The party’s growing strength was reflected in the municipal elections in the capital, Karachi, in April 1958. The elections to the ninety-six seats of the Karachi Municipal Corporation were contested closely and stirred much popular enthusiasm. The elections were used by most parties as a trial run before the expected general elections and were widely viewed as a gauge of the popularity and prowess of various parties, much like the municipal elections in Algeria in 1991 . The Jama’at did unexpectedly well in these elections. It contested twenty-three seats, winning nineteen. Although the Karachi electorate was by no means typical of Pakistan as a whole, the election results gave the party momentum. The American Embassy reported to the secretary of state that the Jama’at did surprisingly well in the elections, producing "the most striking aspect of the election results." Remember, there was no September 11, no Al-Qaeda, No Taliban, no “terrorism.” However, the party that won a high proportion of seats it contested, coming second after the ruling Muslim League party with sixty-one seats was not acceptable.
Unaware of the grand designs in Washington, the Jama’at began preparing for the expected national elections taking the results as a sign of greater victories to follow. Its hopes were, however, dashed when on 7 October 1958, Generals Iskandar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan staged a military coup, dismissed the civilian government, and shelved the plans for national elections. Thanks to the beginning of American interference in the internal politics in Pakistan.
As always, the coup was apparently a response to the crisis of governability in the country. In fact, the fear of the Jama’at’s possible showings in the national elections also played an important role. In his memoirs, General Mirza pointed to the possibility of greater Islamization of Pakistan as a primary reason for staging the coup. To underscore his point, he named the Jama’at and its leader, Mawlana Mawdudi. The decade of authoritarian rule that followed the coup, however, did not make the Jama’at realize that the course that it undertook will never take it to the destination is aspires to reach.
The same plot was repeated in 1977 when Jama’at and other parties were used to dislodge Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and in turn they were dumped with yet another coup leader. More ominous but the least lesson learning experience for the Jama’at was the military’s intervention in the political process under the leadership of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. The US was wary of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s brining Muslim countries to a single platform and launching Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The US supported the opposition led by Jama’at, which mobilized people with the slogan of establishing Islamic order in the country.
Concerned with the growing strength of the opposition, the government resorted to massive rigging of the election results in March 1977. This action produced a national crisis and led to nation-wide agitations. The Jama’at served as the bulwark behind the opposition in the streets, as well as in the parliament. The party not only provided the organizational muscle needed for launching a national protest movement, but through its sole promise of establishing Islamic Model in articulating the opposition’s demands, it was able to further push the government into retreat. So central was the role of the Jama’at, that on 16 April 1977, when Prime Minister Bhutto sought to diffuse tensions, he visited Mawdudi’s house. When that initiative produced no result, he excoriated Mawdudi before the parliament as the person responsible for the agitations across the country. The prime minister clearly saw the crisis as a struggle between the PPP and the Jama’at.
As the crisis escalated, the government agreed to negotiate with the opposition over holding fresh elections. Lengthy negotiations produced a working arrangement. However, before a final agreement could be hammered out, the military took action. In July, the military staged a coup and took over the reigns of power, depriving Jama’at from a historic win in the elections. It was obvious from the rigged elections in March. The political fortunes of the Jama’at would have been considerably different if the elections had been fair or a repeat elections had not been disrupted by the coup.
Jama’at’s dominance was apparent. During the months of agitations following the March elections, the Jama’at’s political prospects became considerably more promising. The government lost legitimacy among the masses, and the PNA grew in strength. The Jama’at spear-headed the PNA’s agitations for new elections and as a result was the greatest beneficiary of the rise in the alliance’s fortunes. By July, the Jama’at had become confident of a solid electoral victory, largely because of its central role in managing the antigovernment agitations. Had the military not intervened in the political process and fresh elections had been held, or had the military held elections soon after the coup as it promised to do, the Jama’at would have most probably reaped the benefits of its promise for establishing an Islamic system in Pakistan.
The secular forces have always been a hurdle to Muslims’ dream of living by Islam. In this case even the US supported Shah of Iran was sufficiently alarmed by the prospects of a more "Islamic Pakistan" to actively lobby with secular elements in the PNA in 1977 to break up the alliance and shore up the PPP government.
Irrespective of General Zia’s Islamic credentials and accommodation of religious parties, the military coup of 1977 was in many ways similar to the Algerian coup of 1992. It denied the Jama’at their chance to make a serious bid for power. It was, however, contended with not being alienated from the state. Zia consciously sought to keep both the PNA and its Islamic elements involved in the political process. In fact, Zia appealed to the PNA in general, and the Jama’at in particular, to legitimate the coup and the following military rule. And the party did, just as it has done in the case of General Musharraf in return of his vague promises. Zia’s combination of keeping the Jama’at away from the polls, especially during the 1977-1979 period, and increasing its involvement in the political process created significant impediments to the party’s progress towards its states goal.
As a rule by now, Jama’at has always had to settle for the niche in the political process as its moment pass. The consequences became apparent in the national elections of 1985, 1988, and 1990 in which religious parties performed modestly. In 1993 in particular, it fielded 103 candidates to contest for national assembly seats and 237 to contest for provincial seats. Still, in these elections the Jama’at received only three national assembly seats, and six provincial assembly seats. Qazi Husain Ahmad, the party’s chief, who had attained the status of a national figure during the campaign, was not even elected to the parliament. The Jama’at received only 3.9 percent of the popular vote compared with 37.9 percent for the PPP and 39.9 percent for the Muslim League.
In a word, Ayub, Zia and Musharraf regimes’ policy of keeping the Jama’at involved in the political process confused and weakened the party both ideologically and politically. It was torn between its ideological commitment, which Zia was serving, and its political interests, which Zia was hurting. Similarly, during Musharraf’s regime, it is torn between its political interests and its larger objective, struggling towards which makes it an accomplice to “terrorism.” The religious alliance in politics (MMA) has effectively abandoned the Taliban and their government; the interests of the people in the tribal areas; Islamic activists who become victims of constant raids and detention, and support for the Madrassas.
It shows that state will always be prone to US interference and the secular order will never allow Islamic parties to take power. State will always react violently when necessary to avoid religious parties from taking power.
c) The Impact of divisions
Another disadvantage of joining the secular order of the prevailing modes of governance is that it promotes division among Muslims. Forming political parties to establish an Islamic state results in competition among Islamic parties to the advantage of secular political actors. It does not make any sense on the part of two Islamic parties fishing for votes while chanting the same slogans, vowing to establish an Islamic order.
Again Pakistan is a good example where the Jama’at’s political fortunes have suffered greatly as a result of its competition with other Islamic parties. If it were just two political parties -” an Islamic and a secular -” it would have been better. But in the chaos of a multitude of political parties, nothing could be more senseless than having a dozen or so Islamic parties, all vowing to establish an Islamic system. Over the years, the size of the religious vote has increased considerably in Pakistan, but the Jama’at’s share of it has grown at a much more modest pace. They have actually confused the masses as well, because their objectives and competition have been reduced to winning seats rather than establishing a system.
The Jama’at has been unable to monopolize the fruits of its toil and the enthusiasm which its politics has generated. This too is a facet of the movement’s diversion from its actual course to participation in the political process. It constitutes the default barrier of secular order to Islamic alternative. What is presented as the “diversity of political expression” is actually a trap to neutralize the force of any movement that has the potential to undermine the existing tyrannical order.
The prevailing governing systems only encourage competition for votes and political spoils. There is no scope for transforming the oppressive and exploitative structures, whether these are in the US, Pakistan, Egypt or Algeria. Encouraging a multitude of political parties, leads many opportunists to form a party in the name of Islam and help the establishment divide the Islamic vote, form a variety of alliances, and thereby diffuse a revivalist challenge against the state.
Some times this struggle among religious parties becomes a mockery of Islam and their stated objectives. For instance when Jama’at was there and fielding 151 candidates in the national election of December 1970 to challenge the two secular parties (PPP and Awami League), was there any need for the Ulema to form two new parties and join the political fray other than self-interest. Their titles are more funny than their objectives: the Party of Ulama of Islam (Jami’at-i Ulama-i Islam, JUI) and the Party of Ulama of Pakistan (Jami’at-i Ulama-i Pakistan, JUP). It shows as if Ulama of Pakistan and Ulema of Islam have different objectives and approaches and the two cannot work together with Jama’at and the three want different kinds of Islamic model for Pakistan.
This leads general public into rightly believing that all ulama and those who form and run religious parties are enticed into the political arena for purposes other than Islam. In May 1971 the Jama’at held the nationwide Glory of Islam Day. The success of the campaign convinced the ulama parties of the potential gains of an Islamic platform in the elections. Unwilling to leave the spoils of political success to the Jama’at, the two ulama parties entered the political arena to claim their share of the electoral votes. Similar conclusions led an array of smaller religious parties to also appeal to the religiously-conscious electorate. By the time the elections were held in 1970, there were at least eight religious parties in competition against each other.
The result was that the Jama’at, the two ulama parties, along with the other contenders for the Islamic vote, divided the Islamic vote among themselves, often to the advantage of the secular parties. In eighty-two electoral constituencies of the Punjab where the PPP did best, 260 candidates from Islamic, and another 114 independent candidates who appealed to Islam divided the vote. The impact of this competition becomes more apparent when one looks to the student elections in that province during the same time period, when the Jama’at’s student union, which alone represented the Islamic vote, defeated PPP’s student union.
Joining the political process in the form of different Islamic parties reduce the work towards the vision of Islam to a competition among versions of Islam. Despite years of experience and more articulate political strategies Jama’at lost to the ulama parties which had just joined the process. Jama’at was challenging PPP candidates, where as the lama parties were undermining Jama’at’s position. As a result the three principal Islamic parties won eighteen seats among them, with JUP and JUI winning seven each and the Jama’at only four. In provincial elections, JUP won eleven seats, JUI ten, and the Jama’at just four.
Without the competition among the so-called ulama of Islam and the politicians of Islam, more people would have trusted a single party with a straight forward agenda and the share of that single party in the parliament would have been more than eighteen (and more than twenty-five in provincial assemblies). The results also show that the Islamic vote bank is confused by such rival claims and competition in the name of Islam. The basic question that an ordinary man in the streets asks is: Which Islam shall we vote for? And which Islam would the ulama implement who do not even like pray together?
The elections of 1993 confirm these findings. In these elections the ulama-led parties once again refused to join in, and instead formed two separate electoral alliances of their own. In several constituencies, these alliances competed with Jama’at candidates, once again dividing the Islamic vote to the advantage of secular parties. The ulama-led parties together won five seats to the National Assembly and eight seats in the provincial assemblies -” two seats more than the Jama’at in each case. In fact, the competition among parties that appealed to the Islamic vote is responsible for Benazir Bhutto’s return to the office of prime minister. In twelve constituencies, the Jama’at, religious parties, and the right-of-center Muslim League together tallied more votes than the PPP, but shared that vote to PPP’s advantage. The twelve seats would have given the Muslim League the elections and denied Benazir Bhutto the premiership.
All this clearly shows the futility of joining in the corrupt political system, rather than working as a pressure group, as a movement, to transform the system. Islamic movement’s participation in the political process as a political party leads to divisions and distraction from the real goal -” the establishment of an Islamic model of governance for the benefit of the rest of the world.
d) The difference between a movement and a political party
A movement leads toward a revolution for transformation. A movement challenges the status quo. A political party works within a system that sustains and consolidates the status quo. There cannot be many Islamic revivalist political parties with competing ideological positions and organizational models like the secular parties working within a system.
Islamic movement has realized by now that it is commonly believed that the more revolutionary the ideological outlook and organizational model of an Islamic revivalist party, the more pronounced its danger to the state and the status quo will be. So you cannot be a political party as well as an agent of meaningful transformation to the system at the same time.
In the prevailing political process, revolutionary ideologies and organizational models are not acceptable and tend to constrict revivalism politically. In a word, the very alternative vision that makes revivalism a threat to authoritarian regimes, in the prevailing political processes becomes the undoing of revivalism when transformed into political parties.
The Jama’at was initially conceived of as a community with limited membership. The party’s founders emphasized quality and caliber of the members over their numbers. The party adopted a disciplinary approach and based its power on its cadre of workers. Despite many years of joining the political process, it could not open its doors and change its structure like other political parties. This half political party and half-revolutionary approach leave the group in the middle of nowhere. It continues to view itself as a "community" and an "organizational weapon," although its aims and participation patterns are those of a mass party.
A disciplined and exclusive membership can project significant power in a revolutionary party, not a political party. That is why that element makes Jama’at the most noted political machine in Pakistan, capable of nationwide action in agitations and elections. The example of its role in this regard is the anti-PPP agitations which followed the elections of 1977. However, for being part of the system, it is in no position to translate its energy into establishing an alternative Islamic model.
Similarly, the Jama’at’s ideology as a movement no more fits its needs as a political party. The Jama’at continues to harp on the theme of Islamic revolution, whereas the party has accepted the legitimacy of the system in which it fully participates. The party’s avowed aim, therefore, does not correctly define its actual agenda. Moreover, due to joining the political process, the Jama’at had to redefine revolution as a process initiated from above rather than from below, and through education rather than cataclysmic social change.
Being part of the existing political order, none of the religious parties’ interpretation of revolution appeal to the electorate, nor do they actually espouse revolution as the term is understood in the West. These parties’ rhetoric claims to be revolutionary, but it advocates incremental change from above for which there seems to be no will or way in the first instance. This brings to the fore an important dilemma in current approaches to Islamic revivalism: the West takes revivalist rhetoric at face value without a proper examination of its content. This definitely leads to Islamophobia, however and unfortunately, without actually making a single inch towards establishing an alternative Islamic model.
Islamic movement in 21st century has enough lessons to take from the experience of others before them. The incongruities in the religious parties’ organizational model and ideological position go a long way in explaining the paradox of their weakness. They also suggest that broad conclusions about the potential of Islamic revival in the light of religious parties’ performance are no longer very useful.
Variations in plan of action of various Islamic movements from Jordan to Malaysia, as well as the sociopolitical context in which these movement operate in different countries are undoubtedly sufficiently. But they get enough experience and lesson to make necessary course correction and produce far effective outcomes than what has been done so far. More important, the Jama’at’s case shows that the more these movements change labels and approaches to join a political process, the more those incongruities come to light, forcing Islamic movement to change for the better.
To the question, “Is Islamic revival a thing of the past?” the right answer is: No. It is instead the authoritarian regimes that would soon be history despite Bush’s re-election and full throttle support to them. The repressive regimes all over the Muslim world have been acutely aware of the predicament before them, particularly so after 9/11. From there onwards, even being a good puppet -” remember Saddam -” is not a guarantee to survival if one is a hurdle in the way toward perfecting global totalitarianism.
The widening chaos has placed greater pressure on Islamic activists to streamline Islamic movement in accordance with the global imperatives before the Ummah. During the 20th century, Islamic movements remained content with token concessions from the ruling regimes and took comfort in their popularity at one or another point in time. Those who joined the political process have enough time to assess their lackluster or brilliant performance -” both to no avail. This is enough to put an end to any illusions the Islamic movements may still have about its political prospects.
Wherever the movement has turned itself into political parties, the parties’ leadership and rank-and-file members have become embroiled in intense debates over the fate of the parties because winning elections and getting a few portfolio is not the objective in the first place. The futility of making religious parties’ alliances still keeps the public confused about the ultimate objectives of these parties and the absent ways and means to achieve these objectives.
Although the ultimate direction the Islamic movement may take is not as yet clear, there is little doubt that it is set to take upon a course of change. What is important to note is that the direction of change that the realities of the existing political order in the Muslim world have necessitated is away from doctrinaire authoritarianism. The more repressive and dictatorial the political process in the Muslim world has become, the more clear this imperative has become.
In the final analysis, participation in the political process can do more to promote authoritarianism than working as a pressure group for reformation. Participation in the fake democratic systems of Musharraf, Mubarak, Karzai, Karimov, Alawi and others simply consolidates and legitimizes authoritarianism in the service of global totalitarians in Washington. Rather than legitimizing dictatorships, boycotting participation in the political process will push it in directions that will constrict its tyrannical growth. Those concerned with the possible threat of neo-cons domination of the world should take the implications of their participation in the existing process seriously, and they should continue to push for greater reform of the governing systems in Muslim countries, despite the possibility of being demonized and marginalized.
Download pdf version from: http://www.icssa.org/Is_Islamic_revival.pdf
 For a subjective definition of Islamic revivalism, see John O. Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan" and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "Activist Shi’ism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon" in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 345-402 and 403-56.
 For a discussion of this issue in the case of Algeria, see John Entelis, "The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of Algeria," Problems of Communism 41 (May-June 1992): 71-81.
 See Hanna Batatu, "Shi’i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da’wah al-Islamiyah" in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Shi’ism and Social Protest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 179-200.
 Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 66.
 On routinization of Iran’s revolution, see Fouad Ajami, "Iran: the Impossible Revolution," Foreign Affairs 67 (Winter 1988/89): 135-55; Ruhollah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran After Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992).
 See Leslie Gelb, "The Free Elections Trap," New York Times, 29 May 1991; and Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," The Atlantic, February 1993, 89-98.
 Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Modernization in Southeast Asia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 1-98; end Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970). The linkage between secularism and democracy is most clearly presented in Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 298-311.
 In this regard, see John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," Middle East Journal 45 (Summer 1991): 427-40; Robin Wright, "Islam and Democracy," Foreign Affairs 71 (Summer 1992): 131-45; John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, "Islam’s Democratic Essence," Middle East Quarterly (September 1994): 3-11; and Timothy D. Sisk, Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in the Middle East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).
 On the importance of this issue, see Mumtaz Ahmad, "Pakistan"’ in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington: Indiana university Press, 1988), 230-40.
 On the Jama’at’s history and the life and thought Of its founder, Mawlana Mawdudi, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’t-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: university of California Press, 1994); Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat" in Marty and Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, 457-530; Abad Shahpuri, Tarikh-i Jama’at-i Islami (History of Jama’at-i Islami) (Lahore, Pakistan: Idarah-i Matarif-i Islami, 1989).
 See Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology Of Mawlana Mawdudi" in Donald E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 1966), 371-97; Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Risalah-i Diniyat (Treatise on Religion)(Hyderabad, India: n.p., 1932); Mawdudi, Tahrik-i Islami ki Akhlaqi Buniadin (The Basic Ethical Principles of the Islamic Movement) (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1968); and Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Jama’at-i Islami; Tarikh, Maqsad, Awr La’ihah-i Amal (Jama’at-i Islami: History, Aims, and Plan of Action), (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1963).
 See Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State" in John L. Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 99-133. Also see Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Jama’at-i Islami ki Untis Sal (Twenty Nine Years of Jama’at-i Islami) (Lahore, Pakistan: Shu’bah-i Nashr’u Isha’at-i Jama-at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1970).
 On the Jama’at’s influence in the Arab World, Afghanistan, Iran, and Malaysia, see Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 154-55; Abdelwahab El-Effendi, "The Long March From Lahore to Khartoum: Beyond the ‘Muslim Reformation’," British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin 17 (1990): 138-39; Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68-70, 80; Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Zainah Anwar, Islamic Fundamentalism in Malaysia (Kualalampur, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1989).
 See Binder, Religion and Politics; and Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi."
 Chaudhri Rahmat Ilahi’ Pakistan Main Jama’at-i Islami Ka Kirdar Jama’at-i Islami’s Activities in Pakistan) (Lahore, Pakistan: Markazi Shu’bah-i Nashr’u Isha’at-i Jama’at-i Islami, Pakistan, 1990).
 The anti-Ahmediya agitations demanded the formal declaration of the Ahmediya sect as a non-Muslim minority, and the nonrecognition of Bangladesh campaign opposed Pakistan’s promise to India in the cease-fire agreement of 1971 to recognize the independence of its former province of East Pakistan. On the two movements, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jama’at-i Tulaba in Pakistan," Middle East Journal 46 (Winter 1992): 67; and Salim Mansur Khalid, ea., Talabah Tahrikain (Student Movements), 2 vole., (Lahore, Pakistan: Al-Badr Publications, 1989).
 S. M. Zafar, Through the Crisis (Lahore, Pakistan: Book Center, 1970); Kawthar Niyazi, Awr Line Kat Ga’i (And the Line was Cut) (Lahore, Pakistan: Jang Publications, 1987); Niyazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan: The Last Days (New Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing House, 1992); and `Abdul-Ghafur Ahmad, Pher Martial Law A-Giya (Then Came the Marital Law) (Lahore, Pakistan: Jang Publications, 1988).
 Huntington, The Third Wave, 75-85.
 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Pakistan: Islamic State, Ethnic Polity," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 16 (Summer 1992): 81-90.
 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1960), 92.
 Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), 193.
 Cheryl Benard, and Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Government of God" Iran’s Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), chap. 1; and Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 24-84.
 A primary example of such approaches to fundamentalism may be found in Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983); and R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985).
 Esposito has argued that there are hidden agendas behind the current approach to Islamic fundamentalism, namely, it serves the need to protect entrenched U.S. foreign and defense policy interests; see Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 168-212.
 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown.
 See the incisive analysis of Ira M. Lapidus in "Islamic Political Movements: Patterns of Historical Change" in Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus, eds., Islam, Politics, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 3-16.
 Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 125-38.
 In this regard, see Daniel Brumberg, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Democracy, and the Gulf War" in James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), 186-208.
 Esposito and Piscatori, "Islam and Democratization."
 Aljomand, The Turban for the Crown; and Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
 U.S. Embassy, Karachi, dispatch #678, 4/10/1958, 790D.00/4-1058, National Archives, Washington, DC.
 U.S. Embassy, Karachi, dispatch #939, 4/11/1958, 790D.00/4-1158, National Archives.
 U.S. Embassy, Karachi, tel. #2708, 5/1/1958, 790D.00/5-158, and despatch #1094, 790D.00/5-2958, National Archives.
 The Jama’at, moreover, defeated Awami League and National Awami Party (with one seat each), both of which were deemed far more powerful than the Jama’at. The U.S. Embassy attributed the Jama’at’s success to its good rapport with the Muhaiir (migrants from India) community of Karchi, owing to its long history of social work among that community, its good choice of candidates, and the efficiency of its campaign. The Jama’at, it is reported, spent a total of Rs.40,000 on the campaign, an average of less than Rs.2000 per candidate; U.S. Embassy, Karachi, despatch #1094, 790D.00/5-2958, National Archives.
 See unpublished memoirs of General Iskandar Mirza, 109-10.
 Personal interview with Kawthar Niyazi, minister of religious affairs from 1971 to 1977, Islamabad, May 1990.
 Niyazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 91.
 See Ijtima’ Se Ijtima’Tak (19741983); Rudad-i Jama’at-i Islami, Pakistan (From Convention to Convention [1974-1983]; Proceedings of Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan) (Lahore, Pakistan: Jama’at-i Islami, 1989).
 Akhlaqi Jang (Karachi), 29 March 1990, 20-23.
 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jama’at-i Islami 1977-1988." International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (May 1993): 261-83.
 Sharif al Mujahid, "Pakistan’s First General Elections," Asian Survey 11 (February 1971): 159-71.
 Nasr, The Vanguard, chaps. 4 and 10.
 See Mujahid, "Pakistan’s First General Elections."
 Ibid Majahid
 Report on the General Elections Pakistan 1970-1971 (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, nd), vol. 2.
 Herald (Karachi), February 1994, 67.
 Mawdudi, Jama’at-i Islami Ki Untis Sal, 38-41.
 Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," 490-96.
 Sayyid Abu’l-Ala Mawdudi, The Process of Islamic Revolution, (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1980).