the pipelines. They are denied and disappear.
But there is another, much simpler explanation. Every
intelligence chief has a political boss – a President, Prime Minister,
Secretary of Defense, Home Secretary. His career depends on the boss, and
so do the chances of advancement of his underlings. When the boss appoints
the service chiefs, he chooses people who are close to his political
agenda. In time, the whole intelligence service becomes an apparatus for
supplying the boss with the information he wants to hear and suppressing
less agreeable information. That is true not only in dictatorships like
those of Stalin, Hitler and Saddam, but also in most democratic regimes.
The successful intelligence chief is an acrobat who walks between the
raindrops and knows how to adapt the intelligence data to the interests of
the political leadership.
For example: during most of the years between the Six-day
and the Yom-Kippur wars, Israel was ruled by Golda Meir, a tough and
not-very-wise person. She never dreamt of returning the territories that
had just been conquered. Her Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, the idol of
the masses at the time, declared that Sharm-al-Sheikh (in South Sinai) was
more important than peace. In order to sell these goods to the Israeli
public, it was necessary to present the Arab armies as a negligible force,
bands of nincompoops who would throw away their boots and run the moment
they saw an Israeli mess sergeant. Army intelligence officially decided
that an Egyptian attack had only "low probability". Two thousand Israeli
soldiers – and who knows how many Egyptians and Syrians – paid for this
with their lives.
From Golda to George, quite a short jump. Bush wanted a
war in Iraq. He could not disclose the real aim to the public: to get his
hands on the fabulous oil riches of that country, to dominate the world’s
oil supplies and acquire a stranglehold on the economies of Europe, Japan
and any other potential competitor. He needed a much more simple and
compelling reason: Saddam has weapons of mass destruction, he is in
cahoots with Bin-Laden, he is about to attack the United States.
To be convincing, authoritative-sounding intelligence data
were required. So the CIA produced documents, already known to be false,
showing Saddam trying to acquire uranium in Niger. Put this into the
President’s State of the Union Address and hop! there’s your war.
Did the Americans get upset when the lie was discovered?
Not at all. So the President lied. Big deal. And the CIA helped him to
lie. Big deal again. The important thing is that the sons of Saddam have
been killed in a "targeted elimination", Israeli-style. How wonderful!
But in the UK, things work differently. There you have a
political class and clear standards of what’s "done" and what’s "not
done". The intelligence service tailored its reports to the requirements
of Tony Blair. He did not have to ask. As always, the intelligence people
knew what he needed and supplied the stories that could be "sexed up" to
taste. One of the experts informed the BBC, and sometimes later his body
was found. Maybe he really committed suicide. Maybe.
England is in an uproar, and perhaps Blair and his
henchmen will suffer for it. In Israel, thank God, there is no such
problem. Our intelligence chiefs blabber, blabber and blabber, and their
prattle always suits the needs of the Prime Minister. When Prime Ministers
change, the prattle of the intelligence chiefs changes accordingly.
Their masters’ voice.